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AUGUST 2017 – AUGUST 2018
CASE LAW ON AMERICAN INDIANS
Thomas P. Schlosser*
I.

UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT
1.

Patchak v. Zinke

No. 16-498, 138 S. Ct. 897 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2018). Neighboring
landowner brought action challenging decision of the Secretary of
the Interior to take a parcel of land into trust on behalf of the Match–
E–Be–Nash–She–Wish Band of Pottawatomi Indians for casino use
pursuant to Indian Reorganization Act (IRA). The District Court,
646 F. Supp. 2d 72, dismissed action on the basis of standing and
the Quiet Title Act. Landowner appealed. The appellate court, 632
F.3d 702, reversed. Certiorari was granted. The Supreme Court, 567
U.S. 209, 132 S. Ct. 2199, 183 L. Ed. 2d 211, affirmed. On remand,
the District Court, 109 F. Supp. 3d 152, entered summary judgment
against landowner, based on Congress’s enactment of the Gun Lake
Trust Land Reaffirmation Act, which reaffirmed the Department’s
decision to take the land into trust and stripped federal courts of
jurisdiction over actions “relating to” the land. Appeal was taken.
The appellate court, 828 F.3d 995, affirmed. Certiorari was granted.
The Supreme Court held that Gun Lake Trust Land Reaffirmation
Act did not violate separation of powers.

*

Mr. Schlosser represents Tribes in fisheries, timber, water, energy, cultural
resources, contracting, tax and federal breach of trust. He is a director of Morisset,
Schlosser, Jozwiak & Somerville, where he specializes in federal litigation,
natural resources, and Indian tribal property issues. He is also frequently involved
in tribal economic development and environmental regulation. In 1970s, Tom
represented tribes in the Stevens’ Treaty Puget Sound fishing rights proceedings.
Tom has a B.A. from the University of Washington and a J.D. from the University
of Virginia Law School. Tom is a founding member of the Indian Law Section of
the Washington State Bar Association and also served on the WSBA Bar
Examiners Committee. Tom is a frequent CLE speaker and moderates an
American
Indian
Law
discussion
group
for
lawyers
at
http://forums.delphiforums.com/IndianLaw/messages. He is a part-time lecturer
at the University of Washington School of Law and Seattle University School of
Law.

51

2.

Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren

No. 17–387, 138 S. Ct. 1649 (U.S. May. 21, 2018). Property owners
brought action against Indian tribe, which owned land adjacent to
owners’ property, seeking to quiet title to property that owners
claimed to have acquired through adverse possession before original
owner sold adjacent property to the tribe. Tribe moved to dismiss
based on tribe’s sovereign immunity. The Superior Court, Skagit
County, Dave Needy, J., denied motion, and Susan K. Cook, J.,
granted summary judgment to property owners. Tribe moved for
direct discretionary review. After accepting review, the Supreme
Court of Washington, 187 Wash. 2d 857, 389 P.3d 569, affirmed.
Certiorari was granted. U.S. 138 S. Ct. 543. The Supreme Court,
Justice Gorsuch, held that: (1) in rem nature of property owners’
action did not, by itself, establish that suit was outside scope of
tribe’s sovereign immunity, and (2) Court would not affirm on
alternative common-law ground that tribe could not assert sovereign
immunity because suit related to immovable property located in
Washington state that was purchased by the tribe in same manner as
a private individual. Vacated and remanded.
3.

Washington v. U.S.

No. 17-269, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (Mem), 86 USLW 361,
186 USLW 4400 (U.S. Jun. 11, 2018). The judgment is affirmed by
an equally divided Court. Justice Kennedy took no part in the
decision of this case.
II.
A.
4.

OTHER COURTS
Administrative Law
Nakai v. Zinke

No. 16–cv–1500, 279 F. Supp. 3d 38 (D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2017).
Applicant for Indian preference brought pro se action against
Department of Interior (DOI) and various DOI employees,
challenging the denial of her application by the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA). Applicant moved to complete the administrative
record, defendants moved to dismiss, and applicant moved to strike
some of defendants’ arguments from their reply brief in support of
their motion to dismiss. The District Court held that: (1) action was
rendered moot by Solicitor of the Interior’s remand of application
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back to the Regional Director of the BIA for reconsideration of
applicant’s application based on her Indian heritage pursuant to
regulation governing Indian preference for BIA positions; (2) DOI’s
interpretation of the Lumbee Act, to preclude applicant for Indian
preference from receiving benefit, based on her Lumbee heritage,
was substantially justified, and thus, applicant would not be entitled
to attorney fees under the Equal Access to Justice Act, even if she
would prevail and be granted Indian preference on remand; and
(3) district court would decline to strike arguments in DOI’s reply
brief supporting its motion to dismiss. Motion to dismiss granted;
motions to complete the record and to strike denied.
5.

Cherokee Nation v. Nash

No. 13–01313, 267 F. Supp. 3d 86 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2017).
Cherokee tribe brought action seeking declaration that descendants
of freed non-Indian slaves no longer had rights to citizenship in
tribe. Department of Interior (DOI) and putative class of freed slaves
intervened as defendants. DOI filed counterclaim for declaration
that freed slaves retained tribal citizenship under Article 9 of the
Treaty with the Cherokee, 14 Stat. 799 (July 19, 1866). Parties filed
cross-motions for summary judgment. The District Court held that:
(1) term “all,” as used in treaty that guaranteed “all the rights of
native Cherokees” to freed slaves of the tribe, was unambiguous in
its scope and covered the entirety of rights with no limitation
whatsoever; (2) treaty gave qualified free slaves the right to
citizenship in Cherokee Nation to same extent that native Cherokees
had; and (3) extant descendants of freed slaves, whose ancestors had
resided in Cherokee Territory within six months of ratification, were
entitled to rights of Cherokee citizens, including citizenship.
Ordered accordingly.
6.

Mdewakanton Sioux Indians of Minnesota v. Zinke

No.16–2323, 264 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D.D.C. Sep. 1, 2017). Putative
Indian tribe and three individuals who allegedly belonged to tribe
brought action against Secretary of Department of the Interior and
United States, alleging that Department’s failure to consult
regarding proposed amendments to constitution of Indian
community and changes to federal land assignment system violated
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and seeking declaratory
and injunctive relief. Defendants moved to dismiss for failure to
exhaust administrative remedies and on statute of limitations
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grounds. The District Court held that: (1) plaintiffs failed to show
that waiver was warranted for their failure to exhaust administrative
remedies; (2) district court would convert government’s motion to
dismiss into motion for summary judgment; and (3) claim accrued,
and six-year limitations period for suits against the United States
began to run, when plaintiffs contacted Department requesting
consultation regarding constitutional amendments and land
assignments. Motion granted.
7.

Forest County Potawatomi Community v. United States

No. 15–105, 270 F. Supp. 3d 174 (D.D.C. Sep. 12, 2017). Indian
tribe brought action under Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
against the United States, challenging Department of Interior’s
(DOI) decision not to approve an amendment to a gaming compact
between the tribe and State of Wisconsin under Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act (IGRA). After a second tribe and its gaming
authority were granted leave to intervene as defendants, 317 F.R.D.
6, plaintiff moved to supplement the administrative record, and
intervenors moved both to supplement the administrative record and
to exclude documents from the administrative record. The District
Court held that: (1) administrative record would not be
supplemented with records of meetings and calls among DOI
official, Wisconsin, and another tribe; (2) administrative record
would not be supplemented with news reports and other public
documents relating to the proposed amendment; (3) administrative
record would not be supplemented with four gaming compacts and
compact-related agreements between other tribes and other states;
(4) administrative record would not be supplemented with
documents referred to in legal memoranda submitted by another
tribe that opposed the amendment; (5) administrative record would
not be supplemented with documents related to a settlement
agreement in a separate suit involving another Indian tribe; and
(6) administrative record would not be supplemented with financial
reports that were not considered by DOI. Plaintiff’s motion denied,
and intervenor defendants’ motion granted in part and denied in part.
8.

Forest County Potawatomi Community v. Zinke

No. 14–2201, 278 F. Supp. 3d 181 (D.D.C. Sep. 30, 2017).
Requester, an Indian tribe, brought action against Department of the
Interior and its component agencies under Freedom of Information
Act (FOIA), seeking response to FOIA requests it had filed
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regarding documents pertaining to another tribe that sought to open
a competing gaming facility. Parties filed cross motions for
summary judgment. The District Court held that: (1) internal records
of environmental contractor that worked on competing facility were
“created or obtained” by agencies; but (2) agencies did not control
contractor’s internal records at time of FOIA request, which thus
were not agency records under FOIA; (3) documents withheld were
“commercial” within meaning of FOIA exemption applicable to
privileged or confidential commercial documents; (4) disclosure of
commercial documents did not pose serious risk to government’s
ability to receive such information in future, but (5) disclosure of
documents created a substantial likelihood of competitive harm to
applicant tribe, so documents were exempt from disclosure under
FOIA; and (6) agencies did not engage in policy or practice of FOIA
noncompliance. Department and officers’ motion granted in part
and denied in part; requester’s motion denied.
9.

County of Amador, California v. United States
Department of the Interior, et al.

No. 15-17253, 872 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2017). County
brought action against Department of Interior (DOI), challenging
record of decision announcing its intention to take land into trust for
benefit of Indian Tribe and allowing Tribe to build a casino on land.
Tribe intervened as defendant. The District Court, 136 F. Supp. 3d
1193, granted summary judgment to DOI and Tribe. County
appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) as matter of first
impression, phrase “recognized Indian tribe now under Federal
jurisdiction,” in IRA includes all tribes that are “recognized” at the
time of the relevant decision and that were “under Federal
jurisdiction” at the time the IRA was passed; (2) DOI’s
interpretation of phrase “under Federal Jurisdiction” in provision of
Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) defining an “Indian” entitled to
IRA’s benefits was best interpretation; (3) DOI’s determination that
tribe was “under Federal jurisdiction” when IRA was passed was
not arbitrary and capricious; and (4) grandfathering provision in
DOI regulation implementing Indian Gaming Regulatory Act’s
(IGRA) “restored tribe” exception was in accordance with IGRA.
Defendants’ motions granted, plaintiff’s denied.
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10.

Moody v. United States,

No. 16–107C, 135 Fed. Cl. 39 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 13, 2017). Lessees,
who had entered into five agricultural leases with Indian tribe,
brought action against United States, alleging that government
breached leases by terminating them and ordering lessees to vacate
land, and that government’s actions constituted taking without just
compensation under Fifth Amendment. Government moved to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and for failure to state
claim. The Court of Federal Claims held that: (1) there was no
privity of contract between United States and lessees;
(2) conversation between lessees and government official could not
have created implied in fact contract; (3) government lacked
authority to enter into implied in fact contract to allow lessees to
continue farming after their leases were cancelled; and (4) because
lessees alleged that government violated regulations in 25 C.F.R. §§
162.247–162.256, rather than acted lawfully pursuant to the
regulations, in terminating leases, lessees could not state Fifth
Amendment takings claim. Motion to dismiss granted.
11.

Nooksack Indian Tribe v. Zinke

No. C17-0219, 2017 WL 5455519 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 14, 2017).
This matter comes before the Court on Plaintiff’s motion for
reconsideration of the Court’s Order denying Plaintiff’s motion for
preliminary injunction and granting Defendants’ motion for
summary judgment (Dkt. No. 43). This lawsuit was initiated by
members of the Nooksack Tribal Council, including “holdover”
members who continued to occupy their seats on the Council
after their terms expired in March 2016. Defendants consist of the
Department of the Interior (“DOI”), Bureau of Indian Affairs
(“BIA”) and members of the agencies’ leadership. On May 11,
2017, the Court granted Defendants’ motion for summary judgment,
holding that it did not have subject matter jurisdiction because the
holdover Council lacked authority to bring its claims on behalf of
the Tribe during the period where DOI had refused to recognize
tribal leadership. The Court subsequently denied Plaintiff’s motion
for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff filed a motion for
reconsideration and Defendants responded. Before the Court
addressed the motion, the parties filed a joint motion for a 120-day
stay of proceedings. The Court granted the stay and the parties filed
a joint status report at the end of the 120-day period. During the stay,
the parties conducted negotiations that resulted in the execution of a
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Memorandum of Agreement (“MOA”) between Robert Kelly, the
Chairman of the Tribal Council, and Michael Black, the ActingAssistant Secretary of Indian Affairs. The MOA outlines a process
through which the federal government will once again recognize the
Nooksack Tribal Council as the governing body of the Nooksack
Tribe. Under the MOA, the Tribe must hold a special election and
the results must be endorsed by the BIA. In addition, the MOA
reiterated that DOI only recognizes actions taken by the Nooksack
Tribal Council prior to March 24, 2016 when a quorum existed. The
special election is scheduled for December 2, 2017 to replace the
“held-over” council members. In the parties’ joint status report,
Plaintiff asked the Court to immediately renote its motion for
reconsideration. Plaintiff’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
12.

Allen v. United States of America

No. C16-04403, 2017 WL 5665664 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2017). In
this Indian tribal rights action, plaintiffs move for summary
judgment. Federal defendants oppose and cross-move for summary
judgment. For the reasons herein, federal defendants’ motion is
granted and plaintiffs’ motion is denied. Plaintiffs are a group of
Indians seeking to organize as the Ukiah Valley Pomo Indian Tribe
on the Pinoleville Rancheria where they reside. The Rancheria is
already home to the Pinoleville Pomo Nation (previously known as
the Pinoleville Indian Community and the Pinoleville Band of Pomo
Indians), a federally recognized tribe, members of which also reside
on the Rancheria. Though the two groups were previously a single,
unified tribe, our plaintiffs have since relinquished their
membership in the Pomo Nation. Based on the foregoing, the
Regional Director acted within her discretion to determine that a
tribe cannot be comprised of only a subset of the Indians residing on
a reservation. Because plaintiffs comprise only a part of the group
for whom the Pinoleville Reservation was established and are only
some of the Indians living on the Reservation, the Regional Director
was within her discretion when she denied them the right to seek
organization. Her determination follows from the language of the
statute and implementing regulation and is not “arbitrary,
capricious, an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance
with law.”
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13.

Bahe v. Office of Navajo

No. CV-17-08016, 2017 WL 6618872 (D. Ariz. Dec. 28, 2017).
Plaintiff Hedy Bahe, on behalf of her deceased husband, Jerry Bahe,
seeks judicial review of the administrative decision by Defendant
Office of Navajo and Hopi Indian Relocation (ONHIR) denying
Plaintiff relocation benefits under the Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act.
Before the Court are the parties’ cross-motions for summary
judgment. The motions are fully briefed and neither side requested
oral argument. In 1882, a reservation was established in northeastern
Arizona for the Hopi Nation and “such other Indians as the Secretary
of Interior may see fit to settle thereon.” Bedoni v. Navajo-Hopi
Indian Relocation Comm’n, 878 F.2d 1119, 1121 (9th Cir. 1989).
Members of the Navajo Nation subsequently settled on the
reservation alongside the Hopi. “The Hopi and Navajo [Nations]
coexisted on the 1882 reservation for seventy-five years, but became
entangled in a struggle as to which [nation] had a clear right to the
reservation lands.” In 1962, this district court found that the two
tribes held joint, undivided interests in most of the reservation,
which was called the “joint use area” (JUA). Twelve years later,
after establishment of the JUA failed to solve inter-tribal conflicts
over the land, Congress passed the Navajo-Hopi Settlement Act in
1974. The Act authorized the district court to make a final partition
of the reservation after mediation efforts between the nations had
failed. See Sekaquaptewa v. MacDonald, 626 F.2d 113, 115 (9th Cir.
1980.) The Act also directed creation of the ONHIR’s predecessor,
the Navajo-Hopi Relocation Commission, to provide services and
benefits to help relocate residents who were located on lands
allocated to the other nation as a result of the court-ordered partition.
See Bedoni, 878 F.2d at 1121-22; 25 U.S.C. § 640d-11. To be
eligible for relocation benefits, a Navajo applicant bears the burden
of demonstrating that he or she was (1) a legal resident on the Hopi
Partitioned Lands (HPL) on December 22, 1974, and (2) a head of
household on or before July 7, 1986. 25 C.F.R. § 700.147. In May
2005, Jerry Bahe, a member of the Navajo Nation, applied for
relocation benefits. In October 2005, ONHIR denied Bahe’s
application, finding that he “did not reside on [HPL] on December
22, 1974.” In November 2005, Bahe timely appealed ONHIR’s
decision. Bahe died in 2006, after which Plaintiff continued to
pursue the claim pursuant to ONHIR’s surviving spouse policy. An
independent hearing officer (IHO) held an appeal hearing. In 2011,
the IHO issued a written opinion upholding the ONHIR’s denial,
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finding that “[t]he greater weight of evidence shows that, on
December 22, 1974, [Jerry Bahe] was a legal resident of Jeddito
Island, an area which was later partitioned for the use of the Navajo
[Nation].” The IHO’s ruling became Defendant’s final decision
when it affirmed the ruling on July 18, 2011. Plaintiff then
commenced this action for judicial review pursuant to 25 U.S.C.
§ 640d-14(g) and the Administrative Procedure Act (APA), 5
U.S.C. § 701 et. seq. On appeal, Plaintiff makes four arguments:
(1) the IHO applied an incorrect legal standard when assessing
whether Plaintiff was a resident of HPL at the time of the statutory
cut-off date; (2) even if the IHO applied the correct legal standard,
his decision is not supported by substantial evidence; (3) the IHO’s
credibility findings are arbitrary and capricious; and (4) the ONHIR
breached its fiduciary duty to Plaintiff. The court found that
Defendant’s decision denying Plaintiff relocation benefits is
reasonable and supported by substantial evidence. Accordingly, it is
ordered that Defendant’s administrative decision denying Plaintiff’s
application for relocation benefits is affirmed. The Clerk entered
judgment accordingly and terminated this case.
14.

Stand Up for California! v. United States Department of
Interior

No. 16-5327, consolidated with 16-5328, 879 F.3d 1177 (D.C. Cir.
Jan. 12, 2018). Community groups and Indian tribe with competing
casino brought action challenging Department of Interior’s decision
to take a tract of land into trust for the North Fork Rancheria of
Mono Indians and authorize it to operate a casino there. The District
Court, 204 F.Supp. 3d 212, granted partial summary judgment to
Department and dismissed remaining claims. Plaintiffs appealed.
The appellate court held that: (1) Indian tribe constituted a
“recognized Indian tribe” at time that Indian Reorganization Act
(IRA) was passed; (2) substantial evidence supported Department’s
conclusion that Indian tribe, as it currently existed, could trace its
roots to Indians who lived on tribe’s reservation at time that IRA
was passed; (3) court would defer to Department’s reasonable
interpretation of provision of Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA) that required an Indian casino to not be a detriment to the
surrounding community; (4) substantial evidence supported
Department’s determination that permitting Indian tribe to operate a
casino on its newly acquired lands would not be detrimental to the
surrounding community; and (5) relevant date for Department’s
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analysis of whether proposed casino would comply with Clean Air
Act (CAA) requirements was when the Department initially made
its determination, rather than when it reissued its determination on
remand. Affirmed.
15.

Chissoe v. Zinke

No. 16-5172, 725 Fed. Appx. 614 (10th Cir. Feb. 16, 2018).
Personal representative of estate of owner of restricted Indian land
appealed decision of the Interior Board of Indian Appeals (IBIA)
upholding denial of application to complete transfer of land to
Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA). The United States District Court for
the Northern District of Oklahoma, No. 4:15-CV-00166, Claire V.
Eagan, 2016 WL 5390890, affirmed. Personal representative
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Scott M. Matheson, Jr., Circuit
Judge, held that: (1) BIA had not made final decision to acquire
property; (2) Secretary of the Interior acted reasonably in
interpreting applicable statute and regulation to require that
applicant be living at time of agency’s decision regarding whether
to take restricted Indian land into trust; and (3) remand was
warranted for district court to determine whether personal
representative was entitled to exception to exhaustion requirement.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
16.

Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v.
Zinke

No. 17–0038, 304 F. Supp. 3d 70 (D.D.C. Mar. 29, 2018). Plaintiff
Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians (formerly known
as the Cheboygan Band) describes itself as “the last ‘landless’ tribe
in Michigan.” This case arises out of the fact that plaintiff has been
seeking formal federal recognition, which would give the Burt Lake
Band (or “the Band”) a number of rights and benefits, since at least
1935. In 1935, a group of the Band’s ancestors petitioned the Bureau
of Indian Affairs (“BIA”) within the Department of Interior to be
recognized under the Indian Reorganization Act of 1934. Am. The
agency has never issued a final decision on the 1935 Petition. In
1985, the Band filed another petition. The 1985 petition went
unanswered for more than 20 years, until it was denied in 2006.
Plaintiff did not seek review of the 2006 decision. In 2014, the BIA
initiated a rulemaking to reform the federal recognition process, and
it solicited comments on a proposed rule that would revise the
existing regulations. Fed. Acknowledgment of Am. Indian Tribes,
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79 Fed. Reg. 30766 (proposed May 29, 2014) (to be codified at 25
C.F.R. pt. 83) (“Proposed Rule”). One of the provisions in the
proposal sent out for notice and comment, would have allowed
Tribes to re-petition the agency for recognition under certain
circumstances. Ultimately, the agency chose not to adopt that
provision, stating that “allowing for re-petitioning by denied
petitioners would be unfair to petitioners who have not yet had a
review,” and identifying other efficiency concerns. Fed.
Acknowledgment of Am. Indian Tribes, 80 Fed. Reg. 37862, 37875
(July 1, 2015) (to be codified at 25 C.F.R. pt. 83) (“2015
Regulations”). Plaintiff filed this lawsuit on January 9, 2017 and
filed an amended complaint on June 1, 2017. The amended
complaint includes seven constitutional and statutory claims.
Counts I, II, and III challenge the agency’s failure to issue a final
decision on the 1935 Petition under the APA, the Due Process
Clause, and the Equal Protection Clause of the 5th Amendment.
Counts IV, V, and VI challenge the agency’s 2015 Regulations
under the APA, the Due Process Clause, and the Equal Protection
Clause. Counts IV, V, and VI will proceed because the Court finds
that plaintiff has standing to challenge the 2015 Regulations.
17.

Nipmuc Nation v. Zinke

No. 14–40013, 305 F. Supp. 3d 257 (D. Mass. Mar. 30, 2018). The
Nipmuc Nation (“Plaintiff”, “Nipmuc Nation” or “Petitioner 69A”),
has filed a Petition for Review of a final administrative
determination by Secretary Ryan Zinke, the United States
Department of the Interior (“DOI”), Bureau of Indian Affairs
(“BIA”), Office of Federal Acknowledgment, and the United States
of America (collectively, the “Defendants”). Plaintiff seeks a ruling
that the Defendants’ Final Determination against federal
acknowledgment was arbitrary, capricious, and abuse of discretion,
against the substantial evidence and not in accordance with the law
(Count One); that the BIA failed to follow the applicable regulations
set forth in 25 C.F.R. § 83 et seq. and therefore, the Defendants’
Final Determination against federal acknowledgment violated
Plaintiff’s procedural due process rights (Count Two); and that the
BIA’s refusal to consider evidence in support of Plaintiff’s Petition,
despite its consideration of such evidence in the applications of other
similarly situated tribes seeking federal acknowledgment, deprived
Plaintiff of its right to equal protection under the law (Count Three).
Essentially, Plaintiffs seeks a declaration that it has satisfied the

61

legal criteria for federal acknowledgment as an Indian tribe under
the laws of the United States of America. Accordingly, Plaintiff
asked the Court to vacate Defendants’ Final Determination against
federal acknowledgment and reverse it, or, alternatively, to vacate
the Final Determination and remand Plaintiff’s Petition to
Defendants with instructions to reconsider the Petition consistent
with the findings of this Court. The Court found that Defendants’
determination that Plaintiff failed to satisfy the requisite criterion for
federal acknowledgment was not arbitrary or capricious.
Additionally, the Court did not find that either the procedure utilized
by the Defendants, or their decision denying Plaintiff federal
acknowledgment deprived the Plaintiff of its Fifth Amendment right
to due process. Defendant’s motion granted.
18.

Butte County, California v. Chaudhuri

No. 16-5240, 887 F.3d 501 (D.C. Cir. Apr. 13, 2018). County in
which parcel of land was located that Indian tribe sought to have
taken into trust to operate a casino on brought action against
National Indian Gaming Commission (NIGC) challenging Secretary
of Interior’s decision to take land into trust. The District Court, 197
F. Supp. 3d 82, granted summary judgment to NIGC. County
appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) Secretary did not abuse
her discretion in reopening administrative record on remand;
(2) Secretary’s grant of 15-day extension to tribe to submit its
response to county’s submission of new evidence was not improper;
(3) Secretary acted within her authority in setting a 20-day deadline
for county to respond to tribe’s expert’s rebuttal report; and
(4) Secretary’s determination that members of modern-day tribe
were biological descendants of members of pre-1850 tribe was not
arbitrary and capricious. Affirmed.
19.

Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of Colusa Indian
Community v. Zinke

No. 17-15245, No. 17-15533, 889 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. May 2, 2018).
Indian tribe with a casino, citizens’ groups, and individuals brought
action to enjoin the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) from taking
parcel of land into trust for another Indian tribe so that it could build
a casino and hotel complex. The District Court, No. 2:12-cv-03021TLN-AC, 2015 WL 5648925, granted summary judgment to
defendants and, 2017 WL 345220, denied reconsideration. Plaintiffs
appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) BIA had authority
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under the Indian Reorganization Act (IRA) to take parcel of land
into trust for the tribe seeking to build a casino; (2) BIA’s decision
under IRA, that the Indian tribe seeking to build a casino needed
BIA to take parcel of land into trust for it for economic development,
was not arbitrary and capricious; (3) BIA’s misdescription of parcel
of land in notice of final agency determination did not render its
decision arbitrary and capricious; (4) BIA satisfied Indian Gaming
Regulatory Act’s (IGRA) requirement for consultation with the tribe
that owned a casino; (5) regulatory definition of “nearby” Indian
tribe, with which BIA was required to consult under IGRA, was not
arbitrary and capricious; (6) district court did not abuse its discretion
when it struck, as outside administrative record, expert declaration;
(7) BIA’s decision under IGRA, that mitigation measures would
prevent detrimental harm to surrounding community from new
Indian casino, was not arbitrary and capricious; and (8) BIA’s final
environmental impact statement (FEIS) satisfied National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) requirements. Affirmed.
20.

Stand Up for California! v. United States Department of
Interior

No. 1:17-00058, 315 F. Supp. 3d 289 (D.D.C. May 30, 2018). A
Gambling advocacy group brought action against the Department of
Interior, challenging adequacy of the administrative record for
judicial review of the Department’s decision to approve acquiring
land in trust for Wilton Rancheria tribe of American Indians,
seeking to supplement the administrative record and seeking
discovery in form of privilege log from Department. The case arose
from the Department’s finalization of acquisition of land for the
tribe’s proposed casino, which was within an entirely different plot
of land than tribe had proposed in its application to Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA). The District Court held that: (1) plaintiff failed to
show any unusual circumstances warranting supplementation of
administrative record; (2) plaintiff made prima facie showing of bad
faith warranting production of privilege log; and (3) defendant did
not wholesale waive its deliberative process privilege for documents
with consultant. Motion to supplement administrative record denied
and motion for discovery granted.
21.

Chinook Indian Nation v. Zinke

No. C17-5668 RBL, 326 F. Supp. 3d 1128 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 20,
2018). This matter is before the Court on Defendants’ Motion to
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Dismiss. Plaintiffs are descendants of the historic Chinook Indian
tribe and bring suit against the Department of the Interior (DOI) and
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA) in an effort to compel those
agencies to add the Chinook Indian Nation (CIN) to the list of
federally acknowledged tribes. Plaintiffs also challenge regulations
promulgated by Defendants which prohibit the CIN from repetitioning the federal government for tribal acknowledgment.
Finally, Plaintiffs seek access to funds from a 1970 Indian Claims
Commission judgment currently held in trust by the DOI for the
Lower Band of Chinook and Clatsop Indians. Defendants move to
dismiss all claims, arguing that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction to confer federal acknowledgment on the CIN.
Defendants also argue that Plaintiffs lack standing to challenge the
re-petition ban, and that the CIN’s claims regarding the funds held
in trust is not a final agency action which can be challenged under
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). For the reasons that
follow, the Motion to Dismiss is granted in part and denied in part.
This Court reaches the same conclusion as the Burt Lake court and
determines that Plaintiffs have standing to challenge the re-petition
ban contained in the 2015 federal acknowledgment regulations.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss Claims 2–5 seeks to have the Court
prematurely address the merits of a re-petition under the 2015
regulations. At this juncture, however, the Court must construe the
Amended Complaint in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party and accept as true all well-pleaded allegations of material fact.
Accordingly, the Court will not dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims
challenging the re-petition ban at this stage of the litigation.
Defendants’ motion to dismiss claims 2–5 is denied.
B.

Child Welfare Law and ICWA
22.

State in Interest of P.F.

No. 20160247, 405 P.3d 755 (Utah Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2017). The
State petitioned to terminate mother’s parental rights to child. The
Juvenile Court, No. 1032776, terminated parental rights. Mother
appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) the placement of child
with a non-Native American foster family did not violate the Indian
Child Welfare Act (ICWA), and thus the trial court could consider
the bond child had with foster family as grounds for good cause to
depart from the ICWA placement preferences, and (2) the trial court
was not required to provide special weight to the testimony of
mother’s expert. Affirmed.
23.

Matter of Adoption of B.B.

No. 20150434, 417 P. 3d 1 (Utah Aug. 31, 2017). Birth father, a
member of a Native American tribe, moved to intervene in adoption
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matter after birth mother, a member of the same tribe, had executed
a voluntary relinquishment of parental rights, in which she listed her
brother-in-law as child’s father, and adoption agency had received
custody of the child. Following its initial granting of birth father’s
motion to intervene, the Third District Court denied on
reconsideration birth father’s motion to intervene and denied birth
mother’s motion to withdraw her consent to the termination of her
parental rights. Birth father appealed. The Supreme Court held that:
(1) birth father was a parent under the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA) and had right to notice and to intervene in the adoption
proceedings; (2) birth father had custody of child under the ICWA;
(3) adoption proceedings were involuntary, not voluntary, as to birth
father (4) trial court’s order accepting birth mother’s consent to
child’s adoption under the ICWA and terminating her parental rights
was not properly presented to the Supreme Court for review; and
(5) any defect in the timing of birth mother’s consent to adoption of
child did not deprive trial court of subject-matter jurisdiction.
Reversed and remanded.
24.

In Interest of S.E.

No. ED 105382, 527 S.W. 3d 894 (Mo. Ct. App. Sep. 12, 2017).
Child protection proceedings were initiated after mother’s Indian
children were alleged to have been abused and neglected. Children’s
tribe intervened in the proceedings. State then filed a motion to
terminate mother’s parental rights. Following a hearing, the Circuit
Court terminated mother’s parental rights. Tribe appealed. The
appellate court held that: (1) Indian tribe had standing to appeal the
judgment independently of mother; (2) alleged invalidity of
mother’s consent to termination of parental rights and trial court’s
alleged error in certifying child protection worker as an expert
witness under the Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did not result
in manifest injustice, and thus plain error review was not
appropriate; and (3) no manifest injustice resulted from alleged
insufficiency under ICWA of the trial court’s findings in support of
the termination of parental rights, and thus plain error was not
appropriate. Affirmed.
25.

In re A.F.

No. D072226, 18 Cal. App. 5th 833 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29, 2017).
After health and human services agency filed dependency petition
on behalf of Indian minor child and recommended that child remain
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in her maternal aunt’s care, child’s paternal grandmother filed
de facto parent request, request for review of agency’s placement
decision, and request to change a court order. After jurisdictional
and dispositional issues were bifurcated at contested jurisdiction and
disposition hearing, the Superior Court made jurisdiction finding of
dependency, and subsequently entered dispositional order placing
child in the care of grandmother. Mother appealed. The appellate
court held that: (1) Indian tribe’s letter indicating its placement
preference did not modify statutory placement preferences for
Indian children, and (2) order placing child with her grandmother
complied with statutory placement preferences. Affirmed.
26.

Interest of K.S.D.

No. 20170272, No. 20170273, 904 N.W. 2d 479 (N.D. Dec. 7,
2017). County Social Services filed petition to terminate mother’s
and father’s parental rights to Native American children. The
Juvenile Court terminated father’s parental rights, and father
appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) evidence supported
findings that children were deprived, that deprivation would
continue, and that father’s continued custody would likely result in
serious emotional or physical damage to children; (2) active efforts
were made to provide remedial services and rehabilitative programs
designed to prevent breakup of family, as prerequisite to termination
of parental rights, under Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA);
(3) under ICWA, qualified expert testimony was required on
whether father’s continued custody of children was likely to result
in serious emotional or physical damage to children. Remanded.
27.

In Interest of J.J.T.

No. 08-17-00162, 544 S.W. 3d 874 (Tex. App. Dec. 20, 2017).
Department of Family and Protective Services filed petition to
terminate parental rights to child, who was member of Navajo
Nation. After denying the Navajo Nation the right to intervene in the
proceedings, the District Court terminated parental rights of both
parents and ordered child to remain in foster home. The Navajo
Nation formally intervened pursuant to the Indian Child Welfare Act
(ICWA) and filed a motion requesting a placement hearing. Navajo
Nation then filed notice of appeal. The appellate court held that:
(1) Navajo Nation had standing to appeal under ICWA; (2) ICWA
section allowing tribe to intervene in child custody proceedings for
an Indian child preempted state rule requiring a written intervention
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pleading; and (3) evidence was sufficient to establish beyond a
reasonable doubt that mother’s continued custody of child was
likely to result in serious emotional or physical damage to the child,
and was not in the child’s best interest. Reversed and remanded.
28.

Matter of IW

No. 115997, 419 P.3d 362 (Okla. Civ. App. Dec. 29, 2017). State
petitioned to terminate parental rights of father of minor children of
Native American descent, alleging father, who resided in Kansas,
failed to correct conditions which led to minor children’s deprived
status after he pled no contest to domestic battery for spanking one
child who suffered significant bruising. The District Court
terminated father’s parental rights. Father appealed, raising issues
under state and federal Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA). The
appellate court held that: (1) expert was qualified to testify regarding
placement of minor children, and (2) expert testimony was
insufficient to support required finding under ICWA that continued
custody of children with father was likely to result in serious
emotional or physical damage to children. Reversed.
29.

State in Interest of A.J.B.

No. 20160954, 414 P.3d 552 (Utah Ct. App. Dec. 29, 2017).
Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) moved to terminate
mother’s parental rights to her minor child. The Eighth District
Juvenile Court terminated mother’s parental rights. Mother
appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) child’s relocation, after
initial custody determination, to community within exterior
boundaries of Indian tribe’s reservation did not divest Juvenile
Court of jurisdiction, and (2) Juvenile Court did not abuse its
discretion by declining to contact tribal court before terminating
parental rights. Affirmed.
30.

Kiva O. v. State Department of Health & Social Services

No.S-16605, 408 P.3d 1181 (Alaska Jan. 5, 2018). Office of
Children’s Services (OCS) sought authority of court to consent to
medicating, over mother’s objection, Indian child in OCS’s custody
with both an antidepressant and mood stabilizer, as recommended
by child’s psychiatrist. The Superior Court granted OCS’s request.
Mother appealed following denial of her request for a stay and
motion for reconsideration. The Supreme Court held that:
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(1) mother had fundamental constitutional liberty and privacy right
that was substantially burdened by OCS’s request for authority to
medicate child over her objection; (2) OCS had compelling interest
in child’s medical care, as factor in determining whether trial court
could override mother’s fundamental constitutional liberty and
privacy right by granting OCS’s request to medicate child over
mother’s objection; (3) evidence supported finding that treating
child with antidepressant was in child’s best interests; (4) evidence
supported finding that there were no available treatments less
intrusive than treating child with antidepressant; and (5) evidence
was insufficient to support finding that mood stabilizer was least
intrusive available treatment to address child’s medical needs.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
31.

Diego K. v. Department of Health & Social Services,
Office of Children’s Services

No. S-16374, 411 P.3d 622 (Alaska Feb. 23, 2018). Office of
Children’s Services (OCS) petitioned for removal of Indian child
from parents’ custody. The Superior Court ordered child removed
from her parents’ home. Parents appealed. The Supreme Court
remanded for additional findings. Following remand, the Superior
Court issued order clarifying its removal findings. Parents appealed.
The Supreme Court held that information from status hearings,
including unsworn statements made by OCS workers, could not be
used by trial court to support its order authorizing removal of Indian
child from parents’ custody. Vacated and remanded.
32.

Nguyen v. Gustafson

No. 18-522, 2018 WL 1413463 (D. Minn. Mar. 21, 2018). This
matter is before the Court on Plaintiff’s Motion for a Preliminary
Injunction. The underlying facts of this action concern divorce
proceedings between Plaintiff James V. Nguyen and Defendant
Amanda G. Gustafson. Gustafson is an enrolled member of the
Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community, while Nguyen is not a
member. Nguyen and Gustafson were married in Las Vegas, Nevada
in 2014, and are the parents of a minor child. Both parties now reside
in Minnesota. In June 2017, Nguyen filed for dissolution of marriage
in California state court, as he resided in California at that time. In
July 2017, Gustafson filed for dissolution of marriage in the
Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community Tribal Court (“Tribal
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Court”), a defendant in the current action. Defendant Henry M.
Buffalo, Jr., Judge of the Tribal Court, was assigned the case. The
California state court held a two-day evidentiary hearing to discuss
custody and visitation. Upon receipt of a Tribal Court order dated
August 10, 2017, in which that court confirmed its intent to proceed
with the case, the California state court dismissed the proceedings
before it. Shortly thereafter, Nguyen moved to Minnesota and filed
for dissolution of marriage in Hennepin County. In his filings,
Nguyen disclosed that he was not currently employed and did not
receive any earned income, with the exception of some rental
income from a leased property. He also alleged that although
Gustafson was not currently employed, she received per capita
payments as a member of the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux
Community. On January 8, 2018, the Hennepin County court stayed
Nguyen’s action as a matter of judicial expedience and comity,
pending the proceedings in Tribal Court. In October 2017, Nguyen
moved to dismiss the proceedings in Tribal Court, asserting that the
court lacked personal and subject matter jurisdiction. Judge Buffalo
issued a written ruling on November 10, 2017, in which he found
that the Tribal Court had both subject matter and personal
jurisdiction and had a substantial interest in continuing to exercise
its jurisdiction. Nguyen then sought an appeal with the Court of
Appeals for the Shakopee Mdewakanton Sioux Community (the
“Tribal Court of Appeals”). He requested permission to appeal
under the collateral order doctrine, and in the alternative, asked the
Tribal Court to certify the November 10, 2017 decision for
interlocutory appeal. On December 11, 2017, the Tribal Court
denied Nguyen’s request for certification, and also found that his
motion to dismiss did not fall within the collateral order doctrine.
On January 30, 2018, the Tribal Court of Appeals denied Nguyen’s
request for an appeal under the collateral order doctrine, and because
it was not certified for interlocutory appeal. On March 7, 2018,
Nguyen filed this action for injunctive and declaratory relief
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1331, under which non-Indians may bring a
federal common law cause of action challenging tribal court
jurisdiction. He seeks a declaration that the Tribal Court lacks
jurisdiction over the dissolution proceedings and that proper
jurisdiction rests in state court. In addition, he seeks a preliminary
injunction to halt all current proceedings in Tribal Court and to
prohibit any defendant from prosecuting Gustafson’s position in that
court. Nguyen contends that he will suffer irreparable harm if forced
to complete discovery and participate in proceedings in a court
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system that lacks jurisdiction, and that he is likely to succeed on the
merits of his contention that the Tribal Court lacks jurisdiction. The
Court denied Plaintiff’s Motion for Preliminary Injunction.
33.

Matter of L.D.

No. 17-0419, 414 P.3d 768 (Mont. Mar. 27, 2018). In child
protection proceeding, the District Court terminated mother’s
parental rights. Mother appealed. The Supreme Court held that:
(1) Department of Health and Human Services could not passively
rely on inaction of Indian tribe to satisfy burden under Indian Child
Welfare Act (ICWA) to actively investigate and ultimately make
formal inquiry with tribe for conclusive determination of child’s
tribal membership eligibility, and (2) trial court could not rely on
mother’s stipulation or acquiescence that the Indian Child Welfare
Act (ICWA) did not apply to child to satisfy its threshold duty to
obtain conclusive determination from Indian tribe of child’s tribal
eligibility. Reversed and remanded.
34.

In re Williams

No. 155994, 915 N.W. 2d 328 (Mich. May 18, 2018). Foster parents
petitioned to adopt children, whose biological father was member of
Indian tribe, after father signed consent to termination of his parental
rights. Father intervened and moved to withdraw his consent to
termination of his parental rights. The Macomb Circuit Court, No.
2012-000291-NA, denied father’s motion, and the Oakland Circuit
Court, No. 2015-837756-AM, denied foster parents’ adoption
petitions. Foster parents and father appealed. The Court of Appeals,
320 Mich. App. 88, 902 N.W. 2d 901, affirmed in part, reversed in
part, vacated in part, and remanded. Father applied for leave to
appeal, which application was granted, 501 Mich. 870, 901 N.W. 2d
856. The Supreme Court held that: (1) specific adoptive placement
was not required for father’s consent to termination of his parental
rights to be valid; (2) father was not required to have executed any
additional consent in order to be statutorily-entitled, under the
Michigan Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA), to withdraw his
consent to termination of his parental rights; and (3) father’s status
as participant in child protection proceeding did not preclude father
from benefiting from consent-withdrawal provision of the Michigan
Indian Family Preservation Act (MIFPA). Reversed and remanded.
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35.

In re C.A.

No. D073229, 24 Cal. App. 5th 511 (Cal. Ct. App. May 23, 2018).
Dependency proceeding was initiated regarding child born with
amphetamine and methamphetamine in her system at birth.
Following determination that Indian Child Welfare Act (ICWA) did
not apply to child’s presumed father or biological father, the
Superior Court, No. J519280, terminated mother’s parental rights to
child. Mother and presumed father appealed. The Court of Appeal
held that:(1) record demonstrated ICWA did not apply based on
biological father’s initial claim of Native American heritage; (2) as
an issue of apparent first impression, presumed father’s claim of
Native American heritage was insufficient to trigger ICWA notice
requirements; and (3) record supported finding that mother was not
entitled to parent-child relationship exception to adoption to
preclude termination of parental rights. Affirmed.
36.

Jane Doe 1 v. The Corporation of The President of The
Church Of Jesus Christ Of Latter Day Saints, et al.

No. 2:17-CV-0300, 2018 WL 3603087 (E.D. Wash. Jul. 6, 2018).
Before the court is Defendants the Corporation of the President of
the Church of Jesus Christ of Latter Day Saints and LDS Family
Services’ Motion for Summary Judgment. The Court has reviewed
the record and files herein and is fully informed. For the reasons
discussed below, the Motion is granted. Plaintiff was born in 1961.
When she was approximately eight years old her mother entered her
in the “Indian Student Placement Program” (ISPP), a program
implemented by Defendant LDS Family Services on behalf of
Defendant the Corporation of the President of the Church of Jesus
Christ of Latter-Day Saints. The program placed Native American
children with “foster” parents during the school year with the aim of
providing better educational opportunities, and the children returned
home in the summer. Pursuant to the ISPP, Plaintiff was taken in by
LDS church members Donald Wayne Lewis and Mary Lewis.
Defendants have presented concrete evidence that Plaintiff was
diagnosed with PTSD and Plaintiff knew the PTSD was a result of
the childhood abuse. Plaintiff fails to show that Plaintiff now suffers
from a qualitatively different harm or symptom than that attending
PTSD. Ultimately, as Plaintiff essentially admits in explaining she
has been trying to bring this suit for over twenty years, Plaintiff has
been aware of the harm upon which she brings this suit, and its

71

connection to the underling abuse, for far too long to avoid the
statute of limitations.
37.
In re D.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court
Law, Los Angeles County Department of Children and Family
Services v. Carla M.
No. B285396, 2018 WL 3599379 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 27, 2018).
Appellant Carla M. (mother) appeals from the jurisdictional findings
and dispositional order as to her daughter, D.F. She argues the court
erred when it did not order reunification services, and that notice
was inadequate under the Indian Child Welfare Act (25 U.S.C.
§ 1901 et seq. (ICWA)). Respondent, Los Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services (DCFS), conceded that
ICWA notice was inadequate, but argues the court appropriately
denied mother reunification services. We conclude that notice was
improper and remand with directions to comply with ICWA. In all
other respects the juvenile court’s order is affirmed. At the time of
the dispositional hearing, two of the Indian tribes who had been sent
ICWA notices had not responded. At that hearing the court set a
progress hearing to address ICWA. This timely appealed followed.
Appellant argues that it was reversible error for the juvenile court to
proceed with the dispositional hearing without first ensuring ICWA
compliance. (Compare Nicole K. v. Superior Court (2007), 146 Cal.
App. 4th 779, 781 [finding lack of ICWA notice should be remedied
by vacating juvenile court orders] with In re Brooke C. (2005),
127 Cal. App. 4th 377, 383 [finding that when notice requirements
of ICWA are not met, case may be remanded prior to termination of
parental rights]. We decline to follow those courts which have
reversed based on lack of ICWA compliance, finding remand to be
the appropriate remedy. Upon remand, if the court finds that D.F. is
an Indian child after providing proper notice, it shall conduct a new
dispositional hearing in compliance with ICWA and related
California law.
38.

Carter v. Tahsuda

No. 17-15839, 2018 WL 3720025 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2018).
Plaintiffs-Appellants include Indian children, their adoptive parents
and next friends. They filed this action in the United States District
Court in Arizona against the Assistant Secretary of Indian Affairs
for the Bureau of Indian Affairs, the United States Secretary of the
Interior, and the Director of the Arizona Department of Child Safety,
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seeking to challenge the constitutionality of various provisions of
the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”), 25 U.S.C. § 1901 et seq.
The Gila River Indian Community and the Navajo Nation
intervened to defend the constitutionality of the Act. The district
court concluded Plaintiffs lack Article III standing. Plaintiffs appeal
from this dismissal. This Court holds this action is now moot.
Adoption proceedings were pending at all times during the litigation
in the district court. Defendants moved to dismiss the action,
contending that Plaintiffs lacked standing and could not state a
constitutional claim upon which relief could be granted. The district
court examined the complaint with respect to each of the challenged
provisions and ruled that Plaintiffs lacked standing because none
had been harmed by any conduct traceable to ICWA. This Court
does not reach the standing inquiry, however, because a subsequent
development has rendered this action moot. Plaintiffs have never
suggested they suffered any economic damages. Their original
complaint sought only declaratory and injunctive relief relating to
ICWA’s application to their adoption proceedings. While Plaintiffs’
appeal from the district court’s dismissal was going forward,
however, Plaintiffs’ adoptions all became final. The relief Plaintiffs
sought to redress their alleged injuries is no longer available to them.
Vacated and remanded.
C.
39.

Contracting

Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation

No. 16-4175, 868 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. Aug. 25, 2017). Nonmember
former contractor brought action against Indian tribe to enjoin tribal
court proceedings seeking declaratory judgment that its contract
with him was invalid. Tribe filed counterclaims against contractor
and third party complaint against judge presiding over contractor’s
state court action seeking injunction against state court proceedings.
The District Court granted contractor’s motion for preliminary
injunction and dismissed tribe’s counterclaims and third-party
claims. Tribe appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) contractor
failed to establish substantial likelihood of success on merits of his
claim that tribal-exhaustion rule did not bar his state court action,
and (2) tribe was not acting as “person” within meaning of § 1983
when it sought to enjoin contractor’s state court action. Affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded.
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40.

Guidiville Rancheria of California v. United States

No. 15-15221, No. 15-17069, 704 Fed. Appx. 655 (9th Cir. Aug. 4,
2017). Developer and Indian tribe sued city for breach of land
disposition agreement and for breach of implied covenant of good
faith and fair dealing. The United States District Court for the
Northern District of California, No. 4:12-cv-01326, Yvonne
Gonzalez Rogers, J., 5 F. Supp. 3d 1142, dismissed claims and
awarded legal fees to city. Tribe and developer appealed. The Court
of Appeals held that: (1) tribe and developer stated actionable claim
against city for violation of implied covenant of good faith and fair
dealing, and (2) complaint plausibly alleged that city did not
negotiate in good faith and thus breached agreement. Affirmed in
part, reversed in part, and remanded.
41.

Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation, Washington v.
United States

No. 2016-2196, 870 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 12, 2017). Indian
tribe and three tribal housing entities that qualified for and received
Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act
of 1996 (NAHASDA) block grants brought suit under the Tucker
Act and Indian Tucker Act, alleging that Department of Housing and
Urban Development (HUD) improperly deprived them of grant
funds to which they were entitled. The Court of Federal Claims, 99
Fed. Cl. 584, dismissed Tribe’s procedural claims. The Court of
Federal Claims, 106 Fed. Cl. 623, subsequently vacated its decision
and subsequently, 112 Fed. Cl. 353, entered partial summary
judgment in Government’s favor. The Court of Federal Claims, No.
1:08-00848, subsequently reaffirmed its prior ruling that
NAHASDA was money mandating, giving Claims Court
jurisdiction over claims. Government filed interlocutory appeal. The
appellate court held that: (1) NAHASDA was not money-mandating
statute, and (2) HUD’s decision not to grant block grants to Tribe
did not constitute illegal exaction. Vacated and dismissed.
42.

Redding Rancheria v. Hargan

No. 14–2035, 296 F. Supp. 3d 256 (D.D.C. Nov. 7, 2017). Indian
tribe sought review of, inter alia, decision by Indian Health Service
(IHS) rejecting tribe’s application for reimbursement under federal
catastrophic health emergency fund (CHEF) for health services
benefits that were provisionally paid by tribally-funded self-
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insurance plan, but ultimately determined by tribe through
coordination of benefits system to be eligible for coverage under
contract health services (CHS) program operated by tribe under
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (ISDEAA)
compact. Tribe and IHS moved for summary judgment. The district
court held that: (1) de novo standard of review, rather than
Administrative Procedure Act’s (APA) arbitrary and capricious
standard, applied; (2) tribe’s self-insured health services plan was
not excluded from qualifying as payor of last resort under Indian
Health Care Improvement Act (IHCIA); (3) plan’s exclusionary
clause did not prevent plan from qualifying as payor of last resort
under IHS’ policy exception to its regulation listing IHS as payor of
last resort; (4) IHS’ interpretation of its payor-of-last-resort
regulation went beyond purpose of regulation; (5) IHCIA provision
prohibiting contract remedies with respect to CHEF benefits did not
preclude tribe’s action; and (6) remand to IHS was warranted.
Tribe’s motion granted in part and denied in part; IHS’ motion
denied; remanded to IHS.
43.

Ute Indian Tribe v. Lawrence

No. 16-4154, 875 F.3d 539 (10th Cir. Nov. 7, 2017). Indian tribe
brought action seeking declaratory judgment that state court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction to hear non-Indian’s breach of contract
case against it, and injunction to halt state court proceedings. The
District Court, No. 2:16-CV-00579-RJS, dismissed complaint, and
tribe appealed. The appellate court held that district court had
subject matter jurisdiction over action. The Tribe's claim—that
federal law precludes state-court jurisdiction over a claim against
Indians arising on the reservation—presents a federal question that
sustains federal jurisdiction. Reversed and remanded.
44.

Williams & Cochrane, LLP v. Quechan Tribe of the Fort
Yuma Indian Reservation

No. 3:17-01436, 2017 WL 7362744 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2017).
Before the Court is Plaintiff’s ex parte motion to seal select portions
of its complaint and certain exhibits attached to the complaint.
Plaintiff first filed this action on July 16, 2017. The case arises out
of an attorney-client fee agreement that Plaintiff entered into with
Defendant Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma Indian Reservation
(“the Tribe”). Plaintiff’s claims arise from the Tribe allegedly
terminating Plaintiff as the Tribe’s counsel three days prior to the
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date on which the Tribe was set to sign a compact with the State of
California. Plaintiff moved to file the case and the complaint under
seal. The court denied the motion on August 17, 2017, explaining
that sealing the case and or the entire complaint was unwarranted.
The Court explained that “Plaintiff has offered no compelling reason
why every paragraph in its 91-page complaint and why each of its
thirty-nine exhibits must be filed under seal.” The Court explained,
however, that “to the extent that Plaintiff wishes to protect the
confidential and privileged information contained within the
complaint, it must redact those portions of the complaint (and those
portions of the exhibits).” On September 19, 2017, Plaintiff refiled
its complaint with several redactions. Along with the complaint,
Plaintiff has filed a motion to seal in which it asks the Court to
approve the redacted complaint as filed and lodged with the Court
an unredacted version of the complaint. The Court finds that the
redactions are appropriate to prevent the disclosure of confidential
attorney-client communications, attorney work-product, and
confidential negotiations between the Tribe and the State of
California. The Court concludes that Plaintiff has offered sufficient
reason to warrant its proposed redactions to its complaint and
attached exhibits. As a result, the Court grants Plaintiff’s motion to
seal and accepts Plaintiff’s redacted amended complaint. The Clerk
of Court is respectfully requested to file, under seal, the lodged
unredacted copy of Plaintiff’s amended complaint.
45.
Modoc Lassen Indian Housing Authority, et al. v. United
States Department of Housing and Urban Development, et al.
No. 14-1313, No. 14-1331, No. 14-1338, No. 14-1340, No. 14-1343,
No. 14-1407, No. 14-1484, No. 15-1060, 881 F.3d 1181 (10th Cir.
Dec. 22, 2017). Several Indian tribes separately brought action
against Department of Housing and Urban Development (HUD),
challenging HUD’s attempt to recapture alleged overpayments
made to tribes under an affordable housing program created by the
Native American Housing Assistance and Self-Determination Act
(NAHASDA) without providing the tribes with administrative
hearings. The district court entered judgment for tribes. HUD
appealed and appeals were consolidated. On rehearing, the Court of
Appeals, Moritz, Circuit Judge, held that: (1) HUD was not required
under NAHASDA to conduct administrative hearings prior to
attempting to recapture alleged overpayments; (2) HUD finding that
tribes incorrectly received NAHASDA payments did not trigger
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provision requiring hearings before finding improper expenditures;
(3) HUD lacked the authority to recapture alleged overpayments via
administrative offset; and (4) sovereign immunity precluded an
award of money damages payable from NAHASDA grant funds
carried over from prior years and funds that would be appropriated
in future years. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
46.

Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah

No. 2:16–cv–00958, 311 F. Supp. 3d 1284 (D. Utah Apr. 30, 2018).
Non-Indian brought action against Indian tribe seeking declaratory
judgment regarding tribal court’s subject matter jurisdiction over
breach of contract claims. Non-Indian moved for preliminary
injunction to enjoin Indian tribe from proceeding in tribal court, and
tribe moved for preliminary injunction to enjoin parties from
proceeding in non-Indian’s state court breach of contract action. The
District Court held that: (1) it was substantially likely that Utah state
court had subject matter jurisdiction over breach of contract claims,
and thus non-Indian had likelihood of success on merits of position
that tribal court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over claims,
such that grant of a preliminary injunction in favor of non-Indian
was warranted; (2) tribal parties did not have likelihood of success
on merits of position that tribal court had subject matter jurisdiction
over claims, and thus grant of a preliminary injunction in favor of
tribe was unwarranted; and (3) tribal court’s determination that
tribal court had subject matter jurisdiction over breach of contract
action was not entitled to preclusive effect or comity. Non-Indian’s
motion granted, and tribe’s motion denied.
47.

Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah v. Lawrence

No. 2:16–cv–00579, 312 F. Supp. 3d 1219 (D. Utah Apr. 30, 2018).
Indian tribe and tribal businesses brought action against state judge
and non-Indian independent contractor seeking declaratory
judgment that state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear
non-Indian’s breach of contract case against it, and injunction to halt
state court proceedings. Tribe moved for preliminary injunction.
The District Court held that: (1) tribal court’s ruling that it had
jurisdiction over contractor was not entitled to preclusive effect;
(2) money representing contractor’s beneficial interest in portion of
net revenue distributed to tribal holding company from tribe’s oil
and gas company did not constitute tribal trust property;
(3) plaintiffs were not likely to succeed on merits of their claim that
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state court lacked subject matter jurisdiction to hear contractor’s
case. Motion denied.
48.

FSS Development Co., LLC v. Apache Tribe of Oklahoma

No. 17-661, 2018 WL 2248457 (W.D. Okla. May 16, 2018). Before
the Court are Defendants’ Motion to Stay Pending Exhaustion of
Tribal Court Remedies and Defendants’ Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiff
FSS alleges that on December 20, 2010, it (1) entered into an
agreement with Defendant Apache Tribe of Oklahoma (“the Tribe”)
to develop a casino called the Red River Project on Apache land,
and (2) loaned the Tribe $2.2 million to cover development
expenses in exchange for a promissory note. In the summer of 2017,
Plaintiff sued the Tribe, the Apache Business Committee (“ABC”)
that allegedly negotiated the contracts for the Tribe, four individual
ABC members, and a Tribe consultant for tortious interference with
contract, breach of contract, and declaratory judgment. The Tribe
then sued FSS in Apache tribal court for declaratory judgment that
the agreements are void under federal and tribal law and,
alternatively, for breach of contract. The Court, concerned about
subject matter jurisdiction, ordered a hearing to determine whether
to dismiss or stay the case. The main issue is complete preemption
initiated by Defendants’ Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (“IGRA”)
defenses – the parties agree that the Tribe defeats diversity
jurisdiction, but dispute whether the IGRA’s completely preemptive
scope provides the Court with federal question jurisdiction. The
Court dismissed Plaintiff’s claims against the Tribe and ABC and
stayed Plaintiff’s tortious interference claim against the individual
Defendants pending exhaustion of tribal remedies.
49.

Williams & Cochrane, LLP v. Quechan Tribe of Fort
Yuma Indian Reservation

No. 3:17-01436, 2018 WL 2734946 (S.C. Cal. Jun. 7, 2018). Before
the Court are several motions. Defendants Quechan Tribe of the Fort
Yuma Indian Reservation (“Quechan,” or the “Tribe”), Escalanti,
and White (collectively, the “Quechan Defendants”) have filed a
motion to dismiss the operative First Amended Complaint (“FAC”)
and a motion to disqualify Williams & Cochrane as counsel for
Plaintiffs other than itself. Defendants Armstrong, Rosette, Rosette
& Associates, and Rosette, LLP (collectively, the “Rosette
Defendants”) have filed an anti-SLAPP motion to strike one of the
claims in the FAC and a motion to dismiss the FAC. For the reasons
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stated below, the Court GRANTS in part and DENIES in part the
Quechan Defendants’ motion to dismiss, DENIES the motion to
disqualify, DENIES as moot the motion to strike, and GRANTS the
Rosette Defendants’ motion to dismiss. Plaintiffs’ First Amended
Complaint alleges the following relevant facts. Plaintiff Williams &
Cochrane, LLP (“W&C”), is a California legal services partnership
formed in 2010 by Cheryl Williams and Kevin Cochrane after they
left their positions at the law firm of Rosette & Associates, PC. All
other Plaintiffs in this case (the “Member Plaintiffs”) are enrolled
members of Quechan, which is a federally-recognized Indian tribe.
Defendant Robert Rosette serves as the President and Director of
Defendant Rosette & Associates, which is a general partner of
Defendant Rosette, LLP. According to Plaintiffs, Rosette is an
Indian law attorney who “has a history of representing individual
persons or factions within tribes while purporting to represent the
tribe itself.” Defendant Richard Armstrong serves as senior of
counsel at Rosette, LLP. Defendant Keeny Escalanti is a member of
the Quechan Tribe who became Tribal Chairman in 2017. Defendant
Mark William White II is a member of the Quechan Tribe who has
served as a member of the Tribe’s council. The Court dismisses
Counts Three, Five, Six, Seven, and Eight. Because this is the first
time the Court has addressed these deficiencies in Plaintiffs’
pleadings, and for the additional reasons listed above, the Court
dismisses these claims without prejudice. However, because the fee
agreement between W&C and Quechan makes clear that W&C is
not entitled to a “contingency fee” under Section 5, any amendment
in an effort to save that aspect of the breach of contract claim would
be futile. The Court therefore dismisses with prejudice Count One
to the extent that it alleges a breach of Section 5 of the fee
agreement.
50.

Gila River Indian Community v. United States
Department of Veterans Affairs

No. 17-15629, 899 F.3d 1076 (9th Cir. Aug. 15, 2018). The Gila
River Indian Community and Gila River Health Care Corporation
(collectively, “the Community”) sued the Department of Veterans
Affairs (“the VA”) for failing to reimburse the Community for the
care it provides to veterans at tribal facilities. The Community
argues that two provisions of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act require the VA to reimburse it even absent an agreement
defining the terms of reimbursement. The district court dismissed
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the Community's lawsuit after determining that the Veterans'
Judicial Review Act, 38 U.S.C. § 511(a), deprived it of jurisdiction
over the Community's claims. The Gila River Health Care
Corporation (GRHC) is a wholly owned tribal organization that
provides health care services to eligible persons. The GRHC was
formed pursuant to the Indian Self-Determination and Education
Assistance Act, which authorizes Indian tribes to contract with the
federal government to provide services that were previously
provided by the federal government. The health care that the GRHC
provides is financed through funding agreements between the tribe
and the Indian Health Service (IHS). Relevant to this case, the
Community provides health care services to Indian and non-Indian
veterans who are entitled to receive services from the VA. The
Community alleges that many veterans have opted to receive care
through the GRHC, rather than through the VA, due to ongoing
issues with the care provided at VA facilities. Instead of providing
reimbursements directly under the ACA, the VA developed
template reimbursement agreements with the IHS, and it required
recipients to enter into an agreement as a condition of receiving
reimbursement. The Community argues that these template
agreements improperly limit the scope of what it contends is a
mandatory and self-executing right to reimbursement directly under
the ACA. In the Community's view, the agreements, among other
things, improperly require express consent by the VA to each
reimbursement request, limit reimbursements to direct care services,
and deny reimbursement to the Community for services provided to
non-Indian veterans who receive treatment from the GRHC. In
March 2016, the Community filed suit against the VA and the
Secretary. The Community alleged that the VA had violated §
1623(b) by “forcing GRHC into a primary payer position on all
services for which VA has refused to provide reimbursements.” The
Community further alleged that the VA violated 25 U.S.C.§1645(c)
by refusing to process reimbursement requests and by conditioning
reimbursement on entering into an agreement with the VA. The
Community requested declaratory and injunctive relief, requiring
reimbursement for services it had already provided to veterans as
well as reimbursement for future services. The VA moved to dismiss
the Community's complaint, arguing that the district court lacked
subject matter jurisdiction under the Veterans' Judicial Review Act
(“VJRA”), and that the complaint failed to state a claim. The VJRA
provides that the Secretary of the VA “shall decide all questions of
law and fact necessary to a decision by the Secretary under a law
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that affects the provision of benefits by the Secretary to veterans.”
38 U.S.C. § 511(a). A decision by the Secretary is “final and
conclusive and may not be reviewed by any other official or by any
court.” The district court dismissed the complaint under Rule
12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The court did not
reach the VA's alternative argument that the complaint failed to state
a claim for relief under Rule 12(b)(6). The Community appeals. The
Community argues that the district court has jurisdiction under 28
U.S.C. § 1362, which provides the district court with original
jurisdiction over civil actions brought by Indian tribes that present a
federal question. The Community did not make this argument in the
district court, and it has therefore been waived. But even if it were
properly before us, we would be obliged to hold that the general
grant of subject matter jurisdiction in 28 U.S.C. § 1362, like other
general grants of subject matter jurisdiction such as 28 U.S.C. §
1331, does not control over the specific limitation of subject matter
jurisdiction contained in 38 U.S.C. § 511(a). Affirmed.
51.

LaBatte v. United States

No. 2017-2396, 899 F.3d 1373 (Fed. Cir. Aug. 16, 2018). Timothy
LaBatte appeals from a judgment of the Court of Federal Claims
(“Claims Court”), dismissing his complaint for breach of contract
for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. LaBatte v. United States, No.
16-798C, slip op. at 15 (Fed. Cl. July 28, 2017). Mr. LaBatte’s
complaint alleges the following. In 1999, a group of Native
American farmers filed a lawsuit against the Secretary of
Agriculture, alleging that the United States Department of
Agriculture (“USDA”) had discriminated against them in the
administration of farm loan and other benefit programs, thereby
violating the Equal Credit Opportunity Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1691. The
district court certified a class, which included Mr. LaBatte, a farmer
and member of the Sisseton Wahpeton Tribe of South Dakota. See
Keepseagle v. Veneman, No. 99-3119, 2001 WL 34676944, at *15
(D.D.C. Dec. 12, 2001). Ultimately, the government reached a classwide settlement, known as the Keepseagle Settlement Agreement
(the “Agreement”). According to the Agreement, the United States
would provide a compensation fund totaling $680 million. The
Agreement established a two track process, “A” or “B,” for
processing claims. Track A was limited to claimants seeking a
standard set of payments of $50,000 and other limited relief. The
Track A process used documentary evidence and was conducted
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with a paper only record. Claimants had to demonstrate by
substantial evidence that they “applied, or attempted to apply, for a
specific farm [loan] at a USDA office” and that the loan was
“denied, provided late, approved for a lesser amount than requested,
encumbered by a restrictive condition(s), or USDA failed to provide
an appropriate loan service(s).” J.A. 114–15. Track A did not require
proof of discrimination. Under Track B, a claimant could seek
damages up to $250,000, but the claimant had to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the “treatment of the Claimant’s
loan or loan servicing application(s) by USDA was less favorable
than that accorded a specifically identified, similarly situated white
farmer(s).” J.A. 117. Track B provided that the “identity of a similar
situated white farmer” could be established “by a credible sworn
statement based on personal knowledge by an individual who is not
a member of the Claimant’s family.” Mr. LaBatte filed his claim
under the Track B process, seeking $202,700.52 in damages. It
appears to be undisputed that Mr. LaBatte satisfies the relevant
criteria for membership in the class. Mr. LaBatte identified two nonfamily persons who had personal knowledge of the USDA’s
treatment of similarly situated white farmers. Mr. LaBatte’s
witnesses were Russell Hawkins (“Hawkins”) and Tim Lake
(“Lake”). Hawkins and Lake belonged to the same tribe as Mr.
LaBatte—the Sisseton Wahpeton Sioux Tribe of South Dakota.
When Mr. LaBatte prepared to submit a claim under the Settlement
Agreement’s Track B process, both Hawkins and Lake worked for
the Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), a government agency within
the Department of the Interior. Both men agreed to provide Mr.
LaBatte with a sworn declaration, detailing the USDA’s
discriminatory acts to meet the criteria of the Agreement. After the
initial declarations were prepared, but before Mr. LaBatte could
finalize and revise the documents and obtain signatures, the United
States directed Hawkins and Lake not to sign the declarations or to
assist in revising the declarations. Hawkins and Lake were “directed
or instructed by federal governmental officials not to sign
declarations of facts that supported LaBatte’s claim,” and were
instructed not to provide any additional information to Mr. LaBatte,
preventing Mr. LaBatte from revising or elaborating on the
information in the declaration. Mr. LaBatte alleges that “[b]oth
witnesses, former Tribal Chair Hawkins and Lake had agreed to
provide complete testimony and sign declarations on LaBatte’s
behalf for his Track B process claim,” and that, because of the
government’s interference, the declarations of Hawkins and Lake
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were unable to be “review[ed], revis[ed], and ultimately execut[ed]
prior to the LaBatte Track B process filing.” Mr. LaBatte alleges
that these actions by the government breached the Agreement.
Because Mr. LaBatte was unable to submit finalized, signed
declarations, he instead submitted to the Neutral a declaration from
his lawyer that detailed his attempts to obtain the information
necessary. However, the Track B Neutral issued a final
determination denying Mr. LaBatte’s claim for having “failed to
satisfy the requirement of the Settlement Agreement, through a
sworn statement, that named white farmers who are similarly
situated to you received USDA loans or loan servicing that was
denied to you.” Mr. LaBatte filed a motion to intervene in the
proceedings underlying the Settlement Agreement in the United
States District Court for the District of Columbia. Mr. LaBatte
asserted, among other things, that government officials had
breached the Settlement Agreement and its implied covenant of
good faith and fair dealing, by preventing witnesses from signing
declarations and providing information. The court denied Mr.
LaBatte’s motion to intervene on the ground that it did not possess
jurisdiction over his claims. Mr. LaBatte appealed the district
court’s decision to the District of Columbia, which affirmed,
explaining that the Settlement Agreement’s enforcement clause
provided the district court with jurisdiction only to enforce the
distribution of the funds. On July 5, 2016, Mr. LaBatte filed a
complaint in the Claims Court. Mr. LaBatte alleged that the
government “breached the Settlement Agreement and breached the
government’s duty of good faith and fair dealing resulting in the loss
of monetary damages,” by ordering Messrs. Hawkins and Lake not
to sign and to refrain “from testifying and providing evidence on
behalf of LaBatte’s claim.” As damages, Mr. LaBatte sought an
award of his full Track B claim amount of $202,700.52. The
government moved to dismiss Mr. LaBatte’s complaint for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim. The
Claims Court granted the government’s motion and dismissed the
complaint for lack of jurisdiction. Although the court recognized
that it had jurisdiction over breach of settlement claims, the court
concluded that it lacked jurisdiction over Mr. LaBatte’s case. The
court decided that Mr. LaBatte had, in the Track B process of the
Settlement Agreement, waived his right to judicial review to
challenge the breach of the Agreement by the United States, because
the Agreement contained a finality clause. Mr. LaBatte appealed,
and we have jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1295(a)(3). We
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review decisions of the Court of Federal Claims de novo with
respect to questions of law, including a dismissal for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction. We are confident that if, after further
proceedings, the Claims Court finds that there was a breach, the
court will be able to decide on an appropriate remedy to provide Mr.
LaBatte what he would have received in the Track B process absent
the breach. The Claims Court may consider whether reconstituting
the Track B process for Mr. LaBatte is an appropriate or necessary
step in arriving at such a remedy. We conclude that Mr. LaBatte has
stated a claim for relief that falls within the subject-matter
jurisdiction of the Claims Court. Reversed and remanded
D.
52.

Employment

Mendoza v. Isleta Resort

No. A-1-CA-35520, 419 P.3d 1256 (N.M. Ct. App. Apr. 9, 2018).
Employee of Indian tribe’s casino filed a workers’ compensation
complaint against casino and its workers’ compensation insurer.
Following dismissal by a workers’ compensation judge on the
grounds of sovereign immunity, employee appealed. The Court of
Appeals, Vigil, J., held that: (1) Indian Gaming Compact set forth
an express and unequivocal waiver of sovereign immunity; (2) even
if Indian Gaming Compact did not contain an express waiver of
sovereign immunity, employee had a right to pursue her workers’
compensation claim against insurer and its third-party administrator;
(3) even if casino was determined to enjoy tribal sovereign
immunity in the context of a workers’ compensation claim, casino
was not an indispensable party without which casino employee’s
claim could not go forward; and (4) employee was a third-party
beneficiary to casino’s workers’ compensation insurance policy.
Reversed and remanded.
53.

Delebreau v. Danforth

No. 17-C-1221, 2018 WL 2694527 (E.D. Wisconsin Jun. 5, 2018).
Plaintiff Dawn Delebreau, who is representing herself, filed this
action in September 2017 against Defendants Cristina Danforth,
Melinda Danforth, Geraldine Danforth, Larry Barton, and Jay Fuss,
all employees of the Oneida Nation, a federally recognized Indian
tribe. Essentially, Delebreau alleges that she was terminated from
her position as an administrative assistant at the Oneida Housing
Authority because she identified and reported the misuse of housing
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authority funds. This matter comes before the court on a motion to
dismiss the complaint filed by four of the defendants, Cristina
Danforth, Larry Barton, Melinda Danforth, and Geraldine Danforth.
They argue that the complaint should be dismissed for lack of
subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
12(b)(1) and for failure to state a claim under Rule 12(b)(6). For the
reasons set forth below, the defendants’ motion to dismiss will be
granted and the complaint will be dismissed sua sponte as to Jay
Fuss. Delebreau alleges she was wrongfully terminated from
employment with the Oneida Nation due to the unspecified activities
of several officers or employees of the Nation. Federal law
recognizes and promotes the authority of sovereign Indian tribes to
control their own economic enterprises. Duke v. Absentee Shawnee
Tribe of Okla. Housing Auth., 199 F.3d 1123, 1125 (10th Cir. 1999).
Indeed, it has been long established that Indian tribes are “distinct,
independent political communities, retaining their original natural
rights” in matters of local self-government. Worcester v. Georgia,
31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515, 559 (1832). Tribal sovereign immunity protects
Indian tribes from suit in their governmental activities, as well as
their commercial activities, absent express authorization by
Congress or clear waiver by the tribe. Kiowa Tribe of Okla. v. Mfg.
Techs., Inc., 523 U.S. 751, 754 (1998). Further, tribal sovereign
immunity “extends to tribal officials when acting in their official
capacity and within the scope of their authority.” Linneen v. Gila
River Indian Cmty., 276 F.3d 489, 492 (9th Cir. 2002); Cook v. AVI
Casino Enters., Inc., 548 F.3d 718, 726–27 (9th Cir. 2008).
Delebreau cites no federal statute or constitutional provision that
overcomes the immunity of the Oneida Nation and its officers and
employees to hire and fire tribal employees without outside
interference. Consequently, Delebreau’s complaint will be
dismissed in its entirety.
E.
54.

Environmental Regulations

Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment v.
Bureau of Indian Affairs

No. 16-08077, 2017 WL 4277133 (D. Ariz. Sep. 11, 2017). Before
the Court is Intervenor-Defendant Navajo Transitional Energy
Company’s Motion to Dismiss. Plaintiffs Diné Citizens Against
Ruining Our Environment (“Diné CARE”), San Juan Citizens
Alliance, Sierra Club, the Center for Biological Diversity, and
Amigos Bravos (collectively, “Citizens”) have filed suit against the
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Bureau of Indian Affairs (“BIA”), United States Department of the
Interior (“DOI”), the Office of Surface Mining, Reclamation and
Enforcement (“OSMRE”), Bureau of Land Management (“BLM”),
R.K. Zinke, in his official capacity as Secretary of the United States
Department of the Interior, and the United States Fish and Wildlife
Service (“FWS”) (collectively, “Federal Defendants”). Plaintiffs
allege that Federal Defendants violated the Endangered Species Act
(“ESA”), the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”), and the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) in the approval of: (1) a
twenty-five year lease extension for operation of the Four Corners
Power Plant (“FCPP”) by Intervenor-Defendant Arizona Public
Service Company, (2) the renewal of certain right-of-ways for
existing transmission lines, and (3) a 5,568-acre expansion of strip
mining in the Navajo Mine’s Pinabete area. Federal Defendants’
actions were predicated on a Biological Opinion issued by FWS in
April 2015, which Plaintiffs characterize as a mistaken
determination that the “proposed authorizations for continued
operations of the FCPP and the Navajo Mine ... will neither
jeopardize the survival and recovery of, nor adversely modify
designated critical habitat of the Colorado pikeminnow and
razorback sucker, two endangered fish that are native to the San Juan
River, in violation of the ESA.” Plaintiffs contend that remaining
Federal Defendants’ reliance on FWS’ Biological Opinion violated
the ESA and that Federal Defendants’ subsequent Record of
Decision and Final Environmental Impact Statement were issued in
violation of NEPA. This litigation followed. The Arizona Public
Service Company (“APS”)—on its own behalf and as operating
agent for the FCPP—was allowed to intervene as of riht as a party
defendant. Navajo Transitional Energy Company (“NTEC”) filed a
Limited Motion to Intervene, which this Court granted on October
28, 2016. Intervenor-Defendant NTEC subsequently filed a Motion
to Dismiss pursuant to Rules 12(b)(7) and 19 of the Federal Rules
of Civil Procedure. All parties, with the exception of IntervenorDefendant APS, oppose Intervenor-Defendant NTEC’s Motion to
Dismiss. Intervenor-Defendant NTEC contends that it is a required
party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, that
cannot be joined by virtue of its sovereign immunity, and that the
present action should therefore be dismissed in equity and good
conscience. The Court found that Intervenor-Defendant is a required
party under Rule 19 of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure because
it has a protected interest in the subject of the present litigation that
only it can adequately protect. As an arm of the Navajo Nation,
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however, Intervenor-Defendant NTEC enjoys sovereign immunity
and since it has neither explicitly waived that immunity, nor has
such immunity been abrogated or waived by Congress, it follows
that Intervenor-Defendant NTEC cannot be joined. In equity and
good conscience, the present case cannot continue without
Intervenor-Defendant NTEC. Accordingly, it is ordered: (1) That
Intervenor-Defendant NTEC’s Motion to Dismiss is granted;
(2) That this action is dismissed with prejudice in its entirety;
(3) That the Clerk of Court shall terminate this action; and (4) That
the Clerk of Court shall enter judgment accordingly.
55.

Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma v. Zinke

No. 16–CV–697, 2017 WL 4079400 (N.D. Okla. Sep. 14, 2017).
Now before the Court is the motion to dismiss of Ryan Zinke, in his
official capacity as Secretary of the United States Department of the
Interior (“Interior”); the United States Bureau of Indian Affairs
(“BIA”); and the United States Bureau of Land Management
(“BLM”). Federal Respondents ask the Court to dismiss Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint (“Am. Compl.”) under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1) for lack of subject matter jurisdiction and under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6) for failure to state a claim
for which relief may be granted. Plaintiffs, the Pawnee Nation of
Oklahoma and a group of individual members of the Pawnee Nation,
own partial interests in allotted tracts of land within the boundaries
of the former Pawnee reservation. Plaintiffs allege that BIA has
approved seventeen leases (the “Pawnee leases”) that permit oil and
gas development on tracts of land in which Plaintiffs allege an
ownership interest. Owners of allotted lands may lease the mineral
interests on their lands, subject to approval by the Secretary of the
Interior. 25 U.S.C. § 396. Leases entered into under 25 U.S.C. § 396
are governed by the regulations at 25 C.F.R. Part 212. Those
regulations provide that appeals of BIA decisions are governed by
25 C.F.R. Part 2. 25 C.F.R. § 212.58 (citing 25 C.F.R. § 211.58).
The seventeen Pawnee leases were approved by the BIA
Superintendent between July 2013 and November 2013. Appeals
from the Superintendent’s decision are to the appropriate Regional
Director (referred to as an “Area Director” in the regulations).
Plaintiffs do not allege that they have appealed any of the decisions
they challenge here, but claim that they did not receive the requisite
notice under the regulations. Federal Respondents have moved to
dismiss a subset of claims in the Amended Complaint. Federal
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Respondents have challenged Plaintiffs’ First, Fourth, Fifth, and
Sixth Causes of Action that challenge the BIA’s approvals of the
Pawnee leases as violations of the Administrative Procedures Act
(“APA”) under the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”),
the American Indian Agricultural Resource Management Act
(“AIARMA”), the National Historic Preservation Act (“NHPA”),
and Executive Order 11988. In addition, Federal Respondents move
to dismiss Plaintiffs Fourth Cause of Action, which challenges
BIA’s approval of the Pawnee leases as well as BLM’s approvals of
Applications for Permits to Drill (“APDs”) and sundry notices on
the tracts of land covered by the seventeen leases, claiming that the
approvals violate the American Indian Agricultural Resource
Management Act. Finally, although their Sixth Cause of Action is
plead as arising under the APA, Plaintiffs have argued that the
violations of NEPA, AIARMA, NHPA, and Executive Order 11988
also amount to a breach of the United States’ fiduciary trust duties.
Having considered the arguments set forth in the parties’ briefing
relating to Federal Respondents’ Motion to Dismiss, the Court finds
that the Motion to Dismiss is GRANTED. Plaintiffs’ First Cause of
Action is dismissed in its entirety for lack of jurisdiction. Plaintiffs’
Fourth, Fifth, and Sixth Causes of Action are also dismissed for lack
of jurisdiction to the extent that they raise challenges to the
approvals of the seventeen Pawnee leases identified in Plaintiffs’
Amended Complaint. Plaintiffs’ Fourth Cause of Action is also
dismissed in its entirety for failure to state claim under Federal Rule
of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). To the extent Plaintiffs’ Sixth Cause of
Action alleges a claim for breach of a fiduciary trust duty, it is also
dismissed for failure to state a claim under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(6).
56.

United States v. Osage Wind, LLC

No. 15-5121, No. 16-5022, 871 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. Sep. 18, 2017).
Federal government brought action against wind company that was
building wind farm on Indian land, alleging that its excavation of
soil, sand, and rock to place cement foundations to support wind
turbines constituted “mining” that required a federally-approved
mineral lease. The District Court, 2015 WL 5775378, granted
summary judgment to wind company. Indian tribe sought to
intervene and appeal. The appellate court held that: (1) Indian tribe
was entitled to appeal district court’s grant of summary judgment to
wind company without having intervened in district court;
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(2) tribe’s claim was not precluded under doctrine of res judicata;
(3) de minimis exception in regulation requiring mineral leases on
indian land did not apply to wind company’s excavation;
(4) definition of “mining” in regulation requiring mineral leases on
Indian land is not limited to commercial extraction of minerals, but
also includes acting upon the minerals to exploit the minerals
themselves; and (5) wind company’s excavation constituted mineral
development. Reversed and remanded.
57.

Wyoming v. Zinke

No. 16-8068, No. 16-8069, 871 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. Sep. 21, 2017).
Industry organization petitioned for Administrative Procedure Act
(APA) review of Bureau of Land Management (BLM) regulation
governing hydraulic fracturing on lands owned or held in trust by
the United States, seeking preliminary injunction. States of
Wyoming and Colorado filed separate petitions for review.
Following consolidation of the cases, North Dakota, Utah, and Ute
Indian Tribe intervened, opposing the regulation, and multiple
citizen groups intervened, defending the regulation. The District
Court, No. 2:15-CV-00043-SWS, 2016 WL 3509415, entered order
invalidating the regulation. BLM and citizen group intervenors
appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) appeal from district
court’s order was unfit for review; (2) withholding review of district
court’s order would not impose hardship on BLM or citizen group
intervenors; (3) dismissal, rather than abatement, of appeal was
warranted; and (4) vacatur of district court’s order invalidating
regulation was warranted. Appeals dismissed as prudentially unripe;
vacated and remanded with instructions.
58.

Havasupai Tribe v. Provencio

No. 15-15857, 876 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2017).
Environmental groups and Havasupai Indian Tribe brought action
under Administrative Procedure Act (APA) challenging Forest
Service’s conclusion that uranium mining company had valid
existing rights to operate a uranium mine on land within a
withdrawal area of public lands around Grand Canyon National Park
that the Secretary of the Interior withdrew from new mining, seeking
declaration that Forest Service was acting in violation of National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA). Mining companies intervened.
The District Court, 98 F. Supp. 3d 1044, entered summary judgment
in favor of Forest Service. Groups and Tribe appealed. The appellate
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court held that: (1) Tribe had standing to bring action challenging
Forest Service’s action; (2) environmental group had standing to
bring action challenging Forest Service’s action; (3) Forest
Service’s conclusion that uranium mining company had valid
existing rights to operate uranium mine constituted final agency
action; (4) Environmental Impact Statement (EIS) was not required;
(5) Forest Service’s determination did not constitute undertaking
under National Historic Preservation Act of 1966 (NHPA), and thus
consultation was not required; and (6) environmental group lacked
prudential standing to challenge merits of Forest Service’s action
under Mineral Act or FLPMA. Affirmed.
59.

National Mining Association v. Zinke

No. 14-17350, No. 14-17351, No. 14-17352, No. 14-17374, 877
F.3d 845 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2017). Miner and trade associations
brought actions challenging Department of Interior’s withdrawal of
more than one million acres of National Forest System lands from
mining location and entry. The District Court, 2014 WL 4904423
and 933 F. Supp. 2d 1215, granted summary judgment for
government. Miner and associations appealed. The appellate court
held that: (1) provision of Federal Land Policy and Management Act
(FLPMA) permitting Congress to block withdrawals of land from
mining location and entry by concurrent resolution, rather than in
conformity with express procedures of Constitution’s prescription
for legislative action, was unconstitutional; (2) issue of whether
unconstitutional legislative veto embedded in FLPMA was
severable from large-tract withdrawal authority delegated to
Secretary of Department of Interior in that same subsection was
properly before court even though statutory legislative veto was not
exercised by Congress; (3) miner and trade associations had
standing to raise issue of whether unconstitutional legislative veto
embedded in FLPMA was severable; (4) unconstitutional legislative
veto embedded FLPMA was severable from large-tract withdrawal
authority delegated to Secretary in that same subsection, and
therefore invalidating legislative veto provision did not affect
Secretary’s withdrawal authority; (5) Secretary’s decision to
withdraw large tract of land to protect water resources in Grand
Canyon watershed and Colorado River from possible water
contamination was not arbitrary, capricious, or not in accordance
with the law; (6) Secretary could withdraw large tracts of land under
FLPMA in interest of preserving cultural and tribal resources;
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(7) withdrawal to protect “other resources,” including visual
resources and wildlife was not arbitrary, capricious; and
(8) agency’s findings regarding quantity of uranium in area to weigh
economic impact of withdrawal were not arbitrary, capricious.
Affirmed
60.

Caddo Nation of Oklahoma v. Wichita and Affiliated
Tribes

No. 16-6161, 2018 WL 3354882 (10th Cir. Dec. 18, 2017). In
neighboring tribe’s action alleging that tribe seeking to build history
center violated procedures required by National Historic
Preservation Act (NHPA) and National Environmental Policy Act
(NEPA) throughout planning process, neighboring tribe moved for
emergency temporary restraining order preventing tribe from
continuing construction until it complied with those procedures.
After initially granting temporary restraining order, the District
Court, 2016 WL 3080971, vacated order. Neighboring tribe
appealed, and tribe moved to dismiss appeal. The appellate court
held that neighboring tribe’s appeal of denial of temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction enjoining tribe’s
construction of history center was moot. Appeal dismissed;
remanded.
61.

Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of
Engineers

No. 16–1534 (and Consolidated Case Nos. 16–1769 and 16–267),
301 F. Supp. 3d 50 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2018). The Yankton Sioux
Tribe challenges the construction and operation of the Dakota
Access Pipeline (DAPL) under the National Historic Preservation
Act, the National Environmental Protection Act, and the 1851
Treaty of Laramie. Specifically, Plaintiffs allege that Defendants—
the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, the U.S. Fish and Wildlife
Service, and an assortment of federal employees of both agencies—
violated the NHPA by failing to adequately consult with the Tribe
regarding historical and cultural sites, violated NEPA by unlawfully
segmenting their analyses of the pipeline’s environmental impacts,
and violated the 1851 Treaty by granting approvals for DAPL
without first obtaining the Tribe’s consent. Both sides have now
filed Cross–Motions for Summary Judgment on the Tribe’s NEPA
and Treaty-based claims. Defendants additionally urge the Court to
dismiss as moot Plaintiffs’ NHPA counts, asserting that they are no
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longer viable in light of DAPL’s completed construction. Agreeing
that it can provide no effective remedy on this last score, the Court
will dismiss the NHPA claims. It will also grant summary judgment
for Defendants with respect to Plaintiffs’ Treaty-based count, which
the Tribe essentially withdrew during briefing. Finally, the Court
concludes that Plaintiffs have not shown that the Corps and FWS
improperly “segmented” their analysis of the pipeline’s
environmental consequences, thus yielding summary judgment for
Defendants on the NEPA claims as well. United States’ motion
granted.
62.
Battle Mountain Band of Te-Moak Tribe of Western
Shoshone Indians v. United States Bureau of Land Management
No. 3:16–cv–0268, 302 F. Supp. 3d 1226 (D. Nev. Mar. 23, 2018).
Indian band brought action alleging that Bureau of Land
Management (BLM) and its district manager violated the National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) by failing to reconsider their
decision to allow mining project to proceed on land identified by
band as traditional cultural property (TCP) and deemed eligible for
inclusion on National Register of Historic Places by BLM. Project’s
operator intervened and filed cross-claims alleging that BLM’s
determination that land was eligible for inclusion on National
Register violated National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) and
Administrative Procedure Act (APA). BLM and manager moved to
dismiss operator’s cross-claims. The District Court, Larry R. Hicks,
J., held that: (1) programmatic agreement gave operator ongoing
consultation right with respect to National Register eligibility
determinations for project land; (2) operator adequately alleged an
injury in fact; and (3) operator had prudential standing to bring
NHPA claims. Motion denied.
63.

Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians of California v.
United States Department of Transportation

No. 15-04987, 2018 WL 1569714 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2018). Before
the Court is the motion for summary judgment filed by Plaintiffs
Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians of California (“Coyote
Valley”) and The Round Valley Indian Tribes of California (“Round
Valley”). Also before the Court is the cross-motion for summary
judgment filed by the United States Department of Transportation
(“USDOT”). This litigation arises out of the construction of 5.9mile-long segment of U.S. Highway 101, which bypasses the City
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of Willits, California (the “Willits Bypass Project”), and postconstruction mitigation projects in the area. The FHWA and
Caltrans issued a final Environmental Impact Statement (“EIS”) for
the Willits Bypass Project in October 2006. In December 2006, the
agencies issued a Record of Decision, which approved a variation
of a four-lane freeway (“Modified Alternative J1T”). The Final EIS
stated there would be no adverse effect on historic properties, if an
environmentally sensitive area was established. The State Historic
Property Officer (“SHPO”) concurred in that finding. This litigation
focuses on the first phase. Construction on the first phase of the
Willits Bypass Project is complete, and it was opened to traffic in
November 2016. The second phase of the Willits Bypass Project
remains unfunded. According to Plaintiffs, at the time the final EIS
was issued, “Caltrans had only identified one archaeological site
eligible for registry on the National Register of Historic Places”
(“NHRP”), and they claim that “[s]ince 2013, Caltrans has identified
at least thirty additional archaeological sites eligible for registry on
the” NRHP. Coyote Valley’s Tribal Chairman, Michael Hunter,
wrote to Charles Felder, a director at Caltrans, and requested
“government-to-government” consultation. (Federal Highway
Administration Administrative Record (“FHWA AR”) Caltrans
Chairman Hunter stated that “[t]he primary and ongoing request we
articulated at this meeting was the need for a Supplemental EIS to
contend with the many ancestral archaeological sites that have been
discovered subsequent to the approval” of the Final EIS “both in the
Project Area and Mitigation parcels” of the Willits Bypass Project.
As a result of the Court’s rulings on the Federal Defendants’
motions to dismiss, Plaintiffs’ claims against the Federal Defendants
have been limited as follows: (1) the Federal Defendants violated
Section 106 of the NHPA by failing to engage in government-togovernment consultation with Plaintiffs (“the NHPA consultation
claim”); and (2) after February 18, 2015, the date on which the
Plaintiffs demanded that the Federal Defendants reassume
responsibility for the Willits Bypass Project, the Federal Defendants
directly violated the NHPA, NEPA, and the Federal Highway
Statutes by failing to act in accordance with the requirements of
those statutes. The Court denies Plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment, and it grants, in part, and denies, in part, the Federal
Defendants’ cross-motion for summary judgment.
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64.

Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment v.
Jewell

No. CIV 15-0209, 312 F. Supp. 3d 1031 (D.N.M. Apr. 23, 2018).
Organization of Navajo community activists and environmental
organizations brought action against United States Department of
the Interior (DOI), Secretary of the Interior, Bureau of Land
Management (BLM), and its director, challenging BLM’s approval
of applications for permit to drill (APD) in the Mancos Shale
formation of the San Juan Basin of northern New Mexico, alleging
that BLM violated National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) by
failing to analyze direct, indirect, and cumulative effects of Mancos
Shale fracking, by not preparing an Environmental Impact
Statement (EIS) on fracking the Mancos Shale, and by taking action
during the NEPA process, and that BLM violated the National
Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) because it did not consider the
indirect and cumulative effects on Chaco Park and its satellites and
did not consult with the New Mexico State Historic Preservation
Officer (SHPO), Indian tribes, or the public. Trade association of the
oil-and-gas industry intervened as defendant. The District Court,
2015 WL 4997207, denied organizations’ motion for preliminary
injunction nullifying BLM’s approval of APDs. The Court of
Appeals, 839 F.3d 1276, affirmed. Organizations petitioned for
review on the merits and moved for permanent injunction. The
District Court held that organizations had standing to assert claims
alleging that BLM violated NEPA; Appellate Court’s affirmance of
District Court’s order denying organizations’ motion for
preliminary injunction did not bar, under law of the case doctrine,
organizations’ claims alleging NEPA violations; BLM’s approval of
applications for drilling permits did not violate NEPA; BLM
satisfied NEPA’s minimal public notice requirements; BLM’s
failure to consult SHPO was not arbitrary and capricious in violation
of NHPA; and BLM’s failure to consider effects of gas and oil wells
in Chaco Park and its satellites did not violate NHPA. Petition
dismissed; motion for permanent injunction denied.
65.

Sisseton–Wahpeton Oyate of Lake Traverse Reservation
v. United States Corps of Engineers

No. 16-4283, 888 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. Apr. 25, 2018). Indian tribe and
its chairman brought action alleging that Corps of Engineers
violated Administrative Procedure Act (APA), Clean Water Act
(CWA), and National Historic Preservation Act (NHPA) in issuing
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permit and exemption determinations allowing adjacent
landowner’s construction of farm road across wetland adjacent to
lake. The District Court ruled that Corps’s determination letters
constituted final agency actions, 918 F. Supp. 2d 962, dismissed
some claims as untimely, 2014 WL 4678052, denied tribe’s request
for equitable tolling, 124 F. Supp. 3d 958, and denied plaintiffs’
request for injunctive relief and remanded NHPA claims to Corps,
2016 WL 5478428. Plaintiffs appealed. The Court of Appeals held
that: (1) Corps’ letter to tribe indicating that roadways met
requirements for CWA’s farm-road exemption and each constituted
single and complete project did not constitute “final agency action”;
(2) tribe’s claim that Corps’ determination that roadway had not
been recaptured was nonjusticiable challenge to enforcement
decision; (3) tribe was not entitled to equitably toll statute of
limitations; (4) Corps did not unlawfully stack permit and
exemption verifications; and (5) district court’s determination that
Corps did not unlawfully stack permit and exemption verifications
was final appealable decision. Affirmed.
66.

Puyallup Tribe of Indians v. Washington State Shorelines
Hearings Board, City of Tacoma

No. 77748-3-1, 3 Wash. App. 2d 1057 (Wash. Ct. App. May 14,
2018). The Puyallup Tribe of Indians appeals the Shorelines
Hearings Board’s decision to affirm a shoreline substantial
development permit. But, because the Board’s decision is supported
by substantial evidence, we affirm. We review decisions of the
Shorelines Hearings Board to determine if the Board’s factual
findings are supported by substantial evidence and if these findings,
in turn, support the Board’s conclusions of law. The Board heard
evidence concerning the risk of disturbing contaminated sediment,
indications of contamination at the project site, the effectiveness of
BMPs, and the adequacy of mitigation. The Board summarized and
weighed the conflicting evidence in its decision. The Board found
persuasive the respondents’ evidence that there is a low risk of
contamination at the project site, the identified BMPs adequately
protect against that risk, any adverse impact will be short term, the
proposed mitigation offsets adverse impacts, and, in the long term,
the project will benefit the waterway’s ecological function.
Affirmed.
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67.

Oglala Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory
Commission

No. 17-1059, 896 F.3d 520 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 20, 2018). Powertech
(USA), Inc. applied to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission for a
license to construct a uranium mining project in the Black Hills of
South Dakota. The Oglala Sioux Tribe, which has historical ties to
the proposed project area, intervened in opposition because it feared
the destruction of its cultural, historical, and religious sites. The staff
of the Commission granted the license. On administrative appeal,
the Commission decided to leave the license in effect –
notwithstanding its own determination that there was a significant
deficiency in its compliance with the National Environmental Policy
Act – pending further agency proceedings to remedy the deficiency.
The Commission grounded this decision on the Tribe’s inability to
show that noncompliance with the Act would cause irreparable
harm. In so doing, the Commission was following what appears to
be the agency’s settled practice to require such a showing. The
National Environmental Policy Act, however, obligates every
federal agency to prepare an adequate environmental impact
statement before taking any major action, which includes issuing a
uranium mining license. The statute does not permit an agency to
act first and comply later. Nor does it permit an agency to condition
performance of its obligation on a showing of irreparable harm.
There is no such exception in the statute. In fact, such a policy puts
the Tribe in a classic Catch-22. In order to require the agency to
complete an adequate survey of the project site before granting a
license, the Tribe must show that construction at the site would
cause irreparable harm to cultural or historical resources. But
without an adequate survey of the cultural and historical resources
at the site, such a showing may well be impossible. Of course, if the
project does go forward and such resources are damaged, the Tribe
will then be able to show irreparable harm. By then, however, it will
be too late. The Commission’s decision to let the mining project
proceed violates the National Environmental Policy Act. Indeed, it
vitiates the requirements of the Act. We therefore find the decision
contrary to law and grant the petition for review in part. Under the
collateral order doctrine, we have jurisdiction to review the
Commission’s decision to leave Powertech’s license in place –
notwithstanding the NRC’s acknowledgment that it has not yet
complied with the National Environmental Policy Act – on the
ground that the Tribe failed to show irreparable harm. Because that
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decision is contrary to law, we grant the petition for review in part
and remand the case to the Commission for further proceedings
consistent with this opinion.
F.

Fisheries, Water, FERC, BOR

68.

United States v. Washington

No. C70-9213, Sub-proceeding No. 17-sp-01, 2017 WL 3726774
(W.D. Wash. Aug. 30, 2017). This matter comes before the Court
on the Jamestown S’Klallam and Port Gamble S’Klallam Tribes’
(collectively “S’Klallam”) and Squaxin Island Tribe’s (“Squaxin”)
motions to dismiss, or in the alternative, for summary judgment, and
Skokomish Indian Tribe’s (“Skokomish”) cross-motion for
summary judgment. In addition, the Court resolves what remains of
Skokomish’s motion to stay the proceedings. S’Klallam requests
that the Court grant it summary judgment on three bases: (1) the
Skokomish request for determination is procedurally improper
because the Skokomish fail to allege which jurisdictional provision
they invoke; (2) the Skokomish request is legally invalid because it
violates a settlement agreement: The Hood Canal Agreement; and
(3) the Court has previously determined, unambiguously, that the
Skokomish U&A is the Hood Canal and its drainage basin, and
therefore it is not entitled to any ruling that it has primary fishing
rights outside of that established U&A. The Squaxin move for
summary judgment on essentially the same bases, albeit with
slightly different legal arguments, and include an additional
argument for dismissal on the basis that Skokomish failed to follow
the pre-filing requirements established by this Court. Skokomish
have opposed the S’Klallam and Squaxin motions and also move for
summary judgment in their favor. Skokomish assert that they have
complied with all pre-filing requirements and have appropriately
asserted jurisdiction over this matter, and argue that both this Court
and the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals have already determined that
their U&A and primary fishing right extend beyond the Hood Canal
and its drainage basin. Accordingly, they assert that summary
judgment in their favor is appropriate. The matter having been fully
briefed, and having determined that oral argument is not necessary
in this matter, the Court now grants S’Klallam’s and Squaxin’s
motions for summary judgment, and denies Skokomish’s crossmotion for summary judgment.
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69.

United States v. Board of Directors of Truckee-Carson
Irrigation District

No. 16–15507, 708 Fed. Appx. 898 (9th Cir. Sep. 13, 2017). United
States sued Truckee–Carson Irrigation District (TCID), which
managed project controlling diversions from Truckee and Carson
rivers, TCID’s board members, and all water users in project as
class, seeking to recoup more than one million acre-feet of water
unlawfully diverted in excess of applicable operating criteria and
procedures (OCAPs) and to detriment of Pyramid Lake Paiute Tribe.
After intervention by tribe as plaintiff, the District Court awarded
government approximately 200,000 acre-feet of water and
post-judgment interest, and denied TCID attorney fees under Equal
Access to Justice Act (EAJA). Appeals were taken. The appellate
court, 602 F.3d 1074, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and
remanded. On remand, the District Court recalculated amount of
excess diversions for four years. Appeals were taken. The appellate
court, 723 F.3d 1029, ruled that extraordinary remedy of correcting
its prior mandate was warranted. On remand, the District Court,
2015 WL 2185551, determined amount of water subject to
recoupment for two years, and subsequently, 2016 WL 304309,
denied government’s and tribe’s recoupment claims for those two
years. Appeal was taken. The appellate court held that: (1) tribe’s
claims were not barred by doctrine of res judicata; (2) tribe’s
appellate arguments were not foreclosed by law of the case; (3) tribe
did not waive appellate arguments supporting claims;
(4) recoupment was available for excess diversions during portions
of two years; and (5) tribe was entitled to equitable remedy of
recouping 8,300 acre-feet of water for two years. Vacated and
remanded.
70.

Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Suquamish Indian Tribe

No. 15-35540, 871 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. Sep. 22, 2017). Upper Skagit
Indian Tribe filed Request for Determination as to the geographic
scope of the Suquamish Indian Tribe’s usual and accustomed fishing
grounds and stations as determined by the District Court, 384 F.
Supp. 312, and 459 F. Supp. 1020, seeking determination that
determination did not include Chuckanut Bay, Samish Bay, and a
portion of Padilla Bay where the Upper Skagit has its own courtapproved fishing grounds and stations determination. The District
Court, Nos. 2:14-sp-00001-RSM 2:70-cv-09213-RSM, entered
summary judgment finding that the District Court did not intend to
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include the contested waters in its determination and entered
summary judgment in Upper Skagit Tribe’s favor. Suquamish Tribe
appealed. The appellate court held that Upper Skagit Indian Tribe
sufficiently met its burden to establish that there was no evidence
before district court judge that Suquamish Indian tribe fished or
traveled through contested areas, and thus Upper Skagit Tribe’s
usual and accustomed fishing grounds and station determination did
not include those areas. Affirmed.
71.

Sturgeon v. Frost

No. 13-36165, 872 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2017). Hunter who
sought to use hovercraft to reach moose hunting grounds brought
action against National Park Service (NPS), challenging its
application of 36 C.F.R. § 1.2(a)(3), a regulation that prohibited use
of hovercraft to National Preserve in Alaska. The United States
District Court for the District of Alaska, H. Russel Holland, J., 2013
WL 5888230, granted summary judgment for NPS. Hunter
appealed. The Court of Appeals, Nguyen, Circuit Judge, 768 F.3d
1066, affirmed in part, vacated in part, and remanded. The Supreme
Court, Roberts, Chief Justice, 136 S. Ct. 1061, granted certiorari and
vacated and remanded Court of Appeals’ decision. On remand, the
Court of Appeals, Jacqueline H. Nguyen, Circuit Judge, held that
regulation preventing use of hovercraft in federally managed
conservation areas applied to river in National Preserve. Affirmed.
72.

Makah Indian Tribe, et al. v. Quileute Indian Tribe, et al.

No. 15-35824, No. 15-35827, 873 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. Oct. 23,
2017). In litigation over fishing rights in Western Washington,
Indian tribe commenced subproceeding to determine usual and
accustomed fishing grounds of two other tribes pursuant to Treaty
of Olympia. Following bench trial, the district court, Nos. 2:09–sp–
00001–RSM, 2:70–cv–09213–RSM, Ricardo S. Martinez, Chief
Judge, determined tribes’ rights and fishing boundaries, 129 F.
Supp. 3d 1069, and corrected scrivener’s error, 2015 WL 10853926.
Plaintiff and state appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) district
court did not clearly err in determining that word “fish,” as used in
Treaty, encompassed sea mammals; (2) tribes were not required to
provide evidence of specific locations that they regularly and
customarily hunted whales or seals; and (3) district court incorrectly
drew longitudinal boundaries of tribes’ U & A fishing grounds.
Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
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73.

Flathead Joint Board of Control v. State

No. DA 16-0516, 389 Mont. 270 (Mont. Nov. 8, 2017). Board
responsible for overseeing irrigation districts challenged the
constitutionality of a water compact entered into between tribes,
State, and the United States. The 20th Judicial District Court found
that a section of the compact’s administrative provisions provided
“new immunity to the State and its agents” and therefore was
unconstitutional, but that it was severable from the remainder of the
compact. Board appealed. The Supreme Court held that:
(1) challenge to the constitutionality of a water compact was
justiciable, and (2) compact did not provide any new immunity to
the State and thus Constitutional provision restraining legislature
from asserting sovereign immunity did not apply. Affirmed in part
and reversed in part.
74.

United States v. Lummi Nation

No. 15-35661, 876 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. Dec. 1, 2017). In proceedings
to adjudicate fishing rights reserved by 1855 Treaty of Point Elliott,
Lower Elwha Band of S’Klallams, Jamestown Band of S’Klallams,
Port Gamble Band of S’Klallams, and Skokomish Indian Tribe
sought determination that Lummi Indian Tribe was violating 1974
District Court opinion in United States v. Washington, Boldt, J., 384
F. Supp. 312, by fishing in areas outside its adjudicated usual and
accustomed grounds and stations. Following entry of summary
judgment order in 1990 in favor of plaintiff tribes determining that
1974 opinion did not intend to include disputed areas within Lummi
Tribe’s usual and accustomed grounds and stations, the District
Court dismissed action. Plaintiff tribes appealed. The appellate
court, 235 F.3d 443, affirmed in part and reversed in part. On
remand, the District Court, 2012 WL 4846239, entered summary
judgment on Klallam Tribes’ request for determination that Lummi
Tribe’s usual and accustomed grounds did not include eastern
portion of Strait of Juan de Fuca or waters west of Whidbey Island.
The appellate court, 763 F.3d 1180, reversed and remanded. On
remand, the District Court, 2015 WL 4405591, entered summary
judgment in favor of the Lower Elwha Klallam Tribe. Lummi Tribe
appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) District Court’s finding
in United States v. Washington, 384 F. Supp. 312, that the usual and
accustomed fishing places of the Lummi Indians at treaty times
included the marine areas of Northern Puget Sound from the Fraser
River south to the present environs of Seattle, was ambiguous as to
100

whether the usual and accustomed fishing places of the Lummi
Indians included the waters west of Whidbey Island, and (2) waters
west of Whidbey Island were encompassed in usual and accustomed
fishing places of the Lummi Indians. Reversed and remanded.
75.

Navajo Nation v. Department of the Interior

No. 14-16864, 876 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2017). Indian tribe
brought action against Interior Department, Interior Secretary,
Bureau of Reclamation, Bureau of Indian Affairs, and water districts
alleging that United States failed in its trust obligation to assert and
protect tribe’s water rights and violated National Environmental
Policy Act (NEPA) and Administrative Procedure Act (APA)
through actions undertaken to manage flow of Colorado River’s
lower basin. The District Court, 34 F. Supp. 3d 1019, granted federal
defendants’ motion to dismiss. Tribe appealed. The appellate court
held that:(1) tribe lacked standing to assert claim that preparation of
environmental impact statement (EIS) and related documents by
Secretary of Department of Interior relating to guidelines for
determining when there was surplus of water from Colorado River
for use within Arizona, California, and Nevada and storage of such
surplus water would threaten its interests in obtaining adequate
water; (2) allegations by tribe about future development of reliance
interests in unadjudicated or unquantified reserved water rights, and
that United States would be disinclined to revisit water rights
adjudications after implementation of guidelines by Department of
Interior clarifying how it would make “surplus” and “shortage”
determinations of waters of Colorado River for delivery to Western
states, did not show that tribe suffered injury needed for Article III
standing; (3) alleged adverse affect on Indian tribe’s generalized
interest in availability of water did not show that tribe suffered injury
needed for Article III standing; (4) breach of trust claim by tribe was
predicated not on affirmative action, but rather failure to act; and
(5) waiver of sovereign immunity applied to breach of trust claim
by tribe. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
76.

Baley v. United States

No. 1–591L, 134 Fed. Cl. 619 (Fed. Cl. Sept. 29, 2017). Farmers
filed class actions against United States, claiming that Bureau of
Reclamation effected Fifth Amendment taking and violated their
water rights under the Klamath River Basin Compact, by
temporarily terminating water deliveries to farmers for irrigation in
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order to preserve habitat of fish protected under Endangered Species
Act (ESA) and to comply with government’s tribal trust obligations
to several Indian tribes. Following consolidation of actions and class
certification, parties cross-moved for summary judgment. The Court
of Federal Claims held that: (1) claims by shareholders in
corporation that supplied irrigation water were barred; (2) claims by
successors to signors of water rights applications were not barred;
(3) claims by successors to signors of repayment contracts were not
barred; (4) claims by some successors to signors of Warren Act
contracts were barred; (5) claims by successors to leaseholders of
land in wildlife refuges were barred; (6) termination of water
deliveries did not affect taking or violate compact as farmers’ water
rights were subordinate to tribes’ rights. Defendant’s motion
granted.

77.

Clayvin Herrera v. State of Wyoming

No. 2016-242, Fourth Judicial District, Sheridan County, State of
Wyoming. Petition for Certiorari Granted, No. 17–532, (U.S. June
28, 2018). Issue: Whether Wyoming’s admission to the Union or the
establishment of the Bighorn National Forest abrogated the Crow
Tribe of Indians’ 1868 federal treaty right to hunt on the
“unoccupied lands of the United States,” thereby permitting the
present-day criminal conviction of a Crow member who engaged in
subsistence hunting for his family. Clayvin Herrera appeals from the
Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Striking Evidentiary Hearing
and Granting State’s Motion in Limine, entered on October 16, 2015
and the Judgment and Sentence entered by the Fourth Judicial
Circuit Court on April 29, 2016. The Appellant frames the pertinent
issues as follows: (1) Did the circuit court err in denying treatybased immunity to Herrera by holding itself “bound by” an
erroneous Tenth Circuit decision, and ruling -- that the
establishment of the Big Horn National Forest (BHNF) in 1897 by
presidential proclamation extinguished the Crow Treaty hunting
rights? (2) Should the Court grant judgment of acquittal to Herrera,
and dismiss the misdemeanor counts against him because the State
did not, and cannot meet the controlling federal “conservation
necessity” standard for prosecution of an otherwise immune treatyhunter under state wildlife laws? Herrera is an enrolled member of
the Crow Tribe and a resident of St. Xavier, Montana, which is
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located on the Crow Reservation. In January 2014, Herrera and
several other tribal members decided to hunt for elk on the Crow
Reservation. They spotted several elk on the Reservation in the
vicinity of Eskimo Creek. At some point, the elk crossed a fence,
leaving the Crow Reservation and entering into the Big Horn
National Forest in the State of Wyoming. Herrera and the others
crossed the fence into Wyoming and continued to track the elk. They
shot three bull elk and took the meat back with them to Montana.
The elk were taken without a license and during a closed season.
Herrera was cited with two misdemeanors, taking an Antlered Big
Game Animal Without a License or During a Closed Season, a
violation of W.S. § 23-3-102(d), and Accessory to Taking Antlered
Big Game Animal Without a License or During a Closed Season, a
violation of W.S. § 23-6-205. Herrera filed a Motion to Dismiss
under the Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution and
the Fort Laramie Treaty of 1868. Herrera did not deny taking the
elk, but he asserted that he had a right to hunt where and when he
did under Article 4 of the 1868 Treaty with the Crow (“Crow
Treaty”). He argued that this treaty gave the Crow Tribe the right to
hunt off of the reservation on the “unoccupied lands of the United
States” that fell within territory that had been ceded by the Crow,
and that this treaty right was still valid and preempted state law. The
circuit court entered its Order Denying Motion to Dismiss, Striking
Evidentiary Hearings and Granting the State’s Motion in Limine.
The trial court held that “[t]his issue of off-reservation treaty hunting
rights is indistinguishable from the issue and arguments which were
adjudicated in Crow Tribe of Indians vs. Repsis, 73 F.3d 982 (10th
Cir. 1995).” The circuit court found itself to be “bound by the Tenth
Circuit’s holding that Crow Tribe members do not have offreservation treaty hunting rights anywhere within the state of
Wyoming.” The circuit court also rejected Herrera’s argument that
Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172
(1999), had reversed and rejected the Repsis case as well as Ward v.
Race Horse, 163 U.S. 504 (1896), upon which the Repsis decision
was based. The circuit court agreed with the Repsis court’s decision
that the off-reservation treaty hunting right was intended to be
temporary and is no longer valid. The circuit court alternatively held
that even if the treaty rights still existed, the regulation at issue met
the “conservation necessity” standard, and therefore the regulation
would apply to treaty hunters. Herrera filed a Petition for a Writ of
Review, Writ of Certiorari and Writ of Prohibition with the
Wyoming Supreme Court. The Wyoming Supreme Court denied the
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Petition. The jury convicted Herrera and he was given concurrent
sentences of one (l) year in jail suspended in lieu of unsupervised
probation, three (3) years of suspended hunting privileges, and
$8,080.00 in fines and court costs. This appeal followed. Herrera is
not challenging anything that occurred at his trial. Rather, he is
appealing the circuit court’s pretrial decisions on the validity of the
off-reservation treaty hunting right. The circuit court was presented
with the Repsis case, which had squarely addressed the
interpretation of the Crow Treaty. The circuit court was free to adopt
that decision if it found it to be persuasive and appropriate. The
circuit court did adopt the analysis and conclusions of the Repsis
case, and this Court finds that it was appropriate to do so. Herrera’s
primary argument is that the circuit court should not have found
Repsis to be persuasive, because it was overruled by Mille Lacs. The
circuit court rejected this argument, and as discussed above, this
Court also concludes that Mille Lacs did not overrule Repsis. Rather,
Mille Lacs reaffirmed the principle that the court must look at the
language in the treaty to determine whether it was intended to be
perpetual or if it was intended to terminate at the occurrence of a
“clearly contemplated” event. The Repsis court applied this
principle and determined that the off-reservation treaty hunting right
in the Crow Treaty was no longer valid. It was therefore proper for
the circuit court to adopt the reasoning in the Repsis decision, and
bar Herrera from asserting the invalidated treaty hunting right as a
defense to the criminal prosecution. Having reviewed the record, the
briefs of the parties, and being otherwise fully advised, the Court
affirms the circuit court’s orders and the Judgment and Sentence.
Now, therefore, it is hereby ordered that the circuit court’s orders
and the Judgment and Sentence are affirmed.
78.

Ak-Chin Indian Community v. Central Arizona Water
Conservation District

No. CV-17-00918-PHX-DGC, 2018 WL 397233 (D. Ariz. Jan. 12,
2018). Crossclaim Defendants the United States, Department of the
Interior (“DOI”), Bureau of Reclamation (“BOR”), and four officials
of the DOI and BOR (collectively, the “United States”) move to
dismiss Defendant Central Arizona Water Conservation District’s
(“CAWCD”) crossclaim against them under Rules 12(b)(1) and
12(b)(6). Plaintiff Ak-Chin Indian Community sued CAWCD to
establish its right to certain water. CAWCD moved to join the United
States as a necessary party defendant under Rule 19, and the Court
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granted the motion. CAWCD then brought a crossclaim against the
United States regarding CAWCD’s obligation to provide the water to
Ak-Chin on behalf of the United States. The crossclaim seeks
injunctive and declaratory relief. CAWCD operates and maintains the
Central Arizona Project (“CAP”) pursuant to an operating agreement
with the United States. As part of a 1984 settlement with Ak-Chin, the
United States committed to deliver not less than 75,000 acre-feet
(“AF”) per year “from the main project works of the [CAP] to the
southeast corner of the Ak-Chin Indian Reservation.” Ak-Chin Water
Rights Settlement Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-530, §2(a), 98 Stat. 2698
(the “1984 Act”). Additionally, “[i]n any year in which sufficient
surface water is available,” the DOI “shall deliver such additional
quantity of water as is requested by the Community not to exceed ten
thousand acre-feet.” Id. § 2(b). The 1984 Act identifies the CAP as the
source of the mandatory 75,000 AF, but does not identify a source for
the additional 10,000 AF. The parties refer to this additional 10,000 AF
as “§ 2(b) water,” and they dispute whether and under what
circumstances CAWCD is obligated to supply it. Pursuant to a contract
between the United States and Ak-Chin, Ak-Chin submits an annual
schedule of its desired water deliveries to the DOI, which reviews the
schedule for compliance with governing statutes and contracts and
transmits it to CAWCD to arrange the water deliveries. CAWCD
alleges that the United States transmitted a 2017 schedule that included
§ 2(b) water and would have forced CAWCD to supply water in excess
of its obligations. The United States instructed CAWCD that the § 2(b)
water was to come from “any unused Indian contract water.” CAWCD
argues that various statutes allocate a total of 136,645 AF of CAP water
for use by the Ak-Chin and San Carlos Apache tribes each year.
Further, CAWCD asserts that forcing it to supply § 2(b) water from
“unused Indian contract water” violates the 2007 CAP Repayment
Stipulation from prior litigation between CAWCD and the United
States. Because § 2(b) water is “Excess Water” under the Stipulation,
CAWCD argues that it has the “exclusive right in its discretion to sell
or use [it] for any authorized purpose of the CAP.” In short, the rights
asserted and the remedies sought in the crossclaim are rooted in
contract. The crossclaim therefore seeks relief impliedly forbidden by
another statute—the Tucker Act—and the APA waiver of sovereign
immunity does not apply. The crossclaim is barred by sovereign
immunity. It is ordered that the United States’ motion to dismiss
CAWCD’s crossclaim is granted.
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79.

Yurok Tribe v. Resighini Rancheria

No. 16-cv-02471 RMI, 2018 WL 550233 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2018).
Appeal filed with the 9th Circuit on February 26, 2018. This is an action
in which the Yurok Tribe (“the Tribe”) seeks a declaratory judgment
that the Resighini Rancheria (“the Rancheria”) and Gary Mitch Dowd,
a member of the Rancheria, do not have any rights to fish in the
Klamath River Indian fishery within the Yurok Reservation. The
Complaint sets forth two claims for relief: (1) violation of the HoopaYurok Settlement Act; and (2) violation of the Yurok Tribe’s exclusive
federally reserved fishing right. Pending before the court is the
Rancheria’s motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
This action is dismissed with prejudice as against the Resighini
Rancheria based on the Rancheria’s tribal sovereign immunity. The
court finds that the Yurok Tribe has waived its claims against
Defendant Dowd in his official capacity, and those claims are
dismissed. Finally, the court dismisses the action without prejudice as
against Defendant Dowd in his individual capacity for failure to join an
indispensable party under Rule 19.

80.

National Wildlife Federation, et al. v.
State of Oregon, et al.

No. 17-35462, No. 17-35463, No. 17-35465, No. 17-35466,
No. 17-35467, No. 17-35502, No. 18-35111, No. 18-35152,
886 F.3d 803 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 2018). Environmental conservation
organizations brought action against National Marine Fisheries
Service (NMFS), U.S. Army Corps of Engineers, and U.S. Bureau
of Reclamation, challenging NMFS’s Endangered Species Act
(ESA) biological opinion regarding salmonid species in Federal
Columbia River Power System (FCRPS). State of Oregon
intervened as plaintiff and states of Washington, Montana, and
Idaho, as well as Indian tribes and other interested groups intervened
as defendants. Following several rounds of appeals and remands to
agencies to modify the biological opinion, the United States District
Court for the District of Oregon, 184 F. Supp. 3d 861, found that
NMFS violated ESA, Administrative Procedure Act (APA), and
National Environmental Policy Act (NEPA) in part. Organizations
and Oregon moved for injunctive relief to address violations. The
District Court, 2017 WL 1135610, granted in part and denied in part
motions for injunctive relief. Agencies and intervenor-defendants
appealed. The Appellate Court held that: (1) conservation
organizations’ injunction motions were not precluded by rule
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establishing under what circumstances a motion for relief from
judgment is permitted; (2) showing an extinction-level threat to a
listed species is not required before an injunction can issue under the
ESA; (3) district court did not err in basing its issuance of
preliminary injunction on the harm from the operation of the FCRPS
dams as a whole, rather than on the harm from only the spill-related
components of the alternative proposed in NMFS’s biological
opinion; (4) district court properly concluded that operation of the
FCRPS dams would cause irreparable harm to threatened and
endangered salmonid species absent an injunction; (5) organizations
adequately showed irreparable harm to their own interests;
(6) preliminary injunction requiring increased amounts of spill was
narrowly tailored to avoid the irreparable harm identified; and
(7) conclusion that operation of dams would cause irreparable harm
to salmonid species absent an injunction requiring operation of
juvenile bypass facilities and associated passive integrated
transponder (PIT) tag detection systems at dams was based on
sufficient findings in the record. Affirmed in part.
81.

United States v. Washington

No. C70-9213, Sub-proceeding 17-02, 2018 WL 1933718 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 24, 2018). This subproceeding concerning the
Muckleshoot Tribe’s marine usual and accustomed fishing grounds
and stations comes before the Court on the Swinomish Indian Tribal
Community’s, Port Gamble and Jamestown S’Klallam Tribes’,
Suquamish Tribes’, and Tulalip Tribe’s Motion to Dismiss under
Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1). The Muckleshoot Tribe
opposes the motion, and the Nisqually Indian Tribe has joined in
that opposition. The Moving Tribes assert that this Court lacks
jurisdiction to hear this matter under Paragraph 25(a)(6) of the Order
Modifying Paragraph 25 of the Permanent Injunction, entered on
August 24, 1993, because the Muckleshoot Tribe’s marine usual and
accustomed fishing grounds and stations (“U&A”) has already been
specifically determined, and because the Muckleshoot asserted a
contrary position to that advanced now in a prior subproceeding in
which it succeeded. The Muckleshoot oppose the motion on the
basis that the marine U&A asserted now has never been determined.
The Nisqually, while not joining any substantive claims to the U&A,
concurs with the procedural arguments made by the Muckleshoot
with respect to its ability to invoke Paragraph 26(a)(6) jurisdiction.
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For the reasons discussed herein, the Court agrees with the Moving
Tribes, and hereby dismisses this subproceeding.
82.

Hoopa Valley Tribe v. National Marine Fisheries Service

No. 16-cv-04294-WHO, 2018 WL 2010980 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30,
2018). On March 24, 2017, I issued permanent injunctions in two
related cases, Hoopa Valley Tribe v. Bureau of Reclamation, No. 16cv-4294, and Yurok Tribe v. Bureau of Reclamation, No. 16-cv6863. See Hoopa Dkt. No. 111; Yurok Dkt. No. 70. The injunctions
ordered the United States Bureau of Reclamation (the “Bureau”) to
require certain types of water flows as part of their operation of the
Klamath River Project in order to prevent irreparable harm to the
SONCC Coho salmon, an endangered species. The plaintiffs in
those two cases are two federally protected Klamath Basin Tribes,
the Hoopa Valley Tribe and the Yurok Tribe, whose cultural
heritage and economic wellbeing revolve around the salmon’s
health, as well as the Pacific Coast Federation of Fishermen’s
Associations, Institute for Fisheries Resources, and Klamath
Riverkeeper. Certain organizations and persons interested in the
Klamath River Project intervened in both cases on the side of the
Bureau and the National Marine Fisheries Service (“NMFS,” and
together with the Bureau, “federal defendants”), advocating the
interests of ranchers and farmers in receiving needed water for their
livelihoods. While all of the parties present important equitable
concerns, the Court issued the injunctions because the law demands
that endangered species are entitled to primary protection. Both
federal defendants and intervenors filed timely notices of appeal in
the two cases. Water year 2017 resulted in favorable conditions in
the Klamath River, while water year 2018 has been significantly
drier. On March 7, 2018, intervenors moved for relief from the
judgment, or, in the alternative, a stay of enforcement of the
injunctions, arguing that the application of the injunctions to water
year 2018 is both unnecessary and inequitable due to new
information not available at the time that the injunctions were
issued. Federal defendants do not join in intervenors’ motion, but
respond separately that they believe that full compliance with the
injunctions is not possible as a result of the drier hydrological
conditions, and propose a new plan. Plaintiffs oppose both
intervenors’ motion and federal defendants’ proposal. Given the
pendency of the appeal, the Court’s jurisdiction is limited. Pursuant
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 62.1, the Court considered the
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merits of intervenors’ motion and denies it because they do not show
newly discovered evidence sufficient to justify suspending or
modifying the injunctions pursuant to Rule 60(b)(2), nor that
prospective application of the injunctions would be inequitable
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5). Staying enforcement would not preserve
the status quo, and the Court lacks jurisdiction to grant their
requested stay while the appeal is pending. Nor would the Court do
so in light of the evidence of record. With respect to federal
defendants’ proposed plan, the Court clarifies federal defendants’
obligations under the injunctions – partial compliance with Measure
4 is necessary in the event that full compliance is not possible.
83.

United States v. Walker River Irrigation District

No. 15-16478, No. 15-16479, 890 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. May 22,
2018). Federal government brought action to establish water rights
in river basin on behalf of the Walker River Paiute Tribe. The
District Court issued decision, 11 F. Supp. 158, and entered decree
awarding water rights to various claimants. Federal government
appealed. The Court of Appeals, 104 F.2d 334, reversed in part. On
remand, the District Court amended and retained jurisdiction to
modify decree. A river irrigation district filed a petition to enjoin
state water resources control board from implementing restrictions
on its water licenses. Tribe and federal government filed
counterclaims asserting new water rights. The District Court, 2015
WL 3439106, granted irrigation district’s motion to dismiss
counterclaims for lack of subject matter jurisdiction, concluding that
while continuing jurisdiction existed, counterclaims were new
action barred by res judicata. Tribe and federal government
appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) continuing jurisdiction
existed; (2) counterclaims were not new action; (3) dismissal based
on res judicata was improper; and (4) Court of Appeals would
reassign case. Reversed, remanded, and reassigned. We hold that the
district court had continuing jurisdiction over the counterclaims and
that it erred in dismissing the claims on res judicata or jurisdictional
grounds without giving the parties an opportunity to brief the issue.
Accordingly, we reverse and remand. On remand, we also order the
reassignment of this case to another district judge.
84.

Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Forsman

No. 17-35336, 738 Fed. Appx. 406, 2018 WL 3017052 (9th Cir.
Jun. 18, 2018). The Jamestown S’Klallam and Port Gamble
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S’Klallam Tribes are required parties to this action to establish
hunting rights. Like Defendants, these amici tribes’ interpretation of
their reserved hunting rights conflicts with Skokomish’s primaryright claim, which entails the power to exclude members from all
other Stevens Treaty Tribes from hunting in the land at issue.
Therefore, the district court correctly concluded that deciding
Skokomish’s claims against the Suquamish Defendants would
necessarily decide Skokomish’s hunting rights in relation to the
amici tribes and potentially other absent, non-party Stevens Treaty
Tribes. Finally, the district court did not err in sua sponte denying
Skokomish leave to amend its complaint. Skokomish has cursorily
argued that it can remedy the absence of indispensable parties by
adding the officers of the other Stevens Treaty Tribes to this action.
Skokomish has failed, however, to allege that any tribe other than
Suquamish has promulgated and is enforcing the type of tribal
hunting regulation at issue. Leave to amend would therefore be
futile.
85.

United States v. United States Board of Water
Commissioners

No. 15-16316, No. 15-16317, No. 15-16319, No. 15-16321, No. 1516323, No. 15-16489, 893 F.3d 578 (9th Cir. Jun. 22, 2018).
Farmers sought review under court’s in rem jurisdiction of Nevada
State Engineer’s and California State Water Resources Control
Board’s approval of conservation organization’s and irrigation
district’s change applications regarding their use of their water
claims from Walker River. The District Court rejected Nevada’s and
California’s rulings, refused to grant change applications, and
remanded. Conservation organization and irrigation district
appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) district court’s remand
order was sufficiently final for Court of Appeals to review;
(2) California Water Board’s adjudication of irrigation district’s
change applications should have been reviewed under abuse of
discretion standard; (3) Nevada State Engineer’s finding was
supported by substantial evidence; (4) farmers failed to demonstrate
that they had any right to the stored water that would have been
injured by irrigation district’s proposed change; and (5) irrigation
district’s proposed change did not violate Decree’s prohibition on
delivering water outside the basin of the Walker River. Reversed
and remanded. Opinion, 890 F.3d 1134, superseded.
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86.

The Klamath Tribes v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, et al.

No. 18-cv-03078-WHO, 2018 WL 3570865 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 25,
2018). The Klamath Tribes have filed suit for declaratory and
injunctive relief to protect two endangered species of sucker fish
from risk of extinction surrounding the operation of the Klamath
Irrigation Project (“Project”). They move for a preliminary
injunction to require the United States Bureau of Reclamation
(“Bureau”) to maintain the water in the Upper Klamath Lake during
the irrigation season of 2018 at elevation levels suggested in a
controlling Biological Opinion issued jointly by the United States
Fish and Wildlife Service (“FWS”) and National Marine Fisheries
Service (“NMFS”). The Bureau, FWS, and NMFS (collectively,
“federal defendants”) as well as Klamath Water Users Association,
Sunnyside Irrigation District, and Ben DuVal (collectively,
“intervenors”), oppose the preliminary injunction and move to
dismiss this case for improper venue, or alternatively to transfer
venue. The federal defendants also move to dismiss one Count as
nonjusticiable, and contend that it should at least be dismissed
against NMFS because it lacks jurisdiction over the protected sucker
fish. Various amici have filed briefs expressing their positions on
venue and the preliminary injunction. While venue may be proper
in the Northern District of California, it is more appropriate in the
United States District Court for the District of Oregon: the Klamath
Tribes are headquartered there, the sucker fish are there, the Upper
Klamath Lake is there, and the Bureau and FWS have offices there.
Only NMFS has an office in the Northern District, and it may not be
long for this case given problems with Count III. The Court will let
the transferee court address the pleadings as it will. There is reason
for all parties to give urgent focus to the health of the sucker fish.
The federal defendants represent that this is already happening, and
the Court encourages the engaged scientists for all parties to work
collaboratively and expeditiously to protect the sucker fish. The
Klamath Irrigation Project is complex, and the endangered species
within it are of paramount importance under the Endangered Species
Act. That said, while this is a close case, the Klamath Tribes have
not convinced the Court on this record that they are likely to prevail
on the merits or that the sucker fish will suffer irreparable harm if I
do not grant the relief the Klamath Tribes seek. There is substantial
disagreement whether the lake elevation level is causing injury to
the sucker fish, but there is no doubt that granting a mandatory
injunction that cuts off water to the Klamath Irrigation District will

111

cause substantial harm to others that depend on it, including wildlife
refuges, farmers and ranchers. The motion for preliminary
injunction is denied.
87.

Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. United States

No. 2017-2340, 900 F.3d 1350, 2018 WL 3945585 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 17, 2018). The Crow Creek Sioux Tribe (“Tribe”) is a federally
recognized Indian tribe. Its reservation is located in South Dakota
along the Missouri River. The Tribe filed suit against the United
States in the Court of Federal Claims (“Claims Court”) seeking
damages and declaratory and injunctive relief for the alleged taking
of its water rights in violation of the Fifth Amendment, and for the
alleged mismanagement of its water rights in violation of 25 U.S.C.
§ 162a(d)(8). The Claims Court dismissed the case for lack of
subject-matter jurisdiction. The Crow Creek Indian Reservation
(“Reservation”) was established in central South Dakota in 1863.
The Missouri River overlies the Reservation's western boundary.
Under the Supreme Court's decision in Winters v. United States, 207
U.S. 564, 28 S. Ct. 207, 52 L. Ed. 340 (1908), the creation of an
Indian Reservation carries an implied right to unappropriated water
“to the extent needed to accomplish the purpose of the reservation.”
These reserved rights are known as Winters rights. They arise as an
implied right from the treaty, federal statute, or executive order that
set aside the reservation, and they vest on the date of the
reservation's creation. The parties agree for purposes of the motion
to dismiss that, pursuant to the Winters doctrine, the Tribe possesses
a perfected right to sufficient water to fulfil the Reservation's
purposes. In June 2016, the Tribe filed suit in the Claims Court
seeking at least $200 million in damages. The complaint alleged that
certain, unspecified acts and omissions by the United States,
presumably including the continued operation of the dams, have
taken the Tribe's “Winters reserved water rights” without just
compensation in violation of the Fifth Amendment. The complaint
also alleged that the government breached its fiduciary duty to
“[a]ppropriately manag[e] the natural resources located within the
boundaries of Indian reservations,” 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d)(8), “by the
acts and omissions described hereinabove, including failing to
protect, quantify, assert or record Plaintiff's water rights, and instead
continuously diverting, retaining, and appropriating that water to
others and to Defendant's own use.” The complaint did not allege
that the government's actions deprived the Tribe of sufficient water
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to fulfill the reservation's purposes or that those actions would cause
the Tribe to lack sufficient water in the future. The United States
filed a motion to dismiss pursuant to Rule 12(b)(1) of the Court of
Federal Claims for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. The Claims
Court granted the motion, noting that Winters only entitles the Tribe
to sufficient water to fulfill the Reservation's purposes and
explaining that nothing in the complaint suggests that the Tribe is
“experienc[ing] a shortage of water” or that its water supply from
the Missouri River is or will be “insufficient for [the Tribe's]
intended pursuits.” The Claims Court rejected the Tribe's argument
that its Winters reserved water rights can be injured by any “taking
or diverting [of] waters from the Missouri River,” even if the
diversion does not cause the Tribe to experience any water shortage.
The court also noted that, while 25 U.S.C. § 162a(d)(8) “does direct
the government to manage the natural resources of Indian tribes,”
the statute “does not direct any specific actions to be taken by the
government in that management.” The Claims Court therefore
dismissed the suit for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because it
could not “identify an injury to the Tribe that has yet occurred.” The
tribe timely appealed. The Claims Court's decision, while it
sometimes uses the word “damages,” turns on the Tribe's underlying
failure to allege an injury in fact. Indeed, the Claims Court concludes
its opinion by stating that “[t]he jurisdictional problem ... arises from
plaintiff's inability to identify an injury to the Tribe.” We think the
Claims Court was correct in dismissing the case for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction because the Tribe failed to sufficiently allege
injury. The Tribe argues that, because its Winters rights vested at the
founding of the Reservation, any subsequent action affecting the
waters of the Missouri River constitutes an injury of those rights,
even if the action does not affect the Tribe's ability to draw sufficient
water to fulfill the purposes of the Reservation. In so arguing, the
Tribe appears to misunderstand what its water rights entail. As noted
above, Winters, the sole source of the water rights asserted in this
case, only entitles tribes to “that amount of water necessary to fulfill
the purpose of the reservation, no more.” And because water rights
are usufructuary in nature—meaning that the property right
“consists not so much of the fluid itself as the advantage of its
use”—the Tribe has no right to any particular molecules of water,
either on the Reservation or up- or downstream, that may have been
used or diverted by the government. The Tribe's Winters rights,
which give the Tribe the right to use sufficient water to fulfill the
purposes of the Reservation, simply cannot be injured by
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government action that does not affect the Tribe's ability to use
sufficient water to fulfill the purposes of the Reservation. Because
the Tribe failed to allege an injury in fact, we affirm the Claims
Court's dismissal for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction. Affirmed.
G.
88.

Gaming

Stockbridge–Munsee Community v. Wisconsin

No. 17–cv–249-jdp, 299 F. Supp. 3d 1026, 2017 WL 4857646
(W.D. Wis. Oct. 25, 2017). Stockbridge–Munsee Tribe filed this
lawsuit, claiming that the Ho–Chunk Nation’s casino violated
Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA) and gaming compact that
other tribe negotiated with state, and that state and its governor
violated compact by refusing to enforce its provisions.
Stockbridge–Munsee Tribe moved for preliminary injunction, and
other tribe moved for judgment on pleadings. The District Court
held that:(1) tribe’s claims accrued when state approved of casino
and other tribe began operating it, and (2) continuing violations
doctrine did not extend statutory period. Motion for judgment on
pleadings granted; dismissed.
89.

Amador County, California v. United States Department
of the Interior

No. 16-5082, 707 Fed. Appx. 720 (Mem) (D.D.C. Nov. 27, 2017).
This petition for review was considered on the record from the
United States District Court for the District of Columbia and on the
briefs filed by the parties. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2); D.C. Cir. R.
34(j). The court has accorded the issues full consideration and
determined that they do not warrant a published opinion. Amador
County challenges the Department of the Interior’s authorization of
gaming on land, known as the Buena Vista Rancheria, that is owned
by the Me Wuk Tribe. Its suit turns on whether the Rancheria is a
“reservation” within the meaning of the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act. See 25 U.S.C. §§ 2703(4), 2710. In 1987, in Hardwick v.
United States, No. C-79-1710 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 21, 1987), the County
and the Hardwick plaintiffs from the Buena Vista Rancheria agreed
to a stipulated judgment stating that the County would treat the
Buena Vista Rancheria “as any other federally recognized Indian
reservation,” and that “all of the laws of the United States that
pertain to federally recognized Indian Tribes and Indians shall
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apply” to the Rancheria. Joint Appendix 31. As the district court
found, the agreement’s plain language “unambiguously sets forth
the parties’ intent that the County would treat the Buena Vista
Rancheria as a reservation.” Amador County v. S.M.R. Jewell, 170
F. Supp. 3d 135, 144 (D.D.C. 2016). And as this court noted in an
earlier appeal, such a clear manifestation of the “parties’ intent to be
bound in future actions” precludes the County from arguing here
that the Rancheria is not an Indian reservation. See Amador County
v. Salazar, 640 F.3d 373, 384 (D.C. Cir. 2011) (citing Otherson v.
Dep’t of Justice, 711 F.2d 267, 274 n.6 (D.C. Cir. 1983)). The

district court’s order of March 16, 2016 is affirmed.
90.

Sharp Image Gaming, Inc. v. Shingle Springs Band of
Miwok Indians

No. C070512, 15 Cal. App. 5th 391, 223 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2017), reh’g denied (Oct. 16, 2017), review denied (Dec. 20,
2017). Casino gaming company brought breach of contract action
against Indian tribe stemming from a deal to develop a casino on
tribal land. The Superior Court denied tribe’s motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction as well as motion for summary
judgment, and, following trial, entered judgment on jury verdict for
the company. Tribe appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) court
was required to determine threshold question of whether agreements
were management contracts or collateral agreements to a
management contract subject to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(IGRA); (2) agreements were “management agreements” within
meaning of IGRA; and (3) promissory note was a collateral
agreement to a management contract within meaning of IGRA such
that preemption applied. Reversed and remanded with directions.
91.

Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Oklahoma

No. 16-6224, 881 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. Feb. 6, 2018). Native American
nation brought action against state of Oklahoma, seeking to enforce
arbitration award obtained in connection with dispute under tribal-state
gaming compact. The District Court, 2016 WL 3461538, entered order
enforcing award. State appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) de
novo review provision of binding arbitration clause in tribal-state
gaming compact was legally invalid, and (2) district court erred in
failing to sever binding arbitration clause from tribal-state gaming
compact. Remanded with instructions to vacate arbitration award.
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92.

Texas v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo

No. EP–17–CV–179–RPM, 2018 WL 1474679 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 26,
2018). The Court considered Defendants Ysleta del Sur Pueblo, the
Tribal Council, and the Tribal Governor Carlos Hisa’s [hereinafter
collectively referred to as “Defendants”] “Motion to Dismiss First
Amended Complaint” (“Motion”). This case is the latest iteration of a
long-running dispute between Plaintiff and Defendants regarding
enforcement of Texas gaming law on the Ysleta del Sur Pueblo
[hereinafter “Pueblo” or “the Tribe”] reservation. In 1987, the United
States enacted the Restoration Act (“the Act”), which “restored trust
responsibility for the Pueblo to the federal government” from the State
of Texas. The Act delineates the nature of the federal trust relationship
and contains provisions regarding, inter alia, federal recognition of the
Tribe, the rights and privileges of the Tribe (including eligibility for
federal services and assistance), the relationship between federal, state,
and tribal authority, and permanent physical improvements to the
reservation. Most importantly for purposes of this case, the Act governs
“Gaming Activities” conducted on the reservation [hereinafter “Pueblo
gaming”]. Section 107 of the Act contains two provisions relevant to
deciding the Motion. Section 107(a), in pertinent part, provides that:
All gaming activities which are prohibited by the laws of the State of
Texas are hereby prohibited on the reservation and on lands of the tribe.
Any violation of the prohibition provided in this subsection shall be
subject to the same civil and criminal penalties that are provided by the
laws of the State of Texas. Section 107(c) provides that “the courts of
the United States shall have exclusive jurisdiction over any offense in
violation of subsection (a) [i.e., the section prohibiting all gaming
activities prohibited by the State of Texas] ....” The effect of
subsections (a) and (c) of the Act is to federalize Texas gaming law,
which currently operates “as surrogate federal law on the Tribe’s
reservation in Texas.” Ysleta del Sur Pueblo v. State of Tex., 36 F.3d
1325, 1334 (5th Cir. 1994). Essentially, any activity prohibited
pursuant to Texas law is prohibited pursuant to federal law. The Court
concludes that the Texas attorney general, who is statutorily authorized
to sue based on the Texas common nuisance statute, maintains the
capacity to bring suit in this case. Accordingly, Defendants Ysleta del
Sur Pueblo, the Tribal Council, and the Tribal Governor Carlos Hisa’s
“Motion to Dismiss First Amended Complaint” is denied.
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93.

Pauma v. National Labor Relations Board

No. 16-70397, No. 16-70756, 888 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. Apr. 26,
2018). Tribal employer that operated casino on Indian reservation
filed petition for review of order of the National Labor Relations
Board (NLRB), No. 21-CA-125450, 363 NLRB No. 60, 205
L.R.R.M. 1591, 2015 WL 7873631, which affirmed as modified
administrative law judge’s (ALJ) decision, 2015 WL 3526140, that
employer committed unfair labor practices in violation of the
National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) by trying to stop union
literature distribution in guest areas at casino’s front entrance and in
non-working areas near its employees’ time clock. NLRB filed
petition for enforcement of its order, and union intervened in
opposition to employer. The Court of Appeals held that: (1) union
could not raise collateral estoppel defense affirmatively waived by
NLRB; (2) NLRB’s determination that tribal employer was
“employer” within meaning of the NLRA was entitled to Chevron
deference; (3) federal Indian law did not preclude NLRB’s
determination that tribal employer was “employer” within meaning
of the NLRA; (4) employer sufficiently exhausted its claim that it
did not violate the NLRA; (5) substantial evidence supported
NLRB’s determination that tribal employer committed unfair labor
practice by trying to stop employees’ union literature distribution to
customers outside casino’s front entrance; and (6) substantial
evidence supported NLRB’s determination that tribal employer
committed unfair labor practice by disciplining employee for
distributing union literature near casino’s time clock. NLRB’s
petition granted and employer’s petition denied.
94.

Fort Sill Apache Tribe v. National Indian Gaming
Commission

No. 14-958, 317 F. Supp. 3d 504, 2018 WL 2389724 (D.D.C.
May 25, 2018). Indian tribe brought action against National Indian
Gaming Commission (NIGC), its acting chairman, and United
States, alleging that NIGC’s decision not to reconsider and to affirm
its prior decision, which determined that tribe was not eligible to
operate casino, was arbitrary and capricious and that United States
breached settlement agreement, under which tribe agreed to
relinquish its lands on reservation and move to area within tribe’s
ancestral homeland. NIGC, acting chairman, and United States
moved to dismiss and to reconsider prior order that allowed tribe to
amend its complaint. In the late 1990s, the Tribe sought to open a
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gaming facility on land within the boundaries of the KCA
Reservation. The Comanche Nation, a separate tribal entity which
also held lands on the KCA Reservation, opposed that plan and sued
the United States to stop it. See Comanche Nation, Okla. v. United
States (Comanche Nation), Case No. CIV–05–328–F (W.D. Ok.
Mar. 9, 2007). The Fort Sill Apache Indian Tribe intervened in the
lawsuit. Pursuant to the Comanche Nation Settlement Agreement,
the Fort Sill Apache Indian Tribe agreed to relinquish its lands on
the KCA Reservation and move to a thirty-acre location in Akela
Flats, New Mexico, an area within the Tribe’s ancestral homeland.
Plaintiff now seeks to establish gaming in the New Mexico lands.
The District Court held that: (1) District Court that issued settlement
agreement retained jurisdiction over the agreement, and thus,
District Court lacked jurisdiction over tribe’s breach of agreement
claim, and (2) NIGC’s decision not to reconsider and to affirm its
prior decision was final agency action, and thus was subject to
judicial review. Motion to dismiss granted in part and denied in part;
motion for reconsideration granted. Having reaffirmed on
reconsideration that the 2017 Decision constitutes final agency
action subject to challenge in court, the Court will order the
Defendants to produce the administrative record for the 2017
Decision, including any privilege log, within fourteen days of the
date of this order. The Tribe’s motion to compel is denied as
premature.
95.

California v. Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians
of California,

No. 16-15096, 725 Fed. Appx. 591 (Mem) (9th Cir. Jun. 5, 2018).
Defendant-Appellants, individual members of the Picayune
Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians of California Tribe (“the
Distributees”), appeal the district court’s entry of judgment and
permanent injunction, which enjoined the Tribe and its agents from
certain conduct related to ensuring the health, safety, and welfare of
the public with respect to the Tribe’s operation of its Chukchansi
Gold Resort and Casino. The Distributees allege that the district
court erroneously recognized a faction of tribal members as the
rightful tribal leadership and failed to recognize and defer to tribal
court rulings regarding the makeup of the Tribal Council and its
election. The Court has jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291
over the appeal of the district court’s judgment and permanent
injunction. Contrary to Appellee’s assertion, the Distributees have
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standing to pursue this appeal because the district court enjoined “all
groups claiming to constitute the tribal government,” which
arguably forms the basis of the Distributees’ claim. Nonetheless, the
appeal fails on the merits. First, the injuries alleged by the
Distributees, recognition of the Interim and New Tribal Councils
and failure to recognize tribal court rulings, are not part of the
district court’s decision. The district court did not determine which
disputant tribal faction represented the rightful tribal council or
leadership. Rather, the district court summarized the intra-tribal
dispute among the factions, the actions taken by the BIA and the
Interior Board of Indian Appeals with respect to the 2010 Interim
Tribal Council, and the October 2015 Tribal Council Election.
Further, the tribal court rulings referenced by the Distributees were
irrelevant to the issues before the district court: the Tribe’s
compliance with the provisions of the Class III gaming Compact
between the Tribe and the State of California requiring the Tribe to
ensure the public’s health, safety, and welfare in operating its
Casino. Because the district court did not recognize one faction over
another and did not err by failing to recognize tribal court rulings
that were irrelevant to the issues before it, reversal of the district
court’s judgment or permanent injunction would not redress or have
a practical effect on the injuries alleged by the Distributees. On the
merits, the district court did not abuse its discretion in granting the
injunction. The State of California sufficiently established
irreparable harm in the danger that the continued conflict over the
tribal casino operations posed to public safety. There were no
adequate remedies at law. The balance of hardships favored the
State. The public interest was served by the entry of a permanent
injunction. The district court acted entirely properly.
96.

Navajo Nation et. al., v. Dalley

No. 16-2205, 896 F.3d 1196, 2018 WL 3543643 (10th Cir. Jul. 24,
2018). The Appellants, the Navajo Nation and its wholly-owned
government enterprise the Northern Edge Navajo Casino (together,
the “Tribe” or “Nation”), entered into a state-tribal gaming compact
with New Mexico under the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act
(“IGRA”), 25 U.S.C. §§ 2701–2721. The Tribe agreed not only to
waive its sovereign immunity for personal-injury lawsuits brought
by visitors to its on-reservation gaming facilities, but also to permit
state courts to take jurisdiction over such claims. Harold and
Michelle McNeal (the “McNeals”) are plaintiffs in just such a state-

119

court action against the Tribe. Mr. McNeal allegedly slipped on a
wet floor in the Northern Edge Navajo Casino. This slip-and-fall
incident constituted the basis for the McNeals’ tort claims against
the Nation for negligence, res ipsa loquitur, and loss of consortium.
Judge Bradford Dalley is a New Mexico state judge who presides
over the ongoing state-court proceedings. The Tribe moved to
dismiss the McNeals’ complaint, arguing that the state court lacked
jurisdiction because neither IGRA nor Navajo law permits the
shifting of jurisdiction to a state court over such personal-injury
claims. The state court rejected that motion. In response, the Tribe
sought declaratory relief in federal court on the basis of the same
arguments. The district court granted summary judgment for the
McNeals and Judge Dalley, holding that IGRA permitted tribes and
states to agree to shift jurisdiction to the state courts and that Navajo
law did not prohibit such an allocation of jurisdiction. The Tribe
timely appealed. Prior to oral argument, the Court ordered the
parties to submit supplemental briefs as to whether the district court
had jurisdiction. Along with the jurisdictional issue, the parties also
dispute (1) whether IGRA permits an Indian tribe to allocate
jurisdiction over a tort claim arising on Indian land to a state court,
and (2) assuming that IGRA does allow for such an allocation,
whether the Navajo Nation Council (“NNC”) was empowered to
shift jurisdiction to the state court under Navajo Law. After first
concluding that the Court has jurisdiction to hear this appeal, the
Court determined that IGRA, under its plain terms, does not
authorize an allocation of jurisdiction over tort claims of the kind at
issue here. Accordingly, the Court reverses the judgment of the
district court and remand with instructions to grant the declaratory
relief sought by the Nation.
97.

State Of California, et al., v. Iipay Nation Of Santa
Ysabel, et al.

No. 17-55150, 898 F.3d 960, 2018 WL 3650825 (9th Cir. Aug. 2,
2018). The panel affirmed the district court’s summary judgment in
favor of the State of California and the United States in their action
seeking injunctive relief prohibiting Iipay Nation of Santa Ysabel
from continuing to operate Desert Rose Casino. Desert Rose Casino
is exclusively a server-based bingo game that allows patrons to play
computerized bingo over the internet. Iipay Nation is a federally
recognized Indian tribe with tribal lands located in San Diego
County, California. The panel held that Iipay Nation’s operation of
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Desert Rose Casino violated the Unlawful Internet Gambling
Enforcement Act (“UIGEA”). The panel held that the Indian
Gaming Regulatory Act protected gaming activity conducted on
Indian lands, but the patrons’ act of placing a bet or wager on a game
of Desert Rose Casino while located in California, violated the
UIGEA, and was not protected by the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act. The panel further held that even if all of the “gaming activity”
associated with Desert Rose Casino occurred on Indian lands, the
patrons’ act of placing bets or wagers over the internet while located
in a jurisdiction where those bets or wagers were illegal made Iipay
Nation’s decision to accept financial payments associated with those
bets or wagers a violation of the UIGEA. This case presents an issue
of first impression: Does the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act, 25
U.S.C. § 2701, et seq., permit an Indian tribe to offer online gaming
to patrons located off Indian lands in jurisdictions where gambling
is illegal? Because we conclude that the Unlawful Internet
Gambling Enforcement Act, 31 U.S.C. § 5361, et seq., bars the
activity at issue in this case, we affirm the district court’s order
granting summary judgment to the State of California and the United
States. As discussed above, DRB (like other forms of bingo,
generally) is a Class II game. Thus, if DRB takes place on Indian
lands, it is under Iipay’s jurisdiction, provided Iipay complies with
certain regulatory requirements that are not at issue here. The
UIGEA was passed to regulate online gambling. See 31 U.S.C.
§ 5361. Unlike IGRA or other gambling regulations, the UIGEA
does not make gambling legal or illegal directly. Instead, the UIGEA
makes it illegal for a “person engaged in the business of betting or
wagering” knowingly to accept certain financial payments from an
individual who is engaged in “unlawful Internet gambling.” 31
U.S.C. § 5363. Unlawful internet gambling occurs when an
individual places or receives a “bet or wager by any means which
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involves the use, at least in part, of the Internet where such bet or
wager is unlawful under any applicable Federal or State law in the
State or Tribal lands in which the bet or wager is initiated, received,
or otherwise made.” 31 U.S.C. § 5362(10)(A) (emphasis added). A
“bet or wager” includes “staking or risking” something of value,
purchasing a lottery ticket, or transmitting “any instructions or
information pertaining to the establishment or movement of funds
by the bettor or customer in, to, or from an account with the business
of betting or wagering.” 31 U.S.C. § 5362(1). Thus, the UIGEA does
not prohibit otherwise legal gambling. But the UIGEA does create a
system in which a “bet or wager” must be legal both where it is
“initiated” and where it is “received.”
H.
98.

Jurisdiction, Federal

Jamestown S’Klallam Tribe v. McFarland

No. 2:17–00293–WBS, 579 B.R. 853 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 19, 2017).
Chapter 11 trustee brought adversarial proceeding against tribe,
seeking to avoid and recover the value of certain allegedly
fraudulent transfers. The bankruptcy court denied tribe’s motion to
dismiss. The Tribe appealed. The District Court held that:
(1) Bankruptcy Code provision abrogating the sovereignty of any
governmental unit, abrogated tribe’s sovereign immunity with
regard to trustee’s adversarial proceeding against tribe under
provision allowing trustee to avoid any transfer of an interest of the
debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor that is
voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an allowable
unsecured claim; (2) due to explicit abrogation of sovereign
immunity in Bankruptcy Code provision abrogating the sovereignty
of any governmental unit, in order to bring a claim against tribe
under provision allowing trustee to avoid any transfer of an interest
of the debtor in property or any obligation incurred by the debtor
that is voidable under applicable law by a creditor holding an
allowable unsecured claim, trustee needed only identify an
unsecured creditor who, but for sovereign immunity, could have
brought claim against tribe; (3) such interpretation in no way altered
state law or created a new cause of action, and thus, trustee could
bring such claim against tribe; (4) trustee’s service of summons and
complaint for adversarial proceeding against tribe, by mail, was
effective; and (5) trustee demonstrated good cause for delay in
service of first amended complaint against tribe, and thus, the
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bankruptcy court did not abuse its discretion in extending the time
for service. Affirmed.
99.

Toya v. Toledo

No. CIV 17-0258 JCH/KBM, 2017 WL 3995554 (D.N.M. Sep. 19,
2017). This matter comes before the Court on Petitioner Milton
Toya’s First Amended Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Relief
from a Tribal Court Conviction Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1303 filed
June 9, 2017. Petitioner asserts that he was denied the right to
counsel and the right to request a trial by jury during the course of
his tribal-court prosecution. Respondents, on the other hand,
contend that Petitioner has failed to exhaust his tribal remedies,
leaving this Court without jurisdiction to resolve the Petition. The
Honorable Judith C. Herrera referred this matter to me to “conduct
hearings, if warranted, including evidentiary hearings, and to
perform any legal analysis required to recommend to the Court an
ultimate disposition of the case.” Having reviewed the submissions
of the parties and the relevant law, the Court finds that Petitioner has
exhausted his tribal remedies or that resort to them would be futile.
The Court furthermore concludes that there is merit to Petitioner’s
contentions, and therefore recommends that the Petition be granted.
Petitioner was charged with four crimes: aggravated driving under
the influence, liquor violation, driving on a revoked or suspended
license, and open container. Petitioner asked to change his plea to
not guilty and proceed to a jury trial. Petitioner also asked for an
attorney. Judge Toledo advised Petitioner that he should have asked
for an attorney and a trial before he pled guilty, and he denied
Petitioner’s request to change his plea. Judge Toledo told Petitioner
that if he was unhappy with the decision, he could appeal to the
Governor’s office. However, it is made clear that Petitioner has no
recourse in appealing to the Tribal Council or in requesting postjudgment relief from his criminal proceedings when examining the
Pueblo of Jemez Rules of Criminal Procedure.
100.

Jones v. Parmley

No. 16-3603-cv, 714 Fed. Appx. 42, 2017 WL 4994468 (2nd Cir.
Nov. 2, 2017). Members of Native American tribe filed suit against
state troopers and other law enforcement officials arising out of
defendants’ conduct in dispersing tribe’s political protest. Following
settlement, 15 members of tribe who refused to settle proceeded to
trial pro se. Following jury trial, the District Court entered judgment
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for defendants, and tribe members appealed. The appellate court
held that: (1) district court’s trial management did not violate rights
of tribe members to fair trial; (2) record contained no evidence of
judicial bias that warranted district court’s recusal; (3) personal
involvement of defendants in alleged constitutional deprivations
was prerequisite to award of damages under § 1983; (4) magistrate
judge did not abuse her discretion in granting motions of tribe
members’ counsel to withdraw following tribe members’ rejection
of settlement. Affirmed.
101.

Murphy v. Royal

No. 07-7068, No. 15-7041, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. Nov. 9, 2017).
After Oklahoma state prisoner’s conviction for first-degree murder
and death sentence were affirmed on appeal, 47 P.3d 876, he filed
petition for writ of habeas corpus. The District Court for the Eastern
District of Oklahoma, D.C. No. 6:03-CV-00443, White, J., 497 F.
Supp. 2d 1257, denied prisoner’s petition, and, after prisoner filed
second habeas petition, the District Court, D.C. No. 6:12-CV-00191,
White, J., 2015 WL 2094548, denied prisoner’s second petition.
Prisoner appealed. The appellate court held that: (1) prisoner’s claim
was governed by clearly established federal law; (2) Oklahoma state
appellate court rendered merits decision on prisoner’s claim that
state court lacked jurisdiction because crime occurred on Indian
land; (3) Oklahoma state appellate court’s decision was contrary to
clearly established federal law; and (4) Congress did not disestablish
Indian reservation, and thus Oklahoma state court lacked
jurisdiction to prosecute defendant for murder that occurred on
reservation. Reversed and remanded.
102.

Darnell v. Merchant

No. 17-03063-EFM-TJJ, 2017 WL 5889754 (D. Kan. Nov. 29,
2017). Petitioner Bobbie Darnell, a member of the Kickapoo Tribe
in Kansas (the “Tribe”), filed a Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus
pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1303 seeking relief from her tribal court
convictions and sentence. Petitioner requests that the Court issue a
writ of habeas corpus commanding her immediate release from jail
in Brown County, Kansas, overturning her convictions in Kickapoo
criminal cases numbers CRM016-11 and CRM016-23, and staying
all further tribal court action against her. As explained below, the
Court denies the Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus because
Petitioner has not exhausted her tribal remedies. After the district
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court filed the sentencing order, Petitioner never filed a notice of
appeal to the Kickapoo Supreme Court. But Petitioner contends that
she does not have to exhaust her tribal remedies because she satisfies
the exceptions to exhaustion set forth in Burrell. Specifically,
Petitioner argues that the assertion of tribal jurisdiction was
motivated by a desire to harass or was conducted in bad faith and
that the assertion of tribal jurisdiction would be futile. She has not
shown that any of the five exceptions to the exhaustion requirement
apply in this case.
103.

State v. Todd

No. 20170240, 904 N.W. 2d 40 (Mem) (N.D. Dec. 7, 2017).
Timothy Lee Todd appeals from a criminal judgment entered after
the district court found him guilty of being in actual physical control
of a motor vehicle while under the influence of intoxicating liquor.
Todd argues the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction
because he is an enrolled member of a federally-recognized tribe and
he was conducting tribe-related business. Because Todd committed
the offense beyond the exterior boundaries of a reservation, we
conclude the district court had subject matter jurisdiction over this
matter under N.D. Const. art. VI, § 8, and N.D.C.C. § 27–05–06. See
State v. Delorme, 2013 ND 123, ¶ 12, 834 N.W. 2d 300 (quoting
Roe v. Doe, 2002 ND 136, ¶ 8, 649 N.W. 2d 566) (stating that
“outside of Indian country, the state has general criminal jurisdiction
over all persons, including Indians”). Further, the district court did
not abuse its discretion in rejecting Todd’s discovery claim, and its
judgment is supported by substantial evidence. We summarily
affirm under N.D.R. App. P. 35.1(a)(3), (4), and (7).
104.

State v. Comenout

No. 48990–2–II, 1 Wash. App. 2d 1058 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 27,
2017). In a consolidated case, Robert Comenout Jr., Lee Comenout
Sr., Marlene Comenout, and Robert Comenout Sr. (collectively the
Comenouts) appeal their convictions following their Alford pleas to
charges relating to the possession and sale of cigarettes in the
operation of the Indian Country Store in Puyallup. The Comenouts
allege that they are enrolled Indians doing business in Indian
Country, and therefore that they are not subject to State criminal
jurisdiction. The Indian Country Store is located on trust allotment
property, but it is not within an Indian reservation. We hold that
(1) the State has criminal jurisdiction over the Comenouts for
125

activity occurring on trust allotment property that is not located
within an Indian reservation, (2) RCW 82.24.250, one of the statutes
associated with their convictions, does not violate equal protection,
(3) we decline to consider the Comenouts’ claim that their
respective informations were insufficient because they presented no
meaningful argument on that claim, and (4) we decline to review the
Comenouts’ other claims that do not involve jurisdiction because
they waived their right to appeal those claims when they pleaded
guilty. Accordingly, we affirm the convictions of Robert Comenout
Jr., Lee Comenout Sr., Marlene Comenout, and Robert Comenout
Sr.
105.

State v. Zack

No. 34926-8-III, 2 Wash. App. 2d 667 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 8,
2018). Defendant was convicted in the Superior Court of assault of
law enforcement officer, arising out of assault of jail officer while
transporting defendant to hospital on deeded (fee) land within
boundaries of reservation. Defendant appealed. As matter of first
impression, the Court of Appeals held that State had jurisdiction to
prosecute defendant, who was not enrolled member of tribe, for
crime that occurred on fee land within boundaries of reservation.
Affirmed.
106.

Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. BNSF Railway
Company

No. C15-0543RSL, 2018 WL 1336256 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15,
2018). This matter comes before the Court on “BNSF Railway
Company’s Motion for Clarification and, if Necessary,
Reconsideration.” The Swinomish Indian Tribal Community filed
this lawsuit in April 2015 alleging that BNSF Railway Company
breached provisions of a Right-of-Way Easement Agreement
(“Easement Agreement”) that governed BNSF’s access to tribal
lands. The Tribe asserted breach of contract and trespass claims and
sought damages, declaratory judgment, and injunctive relief. In its
answer, BNSF admitted that “the Right-of-Way is on the north end
of the Reservation” and “crosses a bridge over the Swinomish
Channel and a bridge across Padilla Bay, both of which are within
the Reservation.” BNSF also raised preemption as an affirmative
defense, arguing that the Tribe’s claims are barred by the Interstate
Commerce Commission Termination Act (“ICCTA”), 49 U.S.C.
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§ 10501 et seq. The parties filed cross-motions for summary
judgment regarding the preemption defense. In support of its
motion, the Tribe set forth facts relevant to the enforceability of the
Easement Agreement, the Court’s jurisdiction, and the nature of its
claims. These facts were not disputed in the summary judgment
memoranda. Although BNSF noted that a contested issue in the
prior litigation was whether the rail line was within the boundaries
of the Reservation, it admitted the fact for purposes of this litigation
and offered no evidence that would suggest a genuine dispute. At
oral argument, however, counsel announced that BNSF was, in fact,
contesting whether the Tribe had any rights in the land underlying
the railway. Again, no evidence was identified or provided in
support of the supposed disputed issue of fact. In ruling on the crossmotions for summary judgment, the Court initially misconstrued
plaintiff’s breach of contract and trespass claims as arising under
state law. The Tribe filed a motion for reconsideration, arguing that
it was “suing to protect its interests in land that, pursuant to treaty,
is held in trust for the Tribe by the United States government” and
that its claims were therefore grounded in federal common law, not
state law. The Tribe clearly linked the resolution of the preemption
issue to its treaty rights in the land underlying BNSF’s tracks,
arguing that the treaty gave rise to a federally-protected interest and
fundamentally changed the preemption analysis. Again, BNSF did
not produce any evidence that the right-of-way fell outside the
Reservation boundaries. Based on the record before it, the Court
found that it had erred in its preemption analysis. A federal right
arising from a treaty is, under the Supremacy Clause of the United
States Constitution, Art. VI cl. 2, on equal legal footing with federal
statutes: Preemption was simply not an issue. Thus, the Court
implicitly adopted the admitted and factually undisputed allegation
that BNSF’s tracks are on tribal land. BNSF, having now lost the
preemption battle, intends to contest a key fact underlying that
analysis, even though it was admitted in its answer and regarding
which it has not provided a shred of evidence. BNSF admits that its
goal is to overturn the Court’s preemption decision by showing that
the Tribe has no treaty rights to the land under the tracks, that the
Tribe’s right is therefore merely a contract right arising under state
law, and that the contract and trespass claims are preempted. This
very issue has been resolved based on a record developed by the
parties with full knowledge that the genesis of the Tribe’s
contractual right—whether it arose from a Treaty right or under state
law—was a critical issue. BNSF chose not to submit evidence on
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that issue, instead asserting a right to litigate this fact on its own
schedule. It will not be permitted to do so. For all of the foregoing
reasons, BNSF’s request for clarification is granted. As part of the
preemption analysis, the Court relied on the record evidence
showing that the Tribe has a treaty right to the land under BNSF’s
tracks. That counsel can imagine a factual dispute regarding
ownership—or the fact that BNSF’s predecessor raised the issue in
a prior litigation—does not mean that there is a genuine issue of
disputed fact in this litigation. The Tribe’s allegation of ownership
was admitted, and BNSF declined to provide any evidence to
support its periodic assertions that there may be some doubt
regarding the issue. Its request for reconsideration is denied.
107.

United States v. 99, 337 Pieces of Counterfeit Native
American Jewelry

No. 16-1304 KG-KBM, 2018 WL 1568725 (D.N.M. Mar. 27,
2018). This matter comes before the Court upon Claimant Romie
Salem’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a Claim, filed March
6, 2017. Mr. Salem requests that the Court dismiss the United States’
claim against his property, asserting he is an innocent bystander
whose property the United States wrongfully seized. Mr. Salem
further asserts that his property is now subject to forfeiture simply
because it was stored in the same facility where other property
subject to forfeiture was stored and that his property, therefore, is
implicated in a criminal investigation not related to his property. The
United States argues the Court should deny the Motion to Dismiss
because the Verified Complaint for Forfeiture In Rem states a claim
for relief. On February 1, 2018, the Court held a hearing on the
Motion to Dismiss. The Court took the matter under advisement but
allowed both parties to file supplemental reply briefs. The United
States brings this civil action to forfeit and condemn property,
alleging violations of: (1) 18 U.S.C. § 542 (“Entry of goods by
means of false statements”), and forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. §
981(a)(1)(C); (2) 18 U.S.C. § 545 (“Smuggling goods in the United
States”), and forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 545; (3) 19 U.S.C. §
1304 (“Marking of imported articles and containers”), and forfeiture
pursuant to 19 U.S.C. § 1595a(c)(2)(E); and (4) 18 U.S.C. § 1956
(“Laundering of monetary instruments”) and § 1957 (“Engaging in
monetary transactions in property derived from specified unlawful
activity”), and forfeiture pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 981(a)(1)(A).
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Defendants in rem include (a) 99,337 Pieces of Counterfeit Native
American Jewelry; (b) 72,620 Pieces of Counterfeit Native
American Jewelry; (c) 21,249 Pieces of Counterfeit Native
American Jewelry; and (d) $288,738.94 in Funds from Bank of
America Account No.-3826 (collectively, Defendant Property). The
allegations stem from an investigation by the United States Fish and
Wildlife Service and the Indian Arts and Crafts Board into the sale
of alleged counterfeit Native American jewelry and violations of the
Indian Arts and Crafts Act (IACA) by Sterling Islands, Inc.
(Sterling), located at 5815 Menaul Boulevard, NE, Albuquerque,
New Mexico. The Complaint alleges Sterling and other associated
businesses worked in concert both inside and outside the District of
New Mexico to design, manufacture, import, and fraudulently sell
counterfeit Native American Jewelry in violation of the IACA. As a
result of the investigation, federal search warrants were obtained and
executed on Sterling’s business located at 5815 Menaul Boulevard
NE, Albuquerque, New Mexico, where agents seized 53 boxes of
alleged counterfeit Native American jewelry, including 99,337
pieces of jewelry. In addition, agents seized $288,738.94. Agents
also executed search warrants at Al Zuni Global Jewelry, located at
1603 West Highway 66, Gallup, New Mexico, where they seized
72,620 pieces of alleged counterfeit Native American jewelry and at
1924 Count Fleet Street SE, Albuquerque, New Mexico, where
agents seized 21,249 pieces of alleged counterfeit Native American
jewelry. Mr. Salem argues the Complaint fails to state a claim
against his property because (1) it does not include his name or that
of his company, “Turquoise Network;” (2) there are no allegations
against him of any wrongdoing; and (3) there is no justification for
the seizure of his property. Mr. Salem also argues there is
“absolutely no way for [him] to know or reasonably expect that he
or his property were involved at all.” Having reviewed the entirety
of the Complaint the Court determines that the Complaint states a
claim against Defendant Property. It is therefore, ordered that
Claimant Romie Salem’s Motion to Dismiss for Failure to State a
Claim is denied.
108.

John v. Garcia

No. C 16-02368 WHA, 2018 WL 1569760 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31,
2018). Respondents move for the third time to dismiss this petition
for writ of habeas corpus pursuant to the Indian Civil Rights Act.
The parties herein belong to the Elem Indian Colony of Pomo
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Indians (the “Tribe”). A general council comprising all qualified
voting members governs the Tribe and delegates various powers to
a biennially-elected executive committee. Following a disputed
election in November 2014, two factions—petitioners and
respondents—each purported to be the Tribe’s duly-elected
executive committee. Respondents managed to establish themselves
as such and remain in power as the current executive committee,
though petitioners continued to contest the results of the 2014
election. On March 28, 2016, respondents issued an “Order of
Disenrollment” to petitioners and other members of the Tribe. The
disenrollment order accused petitioners of “violating the laws of
Elem” and included a list of offenses. It stated, “If you are found
guilty by the General Council of these offenses against the Tribe,
you may be punished by ... DISENROLLMENT—loss of
membership.” Recipients of the disenrollment order could submit a
written answer within 35 days admitting or denying each accusation.
Shortly after issuance of the disenrollment order, on April 30, 2016,
petitioners filed this petition for writ of habeas corpus, alleging
denial of due process and equal protection in violation of the Indian
Civil Rights Act. Respondents had issued a “Disenrollment Notice
of Default,” which claimed that petitioners’ time to answer the
disenrollment order had passed. Petitioners and other recipients of
the order were thus deemed to be in default and to have admitted the
allegations against them. The Court is inclined to dismiss this
petition. The volatility of relations between the two sides, however,
is such that the potential need for relief in the near future remains a
real possibility. This action, moreover, has been plagued by
evolving and shifting facts and narratives, and testimony elicited
during the hearing suggests some effects of respondents’ nowrepudiated actions—such as the denial of medical services to
petitioners based on their purported “disenrollment”—continue to
reverberate. Respondents’ renewed motion to dismiss repeats their
position that petitioners have not been and will not be disenrolled or
banished in the foreseeable future. Based on the premise that no
petitioner has been disenrolled or banished, or will be disenrolled or
banished in the foreseeable future, respondents contend this petition
must be dismissed for lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because it
remains (1) unripe, (2) barred by tribal sovereign immunity, and (3)
“a purely intra-Tribal dispute that should not be heard by this
Court.” Their main thesis seems to be that petitioners cannot
establish subject-matter jurisdiction under the ICRA because they
failed to establish the requisite custody or detention for seeking such
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relief. This order must agree. Since petitioners failed to establish the
requisite custody or detention for seeking relief via a petition for
writ of habeas corpus under Section 1303, this petition must be
dismissed. Petitioners have not requested further leave to amend,
and such leave would not be warranted in any event in light of the
multiple opportunities already granted for petitioners to cure the
deficiencies in their petition, including by taking discovery. Because
this order concludes petitioners have not shown a “severe restraint”
sufficient to invoke Section 1303, it does not reach the parties’
additional arguments, including arguments regarding exhaustion of
administrative remedies or sovereign immunity. Respondents’
motion to dismiss is Granted. This petition is dismissed.
109.

Olson v. North Dakota Department of Transportation

No. 20170351, 909 N.W. 2d 676, 2018 WL 1722354 (N.D. Apr. 10,
2018). Harold Olson appeals a district court order affirming the
North Dakota Department of Transportation’s (“Department”)
revocation of his driving privileges for two years, following an
arrest for driving under the influence. A deputy with the Mountrail
County Sheriff’s Department testified he received a call from a
Three Affiliated Tribes, also known as the Mandan, Hidatsa and
Arikara Nation (“MHA”), officer on May 13, 2017 requesting
assistance with a non-Indian he stopped and detained on tribal land.
The district court affirmed the Department’s decision finding the
deputy was acting under a request for assistance, which extended the
deputy’s authority to arrest onto tribal land. The parties do not
dispute the following facts: (1) Olson was discovered in his vehicle
by a MHA officer on tribal land within the Fort Berthold
Reservation, (2) the MHA officer requested assistance from the
Mountrail County Sheriff’s Department, (3) the deputy completed
an investigation and arrested Olson for driving under the influence
on tribal land within the Fort Berthold Reservation, (4) Olson is an
enrolled member of the Turtle Mountain Chippewa Tribe, and
(5) the MHA officer and the deputy did not know Olson was an
enrolled member at the time of the arrest. Olson argues the deputy
lacked the authority to arrest him on tribal land and that a valid arrest
is a prerequisite to revocation of his driving privileges. Absent a
valid arrest, Olson argues the revocation order is not in accordance
with the law. The Department contends the MHA officer’s request
for assistance from Mountrail County extended criminal jurisdiction
to the State. The appellate court found that the deputy lacked
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authority to arrest Olson, a non-member Indian, on MHA tribal land
and reversed the district court’s order affirming the Department’s
revocation of Olson’s driving privileges and reinstate Olson’s
driving privileges.
110.

Tortalita v. Geisen

No. 1:17-CV-684-RB-KRS, 2018 WL 3195145 (D.N.M. Apr. 24,
2018). This matter comes before the Court upon Petitioner’s Petition
for Writ of Habeas Corpus for Relief from a Tribal Court Conviction
Pursuant to 25 U.S.C. § 1303 (“Petition”), filed June 29, 2017. On
August 31, 2017, in accordance with 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(B), this
Petition was referred to United States Magistrate Judge Kevin R.
Sweazea to conduct any necessary hearings and to recommend an
ultimate disposition. Having reviewed the record and the parties’
briefing, the Magistrate recommends that the Court grant
Petitioner’s Petition and vacate Petitioner’s underlying sentence and
conviction. On September 16, 2016, Petitioner was arrested for
Aggravated DWI; Reckless Driving; Resisting Arrest; Terroristic
Threats; Probation Violation; Eluding; Open Container; Reckless
Endangerment; Disorderly Conduct; and Invalid/Revoked Driver’s
License. He was brought before the Tribal Court on September 20,
2016, at which time he entered pleas of guilty. The Court adjudged
Petitioner guilty, sentenced him to 544 days in jail, and assessed
various fines and fees. On June 29, 2017, Petitioner filed the instant
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus, alleging violations of the Indian
Civil Rights Act of 1968 (“ICRA”) 25 U.S.C. §§ 1301-1303.
Specifically, Petitioner argues that he was (1) denied the right to
assistance of counsel, in violation of 25 U.S.C. § 1302(a)(6);
(2) denied the right to a trial by jury, in violation of 25 U.S.C.
§ 1302(a)(10); and (3) subjected to cruel and unusual punishment,
in violation of 25 U.S.C. §§ 1302(a)(7)(A), (c). As the Tribal
Respondents highlight in their brief, the terms “vacate” and
“reverse” have, at times, been used almost interchangeably in ICRA
actions. However, the terms implicate very different results. In light
of the sanctity of tribal sovereignty, and the need to safeguard not
just the rights of the individual, but also the rights of the tribe, it is
imperative that the Court stay within its own lane when crafting
appropriate relief in this case. For the reasons set forth above, it is
hereby recommended that the Court grant Petitioner’s Petition for
Writ of Habeas Corpus and vacate Petitioner’s underlying sentence
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and conviction. It is further recommended that Petitioner be released
from custody.
111.

Oviatt v. Reynolds

No. 17-4124, 733 Fed. Appx. 929, 2018 WL 2094505 (10th Cir.
May 7, 2018). Arrestees, who were lay advocates in tribe, brought
action against tribal officials, alleging that officials had violated
Fourth Amendment and Indian Civil Rights Act by incarcerating
and searching them. The District Court granted officials’ motion to
dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Arrestees appealed.
The Court of Appeals held that: (1) Court of Appeals would exercise
its discretion to deny appointment of United States Attorney as
counsel for arrestees; (2) arrestees were not detained within
meaning of Indian Civil Rights Act when they brought action
against tribal officials; and (3) arrestees’ Fourth Amendment claims
were frivolous. We consider the plaintiffs “detained” only if they
were subject at the time to “a severe actual or potential restraint on
liberty.” Jeffredo v. Macarro, 599 F.3d 913, 919 (9th Cir. 2010)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of
Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874, 880 (2d Cir. 1996). The plaintiffs have
alleged past arrests and incarceration. But they do not allege that
they were under arrest or incarcerated when they sought habeas
relief. Instead, the plaintiffs argue that they were “banished,” relying
on the Second Circuit’s opinion in Poodry v. Tonawanda Band of
Seneca Indians, 85 F.3d 874 (2d Cir. 1996). We have not decided
whether banishment satisfies the statutory requirement of detention.
See Walton v. Tesuque Pueblo, 443 F.3d 1274, 1279 n.2 (10th Cir.
2006) (declining to decide whether banishment of a non-Indian from
tribal lands constitutes detention under 25 U.S.C. § 1303). But even
in the Second Circuit, a tribal member is considered “detained” only
when permanently banished from the tribe. Shenandoah v. U.S.
Dep’t of Interior, 159 F.3d 708, 714 (2d Cir. 1998). On appeal, the
plaintiffs use the word “banishment.” But in district court, the
plaintiffs did not allege banishment. Nor have they presented
evidence of a permanent prohibition from entering the Ute Tribe’s
land. As a result, even if we were to follow Poodry, the plaintiffs’
new allegation of “banishment” would not satisfy the detention
requirement.
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112.

American Indian Health & Services Corporation v. Kent

No. C081338, 24 Cal. App. 5th 772, 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 583 (Cal. Ct.
App. Jun. 19, 2018). Federally qualified health centers (FQHC) and
rural health clinics (RHC) petitioned for writ of mandate seeking
order requiring Department of Health Care Services to reimburse
services provided to Medi-Cal patients. Prior to July 1, 2009, the
Department processed and paid claims for these services. In 2009,
in a cost-cutting measure due to budget problems, the Legislature
enacted Welfare and Institutions Code section 14131.101 to exclude
coverage for these services (and others) “to the extent permitted by
federal law.” (§ 14131.10, subd. (d).) After the Department stopped
paying claims for these services, various FQHC’s and RHC’s
challenged the validity of section 14131.10, claiming it conflicted
with federal Medicaid law. In California Assn. of Rural Health
Clinics v. Douglas (9th Cir. 2013) 738 F.3d 1007 (CARHC), the
Ninth Circuit held section 14131.10 was invalid to the extent it
eliminated coverage for these services when provided by FQHC’s
and RHC’s because the federal Medicaid Act imposed on
participating states the obligation to cover these services by these
providers. The Superior Court, No. 34-2014-80001828, granted
petition in part and entered judgment in favor of the clinics.
Department appealed. The Court of Appeal J., held that: (1) petition
was not barred by sovereign immunity; (2) Department had
adequate notice that coverage was mandatory; and (3) the Court of
Appeal would decline to consider argument that separation of
powers precluded entry of judgment. Affirmed.
113.

Ho-Chunk, Inc. v. Sessions

No. 17-5140, 894 F.3d 365 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 3, 2018). Tribal
corporations brought action against United States Attorney General
seeking declaratory judgment that they were not subject to
Contraband Cigarettes Trafficking Act’s (CCTA) recordkeeping
requirements. The District Court, 253 F. Supp. 3d 303, entered
summary judgment in government’s favor, and corporations
appealed. In 2016, the federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives sent letters to Rock River, HCI
Distribution, and Woodlands. The letters notified the companies that
the Bureau intended to inspect and copy their records of tobacco
transactions and asked them to name a mutually-acceptable
inspection date within fifteen business days from receipt of the
letters. The companies and their parent responded with a complaint
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seeking a declaratory judgment that they are not subject to federal
recordkeeping laws dealing with the distribution of cigarettes. The
district court entered summary judgment against them. Ho-Chunk,
Inc. v. Sessions, 253 F. Supp. 3d 303, 304 (D.D.C. 2017). Their
appeal presents a question of statutory interpretation – do the federal
recordkeeping laws cover these corporations? Yes. The Court of
Appeals held that: (1) CCTA’s recordkeeping requirements applied
to tribal corporations, and (2) tribal corporations were “persons”
subject to CCTA’s recordkeeping requirements. Affirmed.
114.

Cayuga Nation v. Campbell

No. CA 17–01956, 163 A.D.3d 1500, 2018 WL 3567391 (N.Y. App.
Div. Jul. 25, 2018). This litigation involves a long-standing dispute
over which of two competing factions should have control of the
Cayuga Nation (Nation), a sovereign Indian Nation and a member
of the Haudenosaunee Confederacy, sometimes called the Iroquois
Confederacy. Plaintiff, whose members constitute one of the two
factions vying for control of the Nation (hereafter, plaintiff’s
members), commenced this action seeking declaratory and
injunctive relief as well as money damages. In the complaint,
plaintiff’s members alleged that defendants, who are members of the
other competing faction, were improperly in control of and
trespassing on certain property of the Nation on which the Nation’s
offices and security center, a cannery, a gas station and convenience
store, and an ice cream store were located. Plaintiff moved for
various interim relief, including a preliminary injunction directing
defendants to vacate the subject property. Thereafter, defendants
moved to dismiss the complaint on, inter alia, the ground that
Supreme Court lacked subject matter jurisdiction because this
matter required a determination whether plaintiff or defendants
constituted the proper governing body of the Nation. In support of
their motion, defendants contended that such a determination was
beyond the authority of the courts of New York inasmuch as it
usurped the sovereign right of the people of the Nation to determine
their own leadership. In appeal No. 1, defendants appeal from an
order that, among other things, granted plaintiff’s motion, issued a
preliminary injunction, denied defendants’ motion, and determined
that no undertaking pursuant to CPLR 6213(b) was required. We
affirm. Here, the BIA determined that it will conduct governmentto-government relations with plaintiff. Based on that determination,
the BIA awarded an ISDA contract to plaintiff for the purpose,
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among others, of running the Nation’s office. In this action, plaintiff
seeks several forms of relief, including possession of and the ability
to run the Nation’s office. Thus, although we may not make a
determination that will interfere with the Nation’s governance and
right to self-determination, we must defer to the federal executive
branch’s determination that the Nation has resolved that issue,
especially where, as here, that determination concerns the very
property that is the subject of this action.
115.

Northern Natural Gas Company v. 80 Acres of Land in
Thurston County

No. 8:17-CV-328, 2018 WL 3586527 (D. Neb. Jul. 26, 2018). This
dispute involves the renewal of a right-of-way across tribal and
allotted lands located within reservation boundaries of the Omaha
Tribe of Nebraska. The plaintiff, Northern Natural Gas, filed this
suit seeking to condemn individually owned interests in two parcels
of allotted land: Allotment No. 742-2 and Allotment No. 742-4. The
defendants in this case each have an individual interest in Allotment
No. 742-2, Allotment No. 742-4, or both. Northern filed a partial
motion for summary judgment asking the Court to confirm its right
to condemn the individual interests in those Allotments. At least one
defendant, Nolan J. Solomon, disputes Northern’s power to
condemn the property. For the reasons discussed below, the Court
will grant Northern’s motion for summary judgment. When the BIA
renewed Northern’s right-of-way across the Omaha Tribe’s trust
land, see 25 U.S.C. § 324, it also authorized that right-of-way to
cross newly acquired trust interests deeded to the Tribe between
February 8, 2018 and February 9, 2046. That means Solomon’s
February 23, 2018 conveyance to the Tribe is precisely the type of
land acquisition the “New ROW” sought to include and govern. And
because Solomon’s conveyance is governed by the “New ROW,”
contrary to Solomon’s contention, the Tribe has consented to
Northern’s right-of-way across Allotment No. 742-2 and Allotment
No. 742-4. To that end, Solomon cannot use the Omaha Tribe’s
newly acquired interest in Allotment No. 742-2 and Allotment No.
742-4 to prevent the renewal of a right-of-way the Tribe has already
consented to. Accordingly, Northern may condemn the remaining
individually owned interests in Allotment No. 742-2 and Allotment
No. 742-4. See Pub. Serv. Co. of New Mexico v. Barboan. 857 F.3d
1101, 1105 n.5 (10th Cir. 2017) (implying that allotted interests in
mixed land may be subjected to condemnation if the “tribal interests
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[are left] undisturbed”); WBI Energy Transmission, Inc., 2017 WL
532281, at *4 (allowing the condemnation action to proceed against
the individual interests but not the tribal interests in tribal trust land).
The Court will grant Northern’s partial motion for summary
judgment.
116. Wilhite v. Awe Kualawaache Care Center
No. CV 18-80, 2018 WL 3586539 (D. Mont. Jul. 26, 2018). Tammy
Wilhite was employed as a registered nurse at the Awe Kualawaache
Care Center. The Care Center is an entity owned by the Crow Tribe
of Indians. One day, a patient at the Care Center informed Wilhite
that he had been molested during transport. Wilhite reported the
conversation to her supervisor. When nothing was done, White
reported the incident to law enforcement. Wilhite was subsequently
harassed by her supervisor and terminated from employment by the
Care Center. Wilhite filed suit in federal district court, alleging
solely that she was entitled to damages under the Racketeer
Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1961 et seq.,
(RICO). The Defendants filed a motion to dismiss Wilhite’s claim
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 12(b)(1). The RICO Act does not touch exclusive rights
of self-governance in purely intramural matters. Organized crime
that controls or affects businesses engaged in interstate commerce
is, by definition, not a purely intramural matter. Consumer Financial
Protection Bureau v. Great Plains Lending, LLC, 846 F.3d 1049,
1052-1053 (9th Cir. 2017). holding Consumer Financial Protection
Act of 2010 applied to tribe controlled lenders because they engaged
in interstate commerce). Regarding the third Coeur d’Alene
exception, the Defendants themselves state the RICO Act’s
“legislative history makes absolutely no mention of Indian tribes or
any intent on Congress’ part to have this statute apply to Indian
tribes.” Contrary to the Defendants’ assertions, the third exception
requires affirmative proof Congress did not intend to include tribes
within a generally applicable statute. Donovan v. Coeur d’Alene
Tribal Farm, 751 F.2d 1113, 1115 (9th Cir. 1985). the Defendants
have not shown any of the Coeur d’Alene exceptions apply, the
motion is denied.
117.

State v. George

No. 45196, 422 P.3d 1142, 2018 WL 3598926 (Idaho Jul. 27, 2018).
This is a jurisdictional dispute. Tribal police arrested Shaula Marie
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George (“George”) for possession of methamphetamine on the
Coeur d’Alene Reservation. Upon discovery that George was not a
member of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, the case was referred to the
Kootenai County district court. Thereafter, George filed a motion to
dismiss based on lack of jurisdiction. The district court granted
George’s motion, finding that despite the fact that George was not
eligible to become a member of the Coeur d’Alene Tribe, George
was an Indian; thus, the district court did not have jurisdiction. We
affirm. Regarding the State’s concern that the Tribe would not
prosecute George because it only prosecuted enrolled Tribe
members, the district court recognized that as a state court it either
had jurisdiction or it did not, and that jurisdiction was not based on
whether other agencies had jurisdiction or exercised discretion in
determining whether to prosecute. On May 16, 2017, the district
court entered an order dismissing the case for lack of jurisdiction.
The State timely appealed. We affirm the district court’s dismissal.
I.
118.

Religious Freedom

Hopi Tribe v. Arizona Snowbowl Resort Limited
Partnership

No. 16-0521, 418 P.3d 1032, 2018 WL 771809 (Ariz. Ct. App.
Feb. 8, 2018). This case arises from the sale and use of reclaimed
wastewater to make artificial snow for ski runs on the San Francisco
Peaks (the Peaks) in northern Arizona. The Hopi Tribe (the Tribe),
which opposes the use of reclaimed wastewater on the Peaks,
appeals the dismissal of its complaint for lack of standing and the
award of attorneys’ fees to the City of Flagstaff (the City) and
Arizona Snowbowl Resort Limited Partnership (Snowbowl). At
issue is whether the Tribe sufficiently alleged standing to maintain
a common law public nuisance claim. For a private party to bring a
claim of public nuisance, it must allege both an interference with a
right common to the public and a special injury different in kind
from that of the public. The parties do not dispute that the Tribe
sufficiently alleged that the use of reclaimed wastewater interferes
with the public’s right to use and enjoy the Peaks. Because we find
the Tribe sufficiently alleged the use of reclaimed wastewater causes
its members a special injury, different in kind than that suffered by
the general public, by interfering with places of special cultural and
religious significance to the Tribe, we reverse the trial court’s
dismissal, vacate the orders denying the Tribe’s motion to amend
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the complaint and awarding Snowbowl and the City attorneys’ fees,
and remand for further consideration.
119.

Damon Young, Plaintiff, v. Deputy Warden Smith, et. al.

No. 6:17-cv-00131, 2018 WL 3447179 (S.D. Georgia Jul. 17,
2018). Plaintiff, an inmate at Georgia State Prison in Reidsville,
Georgia, filed the above-captioned action pursuant to 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons
Act (“RLUIPA”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-1 et seq., contesting certain
conditions of his confinement. Plaintiff also filed and was granted a
Motion for Leave to Proceed in Forma Pauperis. In March 2017,
Defendants Allen, Bobbit, and Hutchinson retaliated against
Plaintiff for filing grievances and confiscated Plaintiff’s Native
American religious books and catalogs as well as other items.
Defendant Allen told Plaintiff that he could not have any Native
American religious items while in Tier II, only the Bible or Koran.
Defendants Bobbit and Hutchinson also precluded Plaintiff from
utilizing his sacred religious items, which were stored in the
property room, in his weekly prayer ceremonies. Plaintiff avers
these Defendants’ retaliation and other actions violated his freedom
of religion and equal protection rights, among others. Plaintiff also
contends Defendant Allen violated these same rights when he
denied Plaintiff from receiving kinnikinnick and a “Buffalo Skull”
blanket, which Plaintiff states came in a preapproved mail package.
For the reasons and in the manner set forth, I find Plaintiff plausibly
states colorable: RLUIPA injunctive relief claims; First Amendment
free exercise, establishment clause, and retaliation claims;
Fourteenth Amendment equal protection and due process claims;
Sections 1983 and 1985 conspiracy claims; and Eighth Amendment
deliberate indifference to serious medical needs claims. The Motion
to Dismiss should be denied.
120.

Cobb v. Morris

No. 2:14-CV-22, 2018 WL 842406 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2018).
Plaintiff maintains that the TDCJ prison’s grooming policy, which
prohibits long hair and/or a kouplock, imposes a substantial burden
on his ability to practice his NA faith. Plaintiff testified at his Spears
hearing that it is a tenet of his faith to grow his hair and to cut it only
in times of mourning. However, the grooming policy requires that
male offenders must keep their hair trimmed up the back of their
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neck and head, and also trimmed around the ears. If an offender
refuses to comply with the grooming standards, he is subject to
disciplinary charges that can result in the loss of privileges, and
possibly, adversely affect time-earning classification and good time
credits. Plaintiff’s First Amendment claim against Defendant Morris
is virtually identical to the First Amendment claims raised against
the same defendant in Davis. This Court in Davis concluded that
Defendant Morris was entitled to summary judgment because the
plaintiffs had not established that their First Amendment rights to
exercise their religion had been violated. Davis, 2014 WL 798033,
at *18-19. The Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of First
Amendment claims. Davis, 826 F.3d at 266. Based on the foregoing,
the undersigned respectfully recommends that Defendants’
supplemental motion for summary judgment, which incorporates
their original motion for summary judgment, be denied in part and
granted in part. The summary judgment evidence establishes that
Plaintiff is sincere in the practice of his NA faith and that the TDCJ
grooming policy challenged by Plaintiff imposed substantial
burdens on Plaintiff’s religious exercise. Because the summary
judgment evidence establishes a fact issue as to whether the TDCJ’s
grooming policy is the least restrictive means of maintaining the
TDCJ’s compelling security and costs interests, the undersigned
respectfully recommends that Defendants’ supplemental motion for
summary judgment be denied with respect to Plaintiff’s RLUIPA
grooming policy claim. The undersigned further respectfully
recommends that Defendants’ supplemental summary judgment
motion be granted to the extent that Plaintiff’s First Amendment
claims be dismissed with prejudice as foreclosed by the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in Davis. Plaintiff should be allowed to proceed
to trial on his RLUIPA grooming policy claim against Defendant
Davis.
J.

Sovereign Immunity

121.

Rosales v. Dutschke

No. 2:15–cv–01145, 279 F.Supp.3d 1084, 2017 WL 3730500 (E.D.
Cal. Aug. 30, 2017). Appeal Filed 9th Cir., Sep. 28, 2017. Indian
lineal descendants of members of half-blood Indian tribe called
Jamul Indian Village filed suit against officials of Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA), tribal employees, and gaming corporations, claiming
violation of Native American Graves Protection and Repatriation
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Act (NAGPRA), compact between California and tribe, and state
law, by alleged illegal disinterment and removal of human remains
of descendants’ families from cemetery during construction of
casino, and seeking declaratory and injunctive relief and $4 million
in damages. Plaintiffs moved to substitute personal representative as
party for deceased plaintiffs and moved for leave to amend
complaint, and defendants moved to dismiss for lack of subject
matter jurisdiction. The district court held that: (1) tribal employees
were protected from suit by sovereign immunity, and (2) suit was
barred by descendants’ inability to join tribe as party. Plaintiffs’
motions denied; defendants’ motions granted.
122.

Douglas Indian Association v. Central Council of Tlingit
and Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska

No. S-16235, 403 P.3d 1172 (Alaska Sep. 8, 2017). First Indian tribe
brought action against second Indian tribe and two of its tribal
officials after first tribe withdrew from consortium formed by
second tribe to administer tribal transportation funds from federal
government, but second tribe failed to remit first tribe’s funds as
required by agreement. The Superior Court, No. 1JU-15-00625,
granted second tribe’s motion to dismiss based on sovereign
immunity. First tribe appealed. The Supreme Court held that:
(1) tribal sovereign immunity is jurisdictional bar properly raised in
motion to dismiss for lack of subject matter jurisdiction; (2) trial
court did not abuse its discretion by denying jurisdictional discovery
to first tribe; (3) Ex parte Young doctrine does not allow suit to
proceed against tribal official based on contract claim merely
because plaintiff seeks declaratory and injunctive relief; and (4) trial
court did not have jurisdiction over first tribe’s claims that officials
were not protected by sovereign immunity because their actions
were ultra vires. Affirmed.
123.

Montella v. Chugachmiut

No. 3:16–CV–00251, 283 F.Supp.3d 774, 2017 WL 4238859 (D.
Alaska Sep. 25, 2017). Former employee of organization operated
by tribal consortium brought action against organization, alleging
discrimination in violation of Title VII and breach of implied
covenant of good faith and fair dealing under Alaska law.
Organization moved for summary judgment. The District Court held
that: (1) organization was not an employer within the meaning of
Title VII; (2) organization did not waive tribal sovereign immunity;
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and (3) fact issues precluded summary judgment for organization on
employee’s claim of breach of implied covenant of good faith and
fair dealing under Alaska law. Motion granted in part and denied in
part.
124.

Wilkes v. PCI Gaming Authority

No. 1151312, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 4385738 (Ala. Sep. 25, 2017).
Motorist and passenger brought action against truck driver and
driver’s employer, a casino and hotel owned by Indian tribe, raising
negligence and wantonness claims and seeking compensation for
injuries sustained in head-on collision with driver. The Elmore
Circuit Court, CV-15-900057, entered summary judgment in favor
of employer on basis of tribal sovereign immunity. Plaintiffs
appealed. The Supreme Court held that doctrine of tribal sovereign
immunity did not apply to shield Indian tribe from tort claims
brought by non-tribal plaintiffs. Reversed and remanded.
125.

Rape v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians

No. 1111250, 250 So.3d 547, 2017 WL 4325017 (Ala. Sep. 29,
2017). Non-member patron brought action against Indian tribe that
operated casino and various business entities owned by the tribe,
alleging breach of contract and various tort claims arising out of
disputed winnings from an electric bingo gaming machine.
Defendants moved to dismiss, alleging the claims were barred by
sovereign immunity and that tribe’s court had exclusive jurisdiction
of any claim. The Circuit Court, No. CV–11–901485, granted the
motion. Patron appealed. The Supreme Court held that: (1) it would
decline to decide whether casino was properly located on land
considered Indian country; and (2) it would decline to decide
whether dispute was a matter of internal or tribal relations or,
alternatively, was a dispute specially consigned to the regulatory
authority of a tribe by Congress. Affirmed.
126.

Amerind Risk Management Corporation v. Blackfeet
Housing

No. 16 CV 1093, 2017 WL 4712211 (D.N.M Oct. 17, 2017).
Plaintiff Amerind Risk Management Corporation (Plaintiff) seeks
declaratory and injunctive relief from litigation brought by
Defendant Blackfeet Housing (Defendant) in the Blackfeet Tribal
Courts. The Court previously denied Defendant’s motion to dismiss
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for lack of jurisdiction after concluding that the Court has subject
matter jurisdiction over this case under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 and
personal jurisdiction over Defendant. The Court also found that
Plaintiff has exhausted tribal remedies, so that its challenge to the
jurisdiction of the Blackfeet Tribal Courts may go forward in this
Court. Both parties have now moved for summary judgment.
Although the issues before this Court are jurisdictional, at the root
of the conflict between the parties is a dispute over insurance
coverage. Plaintiff is a federally chartered tribal corporation formed
under Section 17 of the Indian Reorganization Act, 25 U.S.C.
§ 5124 (formerly § 477). The charter tribes are the Red Lake Band
of Chippewa Indians, the Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes
of the Flathead Reservation, and the Pueblo of Santa Ana. Plaintiff
was formed to provide risk-sharing self-insurance for tribal
governments and entities in response to a lack of affordable
insurance options on tribal lands. Plaintiff has over 400 tribal
member entities that contribute capital to a risk pool for each line of
coverage, from which Plaintiff pays all covered claims. Members’
participation in the risk-sharing group is governed by contractual
agreement. Defendant is a member entity that entered into a
Participation Agreement (PA) in March 2012 to join Plaintiff’s
Tribal Operations Protection Plan (TOPP) risk pool. The PA
provides that participants in TOPP “agree to jointly share in the
costs of protecting against financial loss and in the monetary claims
that may arise from financial loss.” In return, the PA guarantees that
TOPP will indemnify members “in accordance with any coverage
documents issued to the Participant and this agreement, but only
from the assets of TOPP.” As a participant in TOPP governed by the
March 2012 PA, Defendant obtained four insurance policies from
Plaintiff. Defendant contacted Plaintiff in April 2013 regarding
issues with some of its covered properties and subsequently made
formal claims.. Plaintiff denied the claims in March 2014.
Defendant, rather than invoking the dispute resolution procedures
contained in the PA, filed suit against Plaintiff in the Blackfeet
Tribal Court alleging breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract,
breach of the duty of good faith, and violations of Blackfeet tribal
law. Plaintiff made a special appearance in the Blackfeet Tribal
Court and moved to dismiss the suit for lack of jurisdiction, asserting
sovereign immunity and relying on the choice of forum provision in
the PA. But the Blackfeet Tribal Court denied Plaintiff’s motion to
dismiss after concluding that Plaintiff did not have tribal sovereign
immunity and that the Blackfeet Tribal Court had jurisdiction to
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decide Defendant’s claim. Plaintiff appealed the jurisdictional issue
to the Blackfeet Court of Appeals, which heard oral argument, but
had not yet decided the case when Plaintiff filed this suit for
declaratory and injunctive relief from the tribal litigation. The
Blackfeet Court of Appeals issued its decision holding that Plaintiff
did have tribal sovereign immunity as a Section 17 tribal
corporation, but that Plaintiff had waived that immunity by
including an arbitration clause in the PA. The Blackfeet Court of
Appeals acknowledged Plaintiff’s argument that any waiver of
immunity was limited to the courts specified in the PA for
enforcement of the arbitration provision, and stated that it would
normally agree. But without giving any reason for broadening the
limited waiver, the Blackfeet Court of Appeals appears to have
concluded that it had jurisdiction. The Blackfeet Court of Appeals
ordered the parties to “proceed to mediation as contemplated by the
Participation Agreement and thereafter to arbitration if needed.” The
issue of the Blackfeet Tribal Court’s jurisdiction is now before this
Court. It is ordered that: (1) Plaintiff’s motion for summary
judgment is granted. A separate order of declaratory judgment and
permanent injunction will be entered. (2) Defendant’s cross-motion
for summary judgment is denied.
127.

Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah and Ouray
Reservation

No. 20160362, 416 P.3d 401, 2017 WL 5166885 (Utah Nov. 7,
2017). Businessman brought action against Indian tribe, tribal
officials, various companies owned by the tribal officials, oil and
gas companies, and other private companies, alleging, inter alia,
tortious interference with economic relations, extortion, violation of
Utah Antitrust Act, and civil conspiracy. The Eighth District granted
defendants’ motions to dismiss. Businessman appealed. The
Supreme Court held that: (1) tribe did not waive sovereign
immunity; (2) tribal officials, in their official capacities, were not
entitled to sovereign immunity on claims to enjoin actions that
exceeded tribe’s jurisdiction; (3) tribal officials were not protected
by sovereign immunity when sued for damages in their individual
capacities; (4) tribe was not a necessary party to businessman’s
action against tribal officials; (5) tribal exhaustion doctrine
prevented state courts from reviewing businessman’s claims against
tribal officials; (6) businessman was not entitled to grant of untimely
motion to file supplemental pleadings; (7) businessman failed to
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state claims against companies owned by tribal officials;
(8) businessman failed to state claims against oil and gas companies;
(9) there is no civil cause of action in Utah for extortion; and
(10) state constitutional provision prohibiting “the exchange of
black lists” was not self-executing. Affirmed in part, vacated in part,
and remanded.
128.

Wilmington Savings Fund Society v. Fryberg

No. C17-1196, 2017 WL 6344185 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 12, 2017).
Plaintiff Wilmington Savings Fund Society brings this foreclosure
action against defendant Corey Fryberg. Corey Fryberg is a member
of the Tulalip Tribes, a federally recognized Indian tribe, and the
property at issue is trust land within the Tulalip Indian Reservation.
The Tulalip Tribes is also a named defendant for having a possible
interest in the property. Plaintiff’s initial complaint was filed on
August 8, 2017. On August 17, 2017, the Court sua sponte issued an
Order to Show Cause for plaintiff’s failure to provide the citizenship
of the parties to establish diversity jurisdiction. On August 25, 2017,
plaintiff filed an amended complaint, and on September 28, 2017,
the Court vacated the Order to Show Cause. Now, defendant Tulalip
Tribes moves to dismiss the case pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(1)
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. Here, the Tulalip Tribes
argues that dismissal is appropriate because diversity jurisdiction is
lacking, the Tulalip Tribes is immune from suit, and plaintiff failed
to exhaust tribal remedies. Each of defendant’s arguments
independently supports dismissal: there is no complete diversity
between the parties; the Tulalip Tribes is immune from suit; and
plaintiff failed to exhaust tribal remedies. For all of the foregoing
reasons, defendant’s motion is granted. The case is dismissed.
129.

Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources v. Timber
and Wood Products Located in Sawyer County

No. 2017AP181, 906 N.W. 2d 707 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 19, 2017).
Department of Natural Resources (DNR) brought action against
Indian tribe and timber and wood products located on tribe’s land,
seeking to recover termination severance tax that tribe allegedly
owed under Forest Croplands Law after tribe’s forest croplands
contract with the State expired. The Circuit Court granted tribe’s
motion to dismiss. DNR appealed. The appellate court held that:
(1) tribe did not clearly and unequivocally waive its sovereign
immunity with respect to DNR’s claims, seeking to recover
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termination severance tax, by executing transfer of land ownership
forms stating it agreed to comply with Forest Croplands Law, and
(2) tribe’s sovereign immunity prevented DNR from pursuing in
rem claim against timber and wood products located on tribe’s land
in order to satisfy termination severance tax. Affirmed.
130.

Buchwald Capital Advisors v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of
Chippewa Indians

No. 16-cv-13643, 584 B.R. 706 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2018).
Litigation trustee brought strong-arm proceeding to avoid allegedly
fraudulent transfers, and Indian tribe named as defendant moved to
dismiss on sovereign immunity grounds. The United States
Bankruptcy Court for the Eastern District of Michigan, 516 B.R.
462, denied the motion, and Indian tribe appealed. The District
Court, 532 B.R. 680, reversed and remanded. On remand, the
Bankruptcy Court, 559 B.R. 842, granted motion to dismiss, and
litigation trustee appealed. The District Court, Borman, J., held that:
(1) allegedly unauthorized acts of tribal officials could not result in
waiver of Indian tribe’s immunity from suit on state law fraudulent
transfer claims asserted, in strong-arm capacity, by litigation trustee
of trust established under debtor’s confirmed Chapter 11 plan;
(2) any waiver of tribe’s immunity by its acts in filing proofs of
claim and participating in bankruptcy case would be limited to
adjudication of matters raised by tribe’s proofs of claim; (3) trustee
could not rely on equitable alter ego or veil-piercing doctrine in
order to make required showing of express, unequivocal,
unmistakable and unambiguous waiver of Indian tribe’s sovereign
immunity. Affirmed.
131.

Charles v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation

No. 2:17-00321, 2018 WL 611469 (D. Utah Feb. 21, 2018). Plaintiff
Grant Charles seeks in this action to enjoin defendants Ute Indian
Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation (the “Ute Court”) based
upon a suit filed in the Ute Court, Hackford v. Allred et al., Ute Case
No. 16-259. Defendants filed three motions to dismiss. Richita
Hackford, who is named as a defendant because her suit in Ute Court
is the underlying case, filed a “Motion to Deny Complaint,” which
is treated as a motion to dismiss. The remaining defendants (the
“Tribal Defendants”) filed an initial motion to dismiss based on lack
of subject matter jurisdiction and insufficient service of process.
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After Ms. Hackford’s claims in the Ute Court were dismissed by an
order of the Ute Court dated June 5, 2017, the Tribal Defendants
filed another motion to dismiss, further arguing that no case or
controversy provides Article III standing in this action. A hearing
on the motions was held on January 4, 2018. Based on the motions,
the argument of the parties at the hearing, and for good cause
appearing, the court finds as follows: (1) The Tribal Defendants’
latter motion to dismiss is granted. In that motion to dismiss for lack
of jurisdiction, the Tribal Defendants correctly analogized the
present case to Board of Education for Gallup-McKinley County
Schools v. Henderson, 696 Fed Appx. 355 (10th Cir. 2017). Because
Ms. Hackford’s case in Ute Court has been dismissed following an
initial screening by the Ute Court, no case or controversy exists on
which to decide the action. Mr. Charles’s complaint must be
dismissed on this basis. (2) As a further partial basis for dismissal,
the tribe, the tribe’s business committee, and the Ute Court are
protected by tribal sovereign immunity. Plaintiff’s primary
argument for jurisdiction is based upon application of Ex Parte
Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) to tribal officers. The court has
jurisdiction over the Chief Judge of the Ute Court on that basis, but
because Ex Parte Young is limited to suits against individuals, the
court does not have jurisdiction over the other Tribal Defendants.
(3) Defendants argue that the court does not have jurisdiction to
review the Ute Court’s exercise of authority over Mr. Charles.
However, a federal court may determine under 28 U.S.C. § 1331
whether a tribal court has exceeded the lawful limits of its
jurisdiction as a federal question. (4) The tribe and business
committee argued that service of process on them was insufficient.
That issue is moot. Judge Reynolds (subsequently replaced as a
named defendant by Judge Stiffarm) did not move to dismiss on that
basis, and the off-reservation service upon Judge Reynolds was
sufficient to provide personal jurisdiction over him. (5) The United
States is not an indispensable party to this action, and no relief is
granted on that basis. (6) Ms. Hackford is dismissed as a defendant
because her underlying suit in Ute Court was dismissed. Her motion
to dismiss this action is therefore rendered moot. Therefore, it is
hereby ordered that the Tribal Defendants’ motion to dismiss for
lack of subject matter jurisdiction is granted.
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132.

Munoz v. Barona Band of Mission Indians

No. 17-cv-2092, 2018 WL 1245257 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2018).
Plaintiff Christobal Munoz brought this action against Defendant
Barona Band of Mission Indians (the “Tribe”) alleging violations of
the Indian Civil Rights Act (“ICRA”). The Tribe has moved to
dismiss the Complaint under Rules 12(b)(1) and 12(b)(6). Plaintiff
is a former employee of the Defendant Tribe. Plaintiff was
employed as a heavy equipment operator with the Barona Resort &
Casino, which the Tribe owns and operates. He alleges that he
suffered an injury in October 21, 2015 while working. He received
workers compensation and medical treatment while his claim was
investigated; his claim was subsequently denied around March
2016. Defendant allegedly terminated Plaintiff in September 2016
“for being on medical leave.” In February 2017, Plaintiff filed
claims in the Tribal Court, alleging personal injury, workers
compensation retaliation, and wrongful termination by the Tribe.
The Tribal Court dismissed each of these claims on April 21, 2017.
The Tribal Court ruled that Plaintiff’s personal injury claim was not
serious, had not occurred while he was working at the Casino, and
was barred by a six-month statute of limitations. The Tribal Court
allegedly ruled on this claim without allowing him to submit
medical evidence. The Tribal Court ruled that Plaintiff’s workers
compensation claim was barred by a thirty-day statute of limitations
and his wrongful termination claim was barred by a five-day statute
of limitations. Plaintiff then filed claims in Tribal Court alleging due
process violations based on the Tribal Court’s ruling on medical
evidence at the demurrer stage and the Tribe’s statutes of
limitations. The Tribe asserted that it had not waived sovereign
immunity for his due process claims and there was no forum for his
claims. Thereafter, Plaintiff reasserted his claims in Tribal Court
regarding due process violations and claimed that the Indian Civil
Rights Act (“ICRA”) had waived the Tribe’s sovereign immunity.
The Tribe and Tribal Court disavowed this. Plaintiff filed his
Complaint in this Court on October 12, 2017. He asserts violations
of his due process rights under ICRA based on the same conduct he
challenged in Tribal Court. Defendant moves to dismiss the
Complaint on the ground that the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over this case in view of the Tribe’s sovereign
immunity, which it argues has not been abrogated either by
Congress or the Tribe. Although the Tribe also asserts a Rule
12(b)(6) challenge to Plaintiff’s claims regarding the Tribe’s statutes
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of limitations, the Court declines to decide that issue because the
Court concludes that it lacks jurisdiction over the Complaint. The
Court grants Defendant’s motion to dismiss and hereby dismisses
the Complaint with prejudice for lack of subject matter jurisdiction
based on tribal sovereign immunity.
133.

In re: Money Centers of America, Inc., et al., v.
Thunderbird Entertainment Center, Inc.

No. 17-319, 2018 WL 1535464 (D. Del. Mar. 29, 2018). Trustee
appeals the Bankruptcy Court’s Order, In re Money Centers of
America, Inc., 565 B.R. 87 (Bankr. D. Del. 2017) (“Dismissal
Order”), which dismissed Trustee’s complaint against Thunderbird
Entertainment Center, Inc. (“Thunderbird”), a wholly owned entity
of the Absentee Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma, seeking to avoid and
recover certain transfers to Thunderbird. Debtors provided debit
card and credit card processing for patrons of Thunderbird’s casino.
Patrons presented their credit or debit cards to Thunderbird, who
would then run those cards through equipment provided by Debtors.
If the transaction was approved, Thunderbird advanced funds to the
patrons, and Debtors would obtain an amount equal to the advanced
amount from the patrons’ credit or debit card issuers and forward
those funds to Thunderbird, less a fee. Debtors filed voluntary
petitions for relief under Chapter 11 in March 2014. On March 21,
2016, the complaint against Thunderbird was filed, seeking to avoid
and recover $230,633.80 in allegedly preferential transfers or
fraudulent conveyances paid by Debtors to Thunderbird in the 90
days prior to Debtors’ bankruptcy filing. Thunderbird filed a motion
to dismiss the complaint on May 5, 2016, arguing that it had not
waived its tribal sovereign immunity and that the Bankruptcy Court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the adversary proceeding.
The Bankruptcy Court agreed and entered the Dismissal Order on
February 28, 2017. On March 13, 2017, a timely appeal was filed. It
is undisputed that Thunderbird is wholly owned by the Absentee
Shawnee Tribe of Oklahoma and is a tribal corporation and tribal
entity with sufficient relationship with the Absentee Shawnee Tribe
to enjoy the tribe’s sovereign immunity. The sole issue on appeal is
whether the Bankruptcy Court correctly held that Congress did not
abrogate tribal sovereign immunity in the Bankruptcy Code. Trustee
opposed dismissal, asserting that Congress abrogated Thunderbird’s
sovereign immunity in 11 U.S.C. § 106. While Congress may waive
tribal sovereign immunity by statute, the Supreme Court has held

149

that “such a congressional decision must be clear.” Bay Mills,
134 S. Ct. at 2031. Congressional waivers further “cannot be
implied but must be unequivocally expressed.” Santa Clara, 436
U.S. at 58; Bay Mills, 134 S. Ct. at 2031-32 (“That rule of
construction reflects an enduring principle of Indian law: Although
Congress has plenary authority over tribes, courts will not lightly
assume that Congress in fact intends to undermine Indian selfgovernment.”) Section 106 waives sovereign immunity for
“governmental units” which are defined at § 101(27) as “a State, a
Commonwealth, a District, a Territory, a municipality, or a foreign
state; or other foreign or domestic government.” 11 U.S.C. § 106.
Trustee argued that the reference to “other ... domestic
government[s]” can only mean Indian tribes, thus the congressional
waiver is clear and unequivocal. Recognizing a split of authority on
this issue, the Bankruptcy Court rejected Trustee’s argument and
adopted the rationale of Buchwald Capital Advisors, LLC v. Papas
(In re Greektown Holdings, LLC), 532 B.R. 680 (E.D. Mich. 2015)
and Whitaker v. Dakota Finance Corp. (In re Whitaker), 474 B.R.
687 (B.A.P. 8th Cir. 2012). See Money Centers, 565 B.R. at 101-03.
These decisions, holding that Congress has not clearly and
unequivocally expressed an intent to abrogate sovereign immunity
of Indian tribes under §§ 106(a) and 101(27), were “well reasoned,
and carefully construe the text of the Bankruptcy Code.” Id. at 103.
On appeal, the Trustee argues that the Dismissal Order should be
reversed because, in Krystal Energy, the only court of appeals to
consider this issue determined that tribes are “domestic
governments.” The Ninth Circuit held that “[i]t is clear from the face
of §§ 106(a) and 101(27) that Congress did intend to abrogate the
sovereign immunity of all ‘foreign and domestic governments.” See
Krystal Energy Co. v. Navajo Nation, 357 F.3d 1057 (9th Cir. 2003)
(emphasis in original). “Indian tribes are certainly governments,”
which the Supreme Court has described as “‘domestic dependent
nations that exercise inherent sovereign authority over their
members and territories.’” Id. (citations omitted). “[T]he category
‘Indian tribes’ is simply a specific member of the group of domestic
governments.” Id. at 1058. Trustee urges the Court to adopt this
interpretation. Trustee argues that Thunderbird has offered no other
possible definition for “other ... domestic governments],” which can
only mean Indian tribes “because there is nothing else to which it
could possibly refer.” Trustee further argues that Congress need not
invoke any “magic words” (i.e., Indian tribes); rather, the intent to
abrogate must simply be “clearly discernable from the statutory text
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in light of traditional interpretive tools.” (Id. at 10). Conversely,
Thunderbird argues that the Bankruptcy Court properly joined
Whitaker in rejecting Krystal Energy’s reliance on “domestic
dependent nations” language in prior cases, finding a waiver by
implication, which is prohibited by Supreme Court precedent.
Thunderbird contends that Congress included the catch-all “other ...
domestic government[s]” to avoid any argument over terminology
used by many types of local domestic governments not expressly
identified – e.g., towns, townships, villages, boroughs, counties, and
parishes. Thunderbird argues it would make little sense to include a
catch-all provision solely to address Indian tribes, when the term
“Indian tribe” would have been much clearer and consistent with the
Supreme Court’s long-standing requirement that Congress be
explicit in enacting waivers of tribal sovereign immunity.
Thunderbird argues that the overwhelming weight of recent
authority is in agreement and cites a recent decision on this issue
from a bankruptcy court in the Third Circuit with nearly identical
facts. (See D.I. 16 at 9 (citing Subranni v. Navajo Times Publishing
Co., Inc.), 568 B.R. 616 (Bankr. D.N.J. 2016)). Subranni also
involved a claim against a tribe to avoid preferential payments. The
tribe moved to dismiss, arguing that §§ 106(a) and 101(27) were not
sufficiently clear or unequivocal to constitute a waiver. The court
adhered to the basic canons of statutory interpretation by following
the plain language of § 106. “The plain language of [§] 106(a) is
clear and unambiguous. It does not abrogate sovereign immunity for
Indian tribes. If Congress had intended to abrogate sovereign
immunity to Indian tribes under [§] 106, it could easily and
expressly have done so, but it did not.” Id. at 625. The Court agrees
with the reasoning set forth in Whitaker, Greektown and Subranni.
In Whitaker, the Eighth Circuit Bankruptcy Appellate Panel adopted
the bright line rule set forth in In re National Cattle Congress, 247
B.R. 259, 267 (Bankr. N.D. Iowa. 2000). Absent a specific mention
of “Indian tribes” in the Bankruptcy Code, any finding of abrogation
under § 106(a) necessarily relies on inference or implication, both
of which are prohibited by the Supreme Court: Courts have found
abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity in cases where Congress
has included “Indian tribes” in definitions of parties who may be
sued under specific statutes ... Where the language of a jurisdictional
grant is unambiguous as to its application to Indian tribes, no more
is needed to satisfy the Santa Clara requirement than that Congress
unequivocally state its intent ... Where the language of a federal
statute does not include “Indian tribes” in definitions of parties
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subject to suit or does not specifically assert jurisdiction over
“Indian tribes,” courts find the statute insufficient to express an
unequivocal congressional abrogation of tribal sovereign immunity.
The Court finds no error in the Bankruptcy Court’s conclusion that
Congress did not unequivocally express an intent to abrogate
sovereign immunity of Indian tribes in §§ 106(a) and 101(27).
Section 101(27)’s reference to “other ... domestic government[s]”
falls short of the clarity required for abrogation of tribal sovereign
immunity. The Dismissal Order is affirmed.
134.

Cain v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc.

No. CV-12-181, 2018 WL 2272792, (D. Mont. May 17, 2018). The
Ninth Circuit issued its opinion in this matter on July 10, 2017.
United States ex rel. Cain v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc., 862 F.3d
939 (9th Cir. 2017). The Ninth Circuit instructed this Court to
determine on remand whether Defendant Salish Kootenai College,
Inc. (the College) functions as an arm of the Confederated Salish
and Kootenai Tribes (the Tribe) “and therefore shares the Tribe’s
sovereign status” for purpose of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C.
§§ 3729–3733. Cain, 862 F.3d at 943. The Ninth Circuit directed
this Court to determine the College’s status by analyzing the
relationship between the College and the Tribe using the factors
described in White v. University of California, 765 F.3d 1010 (9th
Cir. 2014). Id. At 945. The parties have conducted discovery on the
relationship between the College and the Tribe. The College has
filed a Renewed Motion to Dismiss. The College argues that
Plaintiffs’ claims should be dismissed because the College functions
as an arm of the Tribe. The Tribe has filed an amicus curiae brief.
The Tribe agrees with the College. Plaintiffs oppose the College’s
motion. Plaintiffs argue that the College is not an arm of the Tribe.
The Court conducted a hearing on the College’s Renewed Motion
to Dismiss. Plaintiffs ground their federal claims against the College
in the False Claims Act. The False Claim Act permits suits against
“any person” who defrauds the government by “knowingly
present[ing] ... a false or fraudulent claim for payment or approval.”
31 U.S.C. § 3729(a)(1)(A). The False Claims Act excludes
sovereign entities, including federally recognized tribes, from the
term person. Cain, 862 F.3d at 941. Entities that function as an arm
of a tribe are also excluded from the term person for purposes of the
False Claims Act. Id. White instructs courts to employ a multi-factor
analysis to determine whether an entity enjoys sovereign immunity
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as an arm of the tribe. White, 765 F.3d at 1025. The factors include:
(1) the method of creation of the entity; (2) the purpose of the entity;
(3) the structure, ownership and management of the entity, including
the amount of control the tribe has over the entity; (4) the
sovereign’s intent with respect to the sharing of its sovereign
immunity with the entity; and (5) the financial relationship between
the sovereign and the entity. Id. Application of these factors to the
undisputed facts establishes that the College functions as an arm of
the Tribe. All five White factors support a conclusion that the
College functions as an arm of the Tribe. The College shares in the
Tribe’s sovereign immunity given its status as an arm of the Tribe.
The College is not subject to suit under the False Claims Act.
Accordingly, the College’s Renewed Motion to Dismiss is granted.
135.

Caddo Nation of Oklahoma v. Wichita and
Affiliated Tribes

No. 16-0559, 2018 WL 3354882 (W.D. Okla. Jul. 9, 2018). Plaintiff
Caddo Nation of Oklahoma filed this suit seeking to prevent the
construction of the Wichita Tribal History Center (the “History
Center”) by defendant Wichita and Affiliated Tribes (“Wichita
Tribe”). The Caddo Nation sought a declaration that defendants had
violated the National Historical Preservation Act (“NHPA”) and the
National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) and also sought
injunctive relief barring construction of the Center. Plaintiff sought
a temporary restraining order halting the construction efforts, which
the court granted. The court later vacated the TRO and denied
plaintiff’s motion for a preliminary injunction. Plaintiff filed an
interlocutory appeal from that decision but did not seek an
injunction to stay the decision during the appeal. While the appeal
was pending, the Wichita Tribe resumed construction of the History
Center and the center was eventually completed. Due to that fact,
the Court of Appeals concluded the relief sought by plaintiff was
moot and dismissed the appeal. The case was remanded for further
proceedings here. Caddo Nation of Oklahoma v. Wichita and
Affiliated Tribes, 877 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. 2017). Where the
recipient tribe assumes the pertinent regulatory responsibilities, it
must “specify that the certifying officer (i) consents to assume the
status of a responsible Federal official under [NEPA or NHPA] ...
and (ii) is authorized and consents on behalf of the recipient of
assistance ... to accept the jurisdiction of the Federal courts for the
purpose of enforcement of his responsibilities as such an official.”
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Id. at § 5304(g)(3)(D). It is undisputed that the Wichita Tribe
assumed the responsibilities at issue and that defendant Parton, on
behalf of the Wichita and Affiliated Tribes, requested the release of
funds and consented to federal court jurisdiction with respect to the
History Center project. Having invoked the congressionally
authorized procedure for assumption of NEPA/NHPA regulatory
determinations, the Wichita Tribe is bound by the legal
consequences, including being subject to suit in federal court, that
go with it. Sovereign immunity therefore does not prevent the
court’s consideration of the APA claims based on NEPA and
NHPA. The court concludes otherwise as to the other claims
asserted by plaintiff. The state law claims for unjust enrichment and
equitable estoppel, as well as any claims based on the state of legal
title to the property in question, are outside the scope of the
immunity waiver applicable to the NEPA and NHPA claims, and
plaintiffs have not pointed to any other Congressional abrogation of
immunity as to such claims. Absent such action by Congress, suits
based on such claims are barred by sovereign immunity absent a
“clear waiver by the tribe.” Okla. Tax Comm’n v. Citizen Band
Potawatomi Indian Tribe of Okla., 498 U.S. 505, 509 (1991). There
is no suggestion here of such a waiver as to the state law claims.
Further, plaintiff’s submissions provide no basis for concluding that
the actions of the individual defendants were other than within the
scope of their activities and authority as officers of the Wichita
Tribe, and sovereign immunity therefore bars the claims against
them as well. The result is that sovereign immunity bars all of
plaintiff’s claims other than the NEPA/NHPA claims under the APA
referenced above, and the court therefore lacks subject matter
jurisdiction over them.
136.

Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.

Nos. 2018-1638, 2018-1639, 2018-1640, 2018-1641, 2018-1642,
2018-1643, 896 F.3d 1322, 2018 WL 3484448 (Fed. Cir. Jul. 20,
2018). Mylan Pharmaceuticals, Inc., petitioned for inter partes
review (“IPR”) of various patents owned by Allergan, Inc., relating
to its dry eye treatment Restasis. Teva Pharmaceuticals USA, Inc.,
and Akorn, Inc. (together with Mylan, “Appellees”) joined. While
IPR was pending, Allergan transferred title of the patents to the Saint
Regis Mohawk Tribe, which asserted sovereign immunity. The
Board denied the Tribe’s motion to terminate on the basis of
sovereign immunity and Allergan’s motion to withdraw from the
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proceedings. Allergan and the Tribe appeal, arguing the Board
improperly denied these motions. We affirm. Significant features of
the system confirm that inter partes review is an agency
reconsideration rather than an adjudication of a private dispute and
does not implicate sovereign immunity. Inter partes review brings
to bear the same agency expertise as exists in initial examination.
There is no requirement that a third-party petitioner have any
interest in the outcome of the proceeding, much less Article III
standing. See 35 U.S.C. § 311(a). Upon receiving a petition, the
Director has complete discretion regarding whether to institute
review. § 314; Oil States, 138 S .Ct. at 1371. The inter partes review
procedures limit discovery, typically preclude live testimony in oral
hearings, and do not mirror the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
Ultratec, Inc. v. CaptionCall, LLC, 872 F.3d 1267, 1270 n.2 (Fed.
Cir. 2017). If the third-party settles, the proceeding does not end,
and the USPTO may continue on to a final written decision.
§ 317(a). The USPTO may intervene to defend its decisions on
appeal, whether or not the third party petitioner remains in the case.
§ 143; Cuozzo, 136 S. Ct. at 2144. Inter partes review does not
involve exercise of personal jurisdiction over the patent holder or
adjudication of infringement. The only possible adverse outcome is
the cancelation of erroneously granted claims. Notably, the Supreme
Court has held that “adversarial proceedings” that do not involve the
exercise of personal jurisdiction do not necessarily raise sovereign
immunity concerns. See Tenn. Student Assistance Corp. v. Hood,
541 U.S. 440, 448, 124 S. Ct. 1905, 158 L. Ed. 2d 764 (2004)
(bankruptcy). These features distinguish inter partes review from the
proceeding in FMC and bolster the view that it is, like ex parte and
inter partes reexamination, an executive proceeding that enlists
third-party assistance. Sovereign immunity does not apply.
137.

Williams v. Big Picture Loans, LLC

No. 3:17-cv-461, 2018 WL 3615966 (E.D. Va. Jul. 27, 2018). This
matter is before the Court on Defendants Big Picture Loans and
Ascension Technologies’ Motion To Dismiss For Lack Of Subject
Matter Jurisdiction. Big Picture Loans, LLC (“Big Picture”) and
Ascension Technologies, Inc. (“Ascension”) argue that the Court
lacks subject matter jurisdiction over all claims asserted against
them because they qualify as arms of the Lac Vieux Desert Band of
Lake Superior Chippewa Indians (“the Tribe”) and are thereby
entitled to tribal sovereign immunity. For the reasons set forth
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below, the motion was denied. The Tribe’s Business Ordinance
created comprehensive procedures for the creation, operation, and
dissolution of various tribal entities, including limited liability
companies (“LLCs”). Relevant to this dispute, the Ordinance stated
that a tribally-owned LLC with the Tribe as its sole member would
“be considered a wholly owned and operated instrumentality of the
Tribe and ... have all the privileges and immunities of the Tribe,
including but not limited to the Tribe’s sovereign immunity from
suit, except as explicitly waived by the [LVD] Council.” The
Ordinance further indicated that those LLCs would be subject to the
LVD Court’s jurisdiction, but that such provision would not waive
any claim to sovereign immunity in state or federal court. However,
a closer look reveals that neither Big Picture nor Ascension fulfills
those goals very well, if at all. The inadequacies of Hazen’s general
statements about the Tribe’s use of Big Picture’s revenues are
detailed above. Because the extent to which the Tribe has actually
used Big Picture’s funds for the services noted by Hazen is unclear,
the Court cannot tell whether granting immunity here “directly
protects the ... Tribe’s treasury, which is one of the historic purposes
of sovereign immunity in general.” Allen, 464 F.3d at 1047.
Moreover, even assuming that Big Picture’s lending operation and
Ascension’s support have contributed to the Tribe’s economic selfdevelopment to some extent, those entities’ actions have primarily
enriched non-tribal entities like Eventide and, possibly, individuals
like Martorello. The Bellicose purchase, and the resulting Note and
Loan Agreement, have undoubtedly yielded some benefits for the
Tribe. Yet, by limiting the Tribe’s monthly distribution to a very
small percentage of Big Picture’s revenue, the Note forces the Tribe
to receive those benefits at substantial cost, a reality that is
illustrated by the sharp disparity in distributions received by the
Tribe and Eventide since TED began repaying the loan.
Consequently, as Plaintiffs note, granting immunity here might have
the unintended consequence of preventing the Tribe from obtaining
favorable terms in future business transactions, as non-tribal entities
would not be inclined to offer repayment above a certain rate.
Therefore, although Big Picture and Ascension serve the core
purposes of tribal immunity to some extent, these circumstances
cause this factor to weigh against immunity for both entities. For the
reasons discussed, Big Picture and Ascension have the burden to
prove arm-of-the-tribe immunity by a preponderance of the
evidence. That means the weighing of factors must permit a finding
of immunity. On this record, that balance actually falls the other
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way, and weighing everything on the balance, the Court finds that
neither entity qualifies as an arm of the Tribe. Therefore, Big Picture
and Ascension are not immune from suit here.
K.

Sovereignty, Tribal Inherent

138.

Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks

No. 2:16-CV-366, 2017 WL 3699347 (D. Idaho Aug. 25, 2017).
Before the Court is a motion to dismiss filed by the Hawks. The
Tribe brought this action to domesticate and enforce a default
judgment obtained against the Hawks in Tribal Court. The Tribe is
also pursuing this same relief in Idaho State courts. The Hawks own
real property along the St. Joe River with the Coeur d’Alene
Reservation. They also own a boat garage and pilings within the St.
Joe River. The Tribe claims that the boat garage and pilings are
illegal encroachments and filed an objection in June of 2015 in the
Coeur d’Alene-Spokane River Basin Adjudication (CSRBA). That
litigation, a state water rights adjudication, is proceeding in the
District Court of the Fifth Judicial District of the State of Idaho.
Almost a year after filing that objection, the Tribe filed suit against
the Hawks in Tribal Court for violation of the Tribal Code, claiming
that the Hawks failed to obtain a Tribal permit before constructing
the boat garage and pilings. The Tribal Court issued a default
judgment in the form of a civil penalty of $3,900. It is that judgment
that the Tribe seeks to enforce in this Court. The Hawks responded
by filing a motion to dismiss, arguing that this Court does not have
jurisdiction to grant the Tribe the relief they seek. In the briefing on
this motion, the Tribe concedes it is not relying on diversity
jurisdiction, but argues instead that the Court has jurisdiction under
the federal question provisions of 28 U.S.C. § 1331. In support, the
Tribe cites National Farmers Union Ins. Cos. v. Crow Tribe of
Indians, 471 U.S. 845, 105 S. Ct. 2447 (1985). That case would
provide sound support for this Court’s jurisdiction over a lawsuit
filed by the Hawks claiming that the Tribal Court had no jurisdiction
to enter the judgment for $3,900—that would place the Court
squarely within National Farmers, and the dispute over whether the
Tribal Court had jurisdiction over a non-member of the Tribe would
be a federal question that would satisfy the jurisdictional demands
of § 1331. But here, the Hawks have not challenged the Tribal
Court’s jurisdiction to make the award, and the Tribe has not sought
a declaratory judgment that its courts had jurisdiction over the
Hawks. Instead, the Tribe is simply asking a federal court to
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domesticate and enforce a Tribal Court Judgment. While such a
claim has a basis in Idaho law and can be enforced in Idaho courts
pursuant to Idaho Code § 10-1401 et. seq., the Tribe cites no federal
statute or law that is in dispute and that could be used to create a
federal question. The posture of this case shifts it away from
National Farmers, and places it squarely within Miccosukee Tribe
v. Kraus-Anderson Const. Co., 607 F.3d 1268, 1275 (11th Cir.
2010). There, a Tribe filed suit to enforce a Tribal Court Judgment,
and the non-Tribal member defendant filed a motion to dismiss. The
court granted the motion, distinguishing National Farmers. With no
basis for federal jurisdiction, the Court is compelled to grant the
motion to dismiss.
139.

Quinault Indian Nation v. Pearson for Estate of
Comenout

No. 15-35263, No. 15-35267, 868 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. Aug. 29,
2017). Indian tribe brought action alleging that tribal members
violated Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act
(RICO) by engaging in scheme to defraud it of cigarette taxes. After
one member’s death, his estate asserted counterclaims seeking
declaratory judgment that member had not violated cigarette sales
and tax code, order compelling grant of building and business
permits, and mandamus relief, lost profits, and damages due to
alleged antitrust and price-fixing scheme perpetrated by tribe. The
District Court, No. 3:10-cv-05345, 2015 WL 1311438, granted
tribe’s motion to dismiss counterclaims and to voluntarily dismiss
entire action. Estate appealed. The appellate court held that:
(1) tribe’s filing of suit did not constitute waiver of its sovereign
immunity, and (2) district court did not abuse its discretion in
denying estate leave to amend its answer and counterclaims.
Affirmed.
140.

FMC Corporation v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes

No. 4:14-CV-489, 2017 WL 4322393 (D. Idaho Sep. 28, 2017).
Appeal filed, 9th Cir., Oct. 24, 2017. In several pending motions,
the Tribes and FMC ask the Court to determine whether the Tribes
may enforce a Judgment imposed by the Tribal Appellate Court.
That Judgment imposes an annual permit fee of $1.5 million. For
over 50 years, FMC operated a phosphorus production plant on
1,450 acres of property FMC owned in fee in Pocatello, Idaho, lying
mostly within the Shoshone-Bannock Fort Hall Reservation. FMC’s
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operations produced 22 million tons of waste products stored on the
Reservation in 23 ponds. This waste is radioactive, carcinogenic,
and poisonous. It will persist for decades, generations even, and is
so toxic that there is no safe method to move it off-site. The waste’s
extreme hazards led the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) to
declare the site a CERCLA Superfund clean-up site and to charge
FMC with violating the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act
(RCRA). The EPA designed and implemented a program to contain
the waste. To avoid litigation over the RCRA charges, FMC
negotiated with the EPA over a Consent Decree. As a condition of
agreeing to that Consent Decree, the EPA insisted that FMC obtain
Tribal permits for work FMC would do under the Consent Decree
on the Reservation. The Tribes, however, were demanding $100
million for those permits, although they would drop the fee to $1.5
million a year if FMC consented to Tribal jurisdiction. To get the
lower permit fee, and to satisfy the EPA’s condition that they obtain
Tribal permits, FMC consented to Tribal jurisdiction. FMC
challenged those permit fees in Tribal Courts by producing evidence
that the stored waste had caused no harm and the EPA’s containment
program foreclosed any need to impose substantial fees. The Tribes
produced evidence that the waste was severely toxic, would remain
so for generations, and could not be moved off-site. After hearing
this evidence, the Tribal Appellate Court issued a Judgment against
FMC requiring them to pay an annual fee of $1.5 million. The
parties brought this action to resolve the issue whether the Tribes
could enforce that Judgment. The Court finds that the Tribes have
jurisdiction over FMC. The source of the jurisdiction is based on
FMC’s consent, discussed above, and the catastrophic threat FMC’s
waste poses to Tribal governance, cultural traditions, and health and
welfare. Having identified the source of the Tribes’ jurisdiction over
FMC, the Court turns next to the scope of that jurisdiction. To the
extent that Tribal jurisdiction is based on FMC’s consensual
relationship with the Tribe to pay $1.5 million annually to store
hazardous waste within the Reservation, the Tribes have jurisdiction
to impose the $1.5 million annual fee for as long as the waste is
stored there. The Tribal Appellate Court relied on this ground of
jurisdiction to impose its Judgment, and the Court finds that the
Judgment must be enforced on that ground. Using an agreed-upon
figure is fine when the basis of jurisdiction is a consensual
relationship, but when jurisdiction is based instead on a catastrophic
threat, the amount of the Judgment must bear some relationship to
the Tribes’ need to protect against the threat. Because there is no
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such relationship in this record, the Court cannot enforce the
Judgment on the basis of the catastrophic threat basis for Tribal
jurisdiction. Nevertheless, the Court will enforce the Judgment
because, as discussed above, it was properly entered under the
consensual relationship basis for Tribal jurisdiction. Now therefore
it is hereby ordered that the Tribes’ motion to enforce the Judgment
under Montana’s first exception is granted. It is further ordered, that
the motion to enforce the Judgment under Montana’s second
exception is granted in part and denied in part. It is granted to the
extent it seeks a ruling that the Tribes had jurisdiction over FMC
under Montana’s second exception to impose an annual permit fee
to store hazardous waste within the Reservation but is denied to the
extent it seeks to enforce the Judgment of an annual permit fee of
$1.5 million, for the reasons discussed above.
141.

Mitchell v. Tulalip Tribes of Washington

No. C17-1279, 2017 WL 5010129 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 2, 2017). This
matter comes before the Court on Defendant’s motion to dismiss.
Plaintiffs are three married couples, each of whom own a house on
the Tulalip Indian Reservation in Snohomish County, Washington
(“Homeowners”). Defendant Tulalip Tribes of Washington (“The
Tribes”), is a federally recognized American Indian Tribe.
Homeowners are not members of The Tribes. Homeowners seek
declaratory and injunctive relief against The Tribes in regard to
tribal ordinances that they allege are unlawfully encumbering their
property. Although Homeowners’ property is located on the Tulalip
Reservation, they own title in fee simple. In 1999, The Tribes
recorded a Memorandum of Ordinance that states The Tribes have
land use regulatory authority over all properties located within the
Reservation’s boundaries. This regulatory ordinance appears as a
special exception to coverage on Homeowners’ title. In addition, the
Tulalip Tribal Code contains a real estate excise tax provision that
requires payment of 1% of the sale price of any transfer of real
property within the boundaries of the Tulalip Reservation. This
excise tax is also listed as a special exception on Homeowners’ title.
Homeowners allege that the regulatory ordinance and real excise tax
place a cloud on their title and render it unmarketable. Homeowners
ask the Court to: (1) declare The Tribes are without right to regulate
or levy tax on Homeowners’ property; (2) permanently enjoin The
Tribes from excising a tax against Homeowners’ property; and (3)
quiet title to Homeowners’ title free and clear of any encumbrances
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arising from the regulatory ordinance or real estate excise tax. The
Tribes argue that Homeowners’ claims should be dismissed for three
reasons. First, The Tribes assert the Court lacks subject matter
jurisdiction because Homeowners are barred from bringing the
lawsuit under the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity. Second, it
argues that Homeowners’ claims are barred by res judicata because
the Snohomish County Superior Court previously dismissed the
identical claims with prejudice. Third, The Tribes assert that
Homeowners’ claims do not represent an Article III case or
controversy because they are not ripe. The Court finds that
Homeowners’ claims are unripe and therefore does not address the
issues of tribal sovereign immunity and res judicata. The Court will
not issue a declaratory judgment because Homeowners’ complaint
does not demonstrate “that there is a substantial controversy,
between parties having adverse legal interests, of sufficient
immediacy and reality to warrant the issuance of a declaratory
judgment.” United States v. Braren, 338 F.3d 971, 975 (9th Cir.
2003) (internal quotations omitted). The Tribe’s motion to dismiss
is granted. Homeowners’ claims are dismissed without prejudice.
142.

Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Johnson

No. 44478, 162 Idaho 754, 405 P.3d 13 (Idaho Nov. 3, 2017).
Kenneth and Donna Johnson appealed a district court judgment
recognizing a tribal judgment from the Coeur d’Alene Tribal Court
(Tribal Court). The Johnsons owned land within the Coeur d’Alene
Reservation (Reservation) on the banks of the St. Joe River and had
a dock and pilings on the river. The Coeur d’Alene Tribe (Tribe)
initiated an action in Tribal Court to enforce a tribal statute which
required a permit for docks on the St. Joe River within the
Reservation. The Johnsons did not appear and a default judgment
was entered against them. The judgment imposed a civil penalty of
$17,400 and declared that the Tribe was entitled to remove the dock
and pilings. On January 2016, the Tribe filed a petition to have the
Tribal Court judgment recognized in Idaho pursuant to the
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments Act. I.C. sections 10-1301, et
seq. The district court held the Tribal Judgment was valid and
enforceable, entitled to full faith and credit. However, the Idaho
Supreme Court determined the district court was incorrect in
holding the Tribal Judgment was entitled to full faith and credit, and
the civil penalty was not entitled to recognition in Idaho courts.
However, the Idaho Supreme Court held the Tribal Court had
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jurisdiction over the Johnsons and the subject matter of this case; the
Johnsons did not meet their burden of establishing the Tribal Court
did not have jurisdiction, and the Johnsons were afforded due
process in Tribal Court. In this case the judgment comprised two
parts: (1) the civil penalty of $17,400; and (2) the declaration that
the Tribe had the right to remove the offending encroachment. The
civil penalty was not enforceable under principles of comity.
However, the penal law rule does not prevent courts from
recognizing declaratory judgments of foreign courts. Therefore, the
Idaho Supreme Court vacated the district court’s judgment to the
extent that it recognized the Tribal Court’s judgment imposing the
civil penalty of $17,400. The Court affirmed the judgment
recognizing the Tribal Court judgment regarding the Tribe’s right to
remove the dock and pilings. Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and
remanded.
143.

McKesson Corporation v. Hembree

No. 17-CV-323, 2018 WL 340042 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 9, 2018). This
proceeding concerns a lawsuit by the Cherokee Nation against a
number of opioid distributors and pharmacies. However, the
question before the Court is not the merits of the Cherokee Nation’s
lawsuit but rather the boundaries of Tribal Court jurisdiction. The
Attorney General of the Cherokee Nation has filed suit not in state
court but in the Tribal District Court of the Cherokee Nation. Do the
Tribal Courts of the Cherokee Nation have jurisdiction over this
particular action? The Court finds they do not. The Court finds that
Tribal Court jurisdiction over Count I of the Tribal Court Petition is
foreclosed as an unauthorized attempt to privately enforce the
Controlled Substances Act. Further, in light of the Plaintiffs’
nonmember status, the lack of authorization for tribal enforcement
in the CSA or elsewhere, and clearly established authority that the
CSA does not authorize a private right of action, the Court finds that
the lack of Tribal Court jurisdiction over Count I is “so patently
obvious as to defy exhaustion.” Thlopthlocco Tribal Town, 762 F.3d
at 1239. Accordingly, Plaintiffs are not required to exhaust their
arguments in Tribal Court with respect to the CNUDPA claims. To
require otherwise “would serve no purpose other than delay.” Id. at
1238. The Tribal Court Petition asserts common-law claims of
nuisance, negligence, unjust enrichment, and civil conspiracy
against all defendants. Plaintiffs contend, first, that tribal
jurisdiction is automatically foreclosed because none of the conduct
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at issue occurred within Indian country. It is undisputed that the
Distributors’ and Pharmacies’ facilities are not located on land
owned by or held in trust for the Cherokee Nation. However,
because Montana governs jurisdiction over nonmembers even
within Indian country, the Court will determine first whether there
is a colorable claim of jurisdiction under either the first or second
Montana exception. The Court finds that Plaintiffs have shown that
the lack of Tribal Court jurisdiction is sufficiently clear, such that
further proceedings in the Tribal Court Action would serve no
purpose other than delay. First, the Tribal Court’s jurisdiction is
presumptively invalid under Montana because the Distributors and
Pharmacies are nonmembers of the Cherokee Nation. Second, it is
clear that the conduct alleged in the Tribal Court Action falls well
outside the Cherokee Nation’s inherent sovereign authority to
regulate conduct under the first Montana exception. Third, the Court
does not find a colorable argument that the Tribal Court Action fits
within the narrow second Montana exception. The clear lack of
jurisdiction is sufficient to excuse Plaintiffs from the exhaustion
requirement. Accordingly, the Court finds that Plaintiffs are
substantially likely to show that the Tribal Court lacks jurisdiction
in the Tribal Court Action and that exhaustion should not be
required.
144.

Kodiak Oil & Gas (USA) Inc. v. Burr

No. 4:14–cv–085, No. 4:14–cv–087, 303 F.Supp.3d 964, 2018 WL
1440602 (D.N.D. Mar. 22, 2018). Before the Court are three
separate motions for preliminary injunctive relief filed by Kodiak
Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., now known as Whiting Resources
Corporation, HRC Operating, LLC, and EOG Resources, Inc. Also
before the Court are several motions to dismiss the complaints of
Kodiak Oil, HRC Operating, and EOG Resources (“Plaintiffs”). On
July 29, 2014, Kodiak Oil & Gas (USA), Inc., now known as
Whiting Resources Corporation (“Kodiak Oil”), filed a complaint
against Defendants Jolene Burr, Ted Lone Fight, Georgianna Danks,
Edward S. Danks, and Judge Diane Johnson, in her capacity as the
Chief Judge of the Fort Berthold District Court, seeking a
declaration that the Fort Berthold Tribal Court (“Tribal Court”)
lacks jurisdiction over a suit filed by Defendants Jolene Burr, Ted
Lone Fight, as well as Georgianna Danks and Edward S. Danks in
Tribal Court against Kodiak Oil and others. In the underlying Tribal
Court action, the Tribal Court Plaintiffs seek to recover royalties
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pursuant to an Oil & Gas Mining Lease for Kodiak and others’
improper flaring of natural gas associated with oil wells. On May 4,
2015, the Magistrate Judge ordered the federal court action brought
by Kodiak Oil stayed upon agreement of the parties, “pending
further action by the tribal court.” EOG Resources, Inc. (“EOG
Resources”) also filed a complaint in this Court. As a named
defendant in the same tribal court action brought against Kodiak Oil,
EOG Resources similarly seeks a declaration the Tribal Court lacks
jurisdiction over the suit filed by the Tribal Court Plaintiffs in Tribal
Court. On May 1, 2015, EOG Resources requested a stay of the
federal court action due to its pending motion to dismiss for lack of
jurisdiction in the tribal court matter. Consequently, this Court
ordered the federal action stayed “pending a ruling from the Three
Affiliated Tribes District Court and a possible appeal from the tribal
court decision.” While both federal court actions were stayed, the
matter proceeded in the Tribal Court, with Kodiak Oil and others
filing motions to dismiss the tribal court action for lack of
jurisdiction. On May 12, 2016, the Tribal Court issued a
“Memorandum Opinion” in which the Tribal Court denied the
motions to dismiss, concluding the Tribal Court has jurisdiction over
the “straight-forward contract action.” On appeal, the MHA Nation
Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed in part the order of the
Fort Berthold District Court. The MHA Nation Supreme Court
ultimately determined Kodiak Oil, EOG Resources, HRC Operating
and other defendants are subject to MHA Nation’s “legislative,
executive and judicial jurisdiction” because they operate businesses
and conduct business activities within the Fort Berthold
Reservation. The MHA Nation Supreme Court first decided
“Montana’s rule and exceptions do not apply here, where the
challenged non-Indian Petitioner’s activities were all taken on
Indian allotments held in trust.” Essentially, the MHA Nation
Supreme Court construed Montana v. United States, 450 U.S. 544,
101 S. Ct. 1245, 67 L. Ed. 2d 493 (1981) narrowly to apply to lands
within a reservation not owned by the Tribe or its members.
However, the MHA Nation Supreme Court continued, and
determined if Montana applies, the Tribal Court has jurisdiction
over the matter based upon the ‘consensual relationship’ exception
to the Montana rule, evinced “by the oil and gas leases executed by
and between oil and gas companies and the individual Indian
allottees.” The MHA Nation Supreme Court also concluded the
federal regulatory scheme of oil and gas leases for allotted lands
does not preclude the Fort Berthold District Court from exercising
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its jurisdiction over the matter. Nonetheless, the MHA National
Supreme Court ultimately determined “judicial review is premature
at this juncture because [the Tribal Court Plaintiffs] have not
exhausted their administrative remedies.” The Court GRANTS
Kodiak Oil, EOG Resources, and HRC Operating’s motions for
preliminary injunction and ORDERS Defendants Jolene Burr, Ted
Lone Fight, Georgianna Danks and Edward S. Danks enjoined from
further prosecuting the underlying action in Tribal Court and
Defendants Judge Mary Seaworth, in her capacity as Acting Chief
Judge of the Fort Berthold District Court, and Yvette Falcon, in her
capacity as the Court Clerk/Consultant of the Three Affiliated
Tribes District Court of the Fort Berthold Indian Reservation,
enjoined from exercising jurisdiction over the underlying Tribal
Court action until a final determination of the Plaintiffs’ claims in
federal court. Further, the Court DENIES the Tribal Court
Defendants’ motions to dismiss.
145.

Free v. Dellinger

No. 18-cv-181, 2018 WL 3580769 (N.D. Okla. Jul 25, 2018). Now
before the Court are the following motions: Plaintiff’s Motion for
Preliminary Injunction and Brief in Support and Defendant
Dellinger’s Motion to Dismiss Plaintiff’s Complaint for Failure to
Exhaust Tribal Remedies. This case arises out of an ongoing dispute
about gaming activities on land over which the Muscogee Creek
Nation (MCN) claims to have exclusive jurisdiction. The land in
question is located in Broken Arrow, Oklahoma and is known as the
Bruner Parcel, and the MCN claims that Bruner Parcel is within the
historical boundaries of the MCN Reservation. Bruner is a citizen of
the MCN, but he was apparently a member of the Kialegee Tribal
Town as well. On August 16, 2017, the MCN filed a civil action in
the District Court of the MCN seeking a declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief preventing defendants Bruner, The Kialegee Tribal
Town, Jeremiah Hobia, Red Creek Holdings, LLC, and Luis
Figueredo from taking any action in furtherance of gaming activity
on the Bruner Parcel. The Kialegee Tribal Town was allegedly
claiming that it had shared jurisdiction over the Bruner Parcel and it
had issued a gaming license to Bruner. The MCN argues that it has
sole jurisdiction over the Bruner Parcel, and it is seeking to prevent
illegal gaming activity on its lands. The Court finds that this case
should be dismissed, because plaintiff did not exhaust her tribal
court remedies before filing suit in federal court to challenge the

165

jurisdiction of the MCN courts. Plaintiff has not met her burden to
show that any of the exceptions to the exhaustion requirement are
present, and it would be preferable to allow the tribal court to
consider plaintiff’s arguments concerning the existence of tribal
jurisdiction in the first instance. The tribal court action was also in
its early stages and the Court finds that there is not a sufficient
factual record to consider whether plaintiff is subject to the
jurisdiction of the MCN courts.
146.

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v.
Yamassee Tribal Nation, et al.

No. 1:17-cv-00759, 2018 WL 3629940 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 30, 2018).
On March 29, 2018, JPMorgan Chase Bank, N.A. (“Plaintiff” or
“Chase”) filed a motion for entry of default judgment, seeking
declaratory and permanent injunctive relief against Peter P.
Khamsanvong, Yamassee Tribal Nation, and Supreme Court of the
Yamassee Native American Association of Nations (“Yamassee
Supreme Court”) (collectively, “Defendants”). Defendants have not
opposed the motion. Upon review of the declarations, pleadings, and
exhibits to the present motion, the Court recommends granting the
motion for default judgment and awarding declaratory relief. On
June 2, 2017, Plaintiff commenced this declaratory judgment action.
Plaintiff alleges that on or about August 13, 2013, Defendant
Khamsanvong obtained a residential loan in the amount of
$108,989.00 (the “Loan”), secured by a deed of trust, encumbering
the real property known as 1906 West Aurora Avenue, Porterville,
California 93257 (the “Property”). Carrington started non-judicial
foreclosure proceedings on the property, and, on September 30,
2016, caused a notice of default to be recorded against title to the
property. On December 13, 2016, the Yamassee Supreme Court
issued an “Order to Show Cause/Default Judgment/Writ of
Restituion [sic] In The Event Defendants Fail To Respond Within
21 Days Of Receipt Of This Order,” naming Chase and Jamie
Dimon, Chase’s Chief Executive Officer, as defendants. The
purported order to show cause alleges that Defendant Khamsanvong
is “an enrolled tribal member of the Yamassee tribal nation” and that
the Property, which was owned by Defendant Khamsanvong, is in
“Indian country,” and seeks remedies against the named defendants
including “an accounting, restitution or payment of proceeds from
an alleged ‘securitization’ of the mortgage note and damages in the
amount of $25 million dollars.” On January 13, 2017, Plaintiff,
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through a special appearance, responded to the Order Show Cause
objecting to the Yamassee Tribal Nation and the Yamassee Supreme
Court’s purported jurisdiction over Plaintiff and Mr. Dimon.
Plaintiff never received a response to its objection. Plaintiff seeks a
judicial declaration that the Yamassee Tribal Nation or the
Yamassee Supreme Court lacks any personal or subject matter
jurisdiction over Plaintiff or its executives, employees and agents,
including Mr. Dimon, and cannot award damages or any legal or
equitable relief, in any manner or any amount, to Defendant
Khamsanvong. Here, a review of the most recent List, 83 Fed. Reg.
4235-02, reveals no Indian tribe by the name of “Yamassee.”
Furthermore, several courts have found that the Yamassee are “not
recognized as a separate sovereign nation” as they “do not have a
treaty with the United States, are not recognized by the Bureau of
Indians, and are not listed as a recognized Indian tribe in IRS
Revenue Procedure 2002-64.” The Yamassee Tribal Nation,
therefore, is not a federally recognized Indian tribe entitled to the
immunities and privileges available to other federally recognized
Indian tribes, including adjudicative authority pursuant to the
exercise of inherent sovereign authority. Thus, the Yamassee Tribal
Nation has no adjudicative jurisdiction and any judgment issued by
the Yamassee Supreme Court is necessarily null and void.
147. Rabang, et al., v. Kelly, Jr., et al.
No. C17-0088, 2018 WL 3630295 (W.D. Wash. Jul. 31, 2018). This
matter comes before the Court on Plaintiffs’ response to the Court’s
order to show cause and Defendants’ responses. Having thoroughly
considered the parties’ briefing and the relevant record, the Court
finds oral argument unnecessary and hereby dismisses Plaintiffs’
complaint without prejudice and without leave to amend for the
reasons explained herein. This case arises out of the disenrollment
of hundreds of members of the Nooksack Indian Tribe and
subsequent Department of the Interior (“DOI”) and Bureau of Indian
Affairs (“BIA”) decisions regarding the federal government’s
recognition of the Nooksack Tribal Council. Plaintiffs in this matter
are “purportedly disenrolled” members of the Nooksack Indian
Tribe. Defendants are current and former members of the Nooksack
Indian Tribal Council and other figures within the tribal
government. Plaintiffs bring suit against Defendants for alleged
violations of the federal Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1964 (“RICO”). Plaintiffs allege that
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Defendants abused their positions within the tribal government to
carry out a scheme to defraud them of money, property, and benefits
“by depriving [them] of their tribal membership.” The Court
previously stated that “if the DOI and BIA recognize tribal
leadership after new elections, this Court will no longer have
jurisdiction and the issues will be resolved internally.” These
circumstances have come to pass. The DOI recognized the
Nooksack Tribal Council as the Tribe’s governing body, following
the agency’s validation of the December 2017 special election. The
Court’s original basis for exercising jurisdiction under an exception
to the tribal exhaustion rule no longer exists. The Court concludes
that it lacks subject matter jurisdiction over Plaintiffs’ claims. In
general, Indian tribes possess inherent and exclusive power over
matters of internal tribal governance. See Nero v. Cherokee Nation,
892 F.2d 1457, 1463 (10th Cir. 1989); Goodface v. Grassrope, 708
F.2d 335, 339 (8th Cir. 1983). The determination of tribal
membership has long been recognized as a matter of internal tribal
governance to be determined by tribal authorities. The Court
dismisses Plaintiffs’ complaint without prejudice and without leave
to amend.
148.

Stephen Mccoy v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc.

No. 17-88, 2018 WL 3824147 (D. Mont. Aug. 10, 2018). Before the
Court is Salish Kootenai College, Inc’s (the “College”) Motion to
Dismiss. Plaintiff Stephen McCoy (“McCoy”) opposes the Motion.
Amici Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes and the American
Indian Higher Education Consortium have joined in support of the
Motion. McCoy filed his Complaint asserting two claims: a sexbased discrimination claim under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., and a sex-based discrimination
claim under the Montana Human Rights Act, Mont. Code Ann.
§ 49–2–101 et seq. McCoy asserts this Court has jurisdiction
because Title VII presents a federal question. The College moved
the Court to enter a scheduling order for jurisdictional discovery
because the Court lacks jurisdiction if the College is an arm of the
Confederated Salish and Kootenai Tribes (the “Tribes”). The Court
granted the unopposed motion, and the parties have now engaged in
jurisdictional discovery. During the pendency of this case, the Ninth
Circuit issued an opinion similar to this matter on July 10, 2017, in
United States ex rel. Cain v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc., 862 F.3d
939 (9th Cir. 2017). The Ninth Circuit instructed the district court to
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determine on remand whether Defendant Salish Kootenai College,
Inc. functions as an arm of the Confederated Salish and Kootenai
Tribes “and therefore shares the Tribe’s sovereign status” for
purpose of the False Claims Act, 31 U.S.C. §§ 3729-3733. Cain, 862
F.3d at 943. The Ninth Circuit directed the district court to determine
the College’s status by analyzing the relationship between the
College and the Tribe using the factors described in White v.
University of California, 765 F.3d 1010 (9th Cir. 2014).
Subsequently, on May 17, 2018, United States District Court Judge
Morris entered a Memorandum and Order granting the College’s
Motion to Dismiss in accordance with the White factors. Fawn Cain,
Tanya Archer, and Sandi Ovitt v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc. et
al., Case No. CV-12-181-B-BMM, Doc. 108 (May 17, 2018). The
Court finds that all five White factors support that the College
functions as an arm of the Tribe. Consequently, the College shares
in the Tribe’s sovereign immunity given its status as an arm of the
Tribe. The College is not subject to suit under the Title VII and the
College shares in the Tribe’s sovereign immunity. Therefore, the
Court lacks subject matter jurisdiction over the claims asserted
against the College and tribal court has exclusive jurisdiction over
the state law claim. Accordingly, it is ordered the College’s Motion
to Dismiss is granted. McCoy’s claims against the College are
dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
149.

Drabik v. Thomas

No. AC 38997, __ A.3d __, 2018 WL 3829155 (Conn. Ct. App.
Aug. 14, 2018). The plaintiff, John Drabik, appeals from the
judgment of the trial court dismissing his petition for a bill of
discovery against the defendants, Elaine Thomas, a deputy tribal
historic preservation officer for The Mohegan Tribe of Indians of
Connecticut (tribe), James Quinn, the tribal historic preservation
officer for the tribe, and the Tribal Council, the governing body of
the tribe, on the ground of tribal sovereign immunity. Specifically,
the plaintiff claims that the trial court improperly (1) decided that
the petition should be dismissed on the ground that tribal sovereign
immunity applies to petitions for a bill of discovery, and
(2) determined that the defendants are entitled to tribal sovereign
immunity. The plaintiff owns property in East Lyme that is not part
of or adjacent to the reservation of the tribe. AT & T evaluated the
plaintiff's property as a potential location for a new cellular
communications tower. As part of the application process to the
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Connecticut Siting Council, the agency responsible for utility
facilities' locations, AT & T submitted an electronic message with
the proposed site to the Federal Communications Commission,
which notified the tribe of the proposal. The tribe’s response, written
by Thomas, indicated that a site walk conducted on June 10, 2015,
identified “substantial stone groupings” on the property adjacent to
the plaintiff's property. According to the response, the proposed
tower would “impact the view shed” of these “cultural stone
features” and could “possibly cause impact to the overall integrity
of the landscape.” The response concluded that, in the opinion of the
Mohegan Tribal Historic Preservation Office, the proposed tower
would cause an adverse effect to “properties of traditional religious
and cultural significance to the [tribe].” After receiving this response
from the tribe, AT & T stopped considering the plaintiff's property
as a potential site for the tower. On multiple occasions, the plaintiff
made requests for clarification from Thomas and Quinn about the
stone groupings, seeking more information about their location,
substance, and historical and cultural significance, but no
representative of the tribe responded to any of his repeated requests.
The plaintiff filed a petition for a bill of discovery, alleging that he
may have a cause of action of intentional interference with a
business relationship against the defendants. The defendants filed a
motion to dismiss, citing the doctrine of tribal sovereign immunity.
The trial court granted the defendants' motion to dismiss the bill of
discovery. The plaintiff then filed the present appeal, claiming that
the court improperly found that sovereign immunity applied to bar
a bill of discovery. The plaintiff acknowledges that “the [tribe] and
its officers enjoy tribal sovereign immunity that protects them from
most lawsuits in Connecticut Superior Court,” but he insists,
nonetheless, that tribal sovereign immunity does not bar a bill of
discovery, as a bill of discovery seeks equitable relief and is distinct
from the filing of a lawsuit. There are no allegations in the bill of
discovery that Thomas or Quinn conducted the site walk, identified
the stone groupings, failed to respond to the plaintiff's requests while
acting outside of their official capacity, or otherwise exceeded the
authority given to them by the tribe. As such, the facts as alleged do
not support the plaintiff's claim that Thomas and Quinn were named
as defendants in their individual capacities or otherwise exceeded
the scope of their authority. Thus, the court correctly concluded that
the defendants were protected by sovereign immunity and,
therefore, properly granted the defendants' motion to dismiss. The
judgment is affirmed.
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L.
150.

Tax

Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Gerlach

No. 14–4171, 269 F. Supp. 3d 910 (D.S.D. Sep. 15, 2017). Appeal
Filed 8th Cir., Feb. 6, 2018. Indian tribe brought action, alleging that
state was not entitled to collect use tax on non-gaming purchases by
individuals that were not tribe members at casino that was subject
of compact pursuant to the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act (IGRA),
and related operations, as well as nearby convenience store. Tribe
and state both moved for summary judgment. The District Court
held that: (1) IGRA preempted state from imposing use tax on
purchases made at casino and related operations that facilitated
gaming activities; (2) IGRA did not preempt state’s imposition of
use tax on purchases at convenience store by nonmembers;
(3) state’s imposition of use tax on nonmembers for purchases at
store was not preempted under White Mountain Apache Tribe v.
Bracker, 100 S. Ct. 2578; (4) state’s imposition of use tax on
purchases at store by nonmembers was not discriminatory;
(5) burden upon tribe to collect and enforce use tax on nonmember
purchases at store was not preempted by federal law, nor did it
infringe upon tribal sovereignty; and (6) State was not entitled to
condition issuance of liquor license to casino and related operations
upon remittance of use tax for nonmember purchases at store.
Motions granted in part and denied in part.
151.

People ex rel. Becerra v. Rose

No. C080546, 16 Cal. App. 5th 317 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 28, 2017).
The People brought action against cigarette seller operating on
Indian land allotments, alleged violations of the tobacco directory
law, California Cigarette Fire Safety and Firefighter Protection Act,
state excise tax laws, and unfair competition law, and seeking
injunctive relief and civil penalties. The Superior Court, No.
176689, entered judgment for the People and imposed total civil
penalty of $765,000 as well as injunctive relief. Seller appealed. The
appellate court held that: (1) California had jurisdiction over
cigarette sales on Indian land allotments, and (2) uncontested
findings of fact supported conclusion all 51,000 sales for which
penalties were imposed occurred after seller was notified sales were
illegal. Affirmed.
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152.

Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Biegalski

No. 16-62775, 2017 WL 4570790, 2017 WL 4570790 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 12, 2017). The Seminole Tribe of Florida has filed suit, seeking
injunctive relief and a declaratory judgment that Florida’s
imposition of a utility tax on the Tribe’s use of electricity on its
reservations or other property is improper. This is the second time
the Tribe has sought relief from Florida’s utility tax. Accordingly,
Defendant Leon Biegalski has filed a motion to dismiss, arguing that
the Tribe’s second suit is foreclosed by claim preclusion. The Tribe,
of course, vigorously opposes the application of claim preclusion to
this suit. After careful analysis, the Court agrees with Biegalski and
finds the Tribe’s instant case should be dismissed. Because the
Court finds the specific allegations presented in this case barred by
claim preclusion, it grants Biegalski’s motion to dismiss. The
Tribe’s complaint is therefore dismissed with prejudice.
153.

Perkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue

Docket No. 28215–14, 62018 WL 1146343, 129 Tax Ct. Rep. Dec.
(RIA) 150.6 (T.C. Mar. 1, 2018). Married taxpayers petitioned for
redetermination of income-tax deficiency arising from disallowance
of exemption for income earned from selling gravel mined from land
of Seneca Nation of Indians, of which wife was enrolled member.
IRS moved for summary judgment. The Tax Court, held that:
(1) General Allotment Act of 1887 did not exempt married
taxpayers’ income from gravel sales; (2) Canandaigua Treaty
between federal government and Seneca Nation did not create
income-tax exemption for individual member of Seneca Nation, at
least insofar as income was not derived from land allotted to such
member; (3) taxpayers were liable for additions to tax for failure to
timely file returns; (4) IRS failed to meet its burden of production
with respect to taxpayers’ liability for accuracy-related penalties;
and (5) in opinion by Lauber and Pugh, JJ., federal government’s
Treaty with the Seneca conferred rights on Seneca Nation of
Indians, not its constituent members, and it covered only taxes
imposed by State of New York. Motion granted in part and denied
in part.

172

154.

Barrett v. California Department of Tax and Fee
Administration

No. B276619, 2018 WL 2252657 (Cal. Ct. App. May 17, 2018).
Selnek operates the Torres–Martinez Travel Center (Travel Center),
which is located on tribal land. The Travel Center sells fuel,
alcoholic beverages, food, and general merchandise to the public. In
May and June 2014, Barrett purchased fuel and an alcoholic
beverage from the Travel Center, his receipts either reflected that no
sales tax had been collected, or did not indicate whether or not a
state sales tax had been collected. Barrett informed the Board of
Selnek’s tax delinquency, but the Board responded “that because of
the difficulty of enforcing sales/use taxes against tribal corporations,
... [the Board] has ... declined to even attempt to apply and enforce
sales/use tax statutes against Selnek.” Barrett asserts that the failure
to collect sales and use taxes from the tribe and Selnek violates
mandatory duties imposed by statute on respondents. Barrett
therefore seeks a writ of mandate compelling respondents to
calculate and collect delinquent taxes and penalties owed by the
tribe, Selnek, and “other similarly situated retailers.” In the present
petition for writ of mandate, appellant James Barrett alleges that
several state agencies and administrators (collectively, respondents)
unlawfully failed to collect state sales and use taxes owed by an
Indian tribe and corporation. The trial court sustained respondents’
demurrer with leave to amend and, when Barrett failed to file an
amended petition, dismissed the petition. Barrett appealed from the
resulting judgment of dismissal. We affirm. As we discuss, a writ of
mandate may issue to compel performance of a ministerial duty, but
may not command the exercise of discretionary powers in a
particular manner. Because Barrett has not alleged either the failure
to perform a ministerial duty or the unreasonable or arbitrary
exercise of discretionary power, his petition failed to state a claim
for relief in mandate. (Code Civ. Proc., § 1085.) Accordingly, the
trial court properly sustained respondents’ demurrer and entered
judgment for respondents.
155.

United States v. Jim

No. 16-17109, 891 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. Jun. 4, 2018). Government
brought action against Indian tribe member seeking to reduce
income tax assessments on gaming revenue distributions to
judgment. Tribe intervened as a defendant. The District Court,
No. 1:14–cv–22441, 2016 WL 7539132, granted in part
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government’s motion for summary judgment on affirmative defense
that distributions were exempt from taxation under Tribal General
Welfare Exclusion Act, following bench trial, 2016 WL 6995455,
issued findings of fact and conclusions of law and entered judgment
against defendants, and denied tribe’s motion to alter or amend
judgment. Defendants appealed. The Court of Appeals held that: (1)
Indian general welfare benefits exemption did not apply to
distributions; (2) distributions did not derive from tribal land, and,
thus, were not exempt from federal taxation on such basis;
(3) District Court did not abuse its discretion in denying tribe’s
motion to amend judgment entered against it. Affirmed. In this
appeal, the member and the tribe contend that the District Court
erred in concluding that the exemption for Indian general welfare
benefits did not apply to the distributions. The tribe alone asserts
that the District Court erroneously upheld tax penalties against the
member and incorrectly attributed to the member the distributions
of her husband and daughters. Lastly, the tribe argues that the
District Court erred by entering judgment against it as an intervenor.
We affirm the ruling of the District Court in each of these matters.
The distribution payments cannot qualify as Indian general welfare
benefits under GWEA because Congress specifically subjected such
distributions to federal taxation in IGRA. The member has waived
any arguments as to penalties or the amount assessed against her,
and the tribe lacks a legal interest in those issues. The District Court
did not err in entering judgment against the tribe because the tribe
intervened as of right and the Government sought to establish its
obligation to withhold taxes on the distributions.
156.

White v. Schneiderman

No. 59, 31 N.Y.3d 543, 2018 WL 2724989 2018 N.Y. Slip Op.
04028 (N.Y. Cir. Jun. 7, 2018). Tribal retailer and its owner brought
action against state Attorney General and state tax commissioner,
seeking declaration that requirement that they pre-pay amount of tax
to be assessed on sale of cigarettes to non–Indians violated Indian
Law and treaties between Seneca Nation and United States, and
sought preliminary injunction enjoining enforcement of Tax Law.
The Supreme Court granted defendants’ cross motion to dismiss,
and plaintiffs appealed. The Supreme Court, Appellate Division,
140 A.D.3d 1636, 33 N.Y.S. 3d 614, affirmed as modified,
reinstating complaint for declaratory relief but concluding plaintiffs
were not entitled to such relief. Plaintiffs were granted leave to
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appeal. The Court of Appeals, Garcia, J., held that prepayment
scheme did not constitute a tax, and thus did not violate federal law,
and since prepayment scheme was not a tax, it did not violate
Buffalo Creek Treaty of 1842, or state statute derived therefrom.
Affirmed.
157.

Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Sattgast

No. 4:17-CV-04055-KES, 325 F.Supp.3d 995, 2018 WL 3432047,
D.S.D. Jul. 16, 2018). Plaintiff, Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe, filed
this action against defendants Richard L. Sattgast, Andy Gerlach,
and Dennis Daugaard seeking a judicial declaration that, under
federal law, the State of South Dakota does not have the authority to
impose the State’s excise tax in connection to services performed by
non-Indian contractors in the Tribe’s on-reservation construction
project. Plaintiff and defendants move for summary judgment. The
Department of Revenue denied requests by the Tribe and its
construction manager for an exemption for the casino construction
project. As a result, Henry Carlson has paid contractor’s excise tax
under protest consistent with SDCL § 10-27-2. Henry Carlson’s
protest letters requested that the state issue refunds to the Tribe as
the entity who paid the cost of taxes. The Tribe seeks to have a
judicial declaration that the State does not “have the authority to
impose the State’s contractor’s excise tax” and seeks a refund of the
“contractor’s excise tax paid, or to be paid, under protest.”
Currently, the Tribe estimates that the contractor’s excise tax on the
project will be approximately $480,000. Here, similar to Ramah and
Bracker, Congress created a comprehensive and pervasive
regulatory scheme with the explicit intent of providing tribal
governments with revenue and the ability to be self-sufficient. IGRA
not only regulates gaming operations, but it also requires the Tribe
to adopt a tribal resolution for the construction and maintenance of
the gaming facility that is subject to approval by the Chairman of
NIGC. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(2)(E). And unlike Yee, the Tribe did not
engage in tax manipulation and the Tribe is a party to the transaction
subject to the tax. The State’s excise tax undermines the objective
of IGRA because the tax is passed from the contractor to the Tribe
which interferes with the Tribe’s ability to make a profit from
gaming activities. Thus, Congress intended for IGRA to completely
regulate Indian gaming and there is no room for the State’s
imposition of an excise tax. In conclusion, the court finds that both
barriers to the State’s exercise of authority are present here. The
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excise tax is pre-empted by federal law by IGRA. Also, the State’s
interests in imposing the excise tax do not outweigh the tribal and
federal interests in promoting self-sufficiency because there is not a
nexus between any services the State provides to the Tribe or the
contractor and the imposition of the excise tax. Either barrier, on its
own, is sufficient to find that state authority inapplicable. Bracker,
448 U.S. at 143, 100 S. Ct. 2578. Thus, the court finds that the
State’s excise tax is inapplicable. Because the court finds in favor of
the Tribe under both prongs of the Bracker analysis, it does not reach
the other theory raised by the Tribe – namely whether the Indian
Trader Statutes pre-empt the State’s ability to impose the
contractor’s excise tax.
158.

United States v. King Mountain Tobacco Company, Inc.

Nos. 14-36055, 16-35607, 899 F.3d 954, 2018 WL 3826230 (9th
Cir. Aug. 13, 2018). In this case of first impression, we consider
whether King Mountain Tobacco Company, Inc. (“King
Mountain”), a tribal manufacturer of tobacco products located on
land held in trust by the United States, is subject to the federal excise
tax on manufactured tobacco products. The district court awarded
the United States almost $58 million for unpaid federal excise taxes,
associated penalties, and interest. In 2006 the late Delbert Wheeler,
Sr., a lifelong-enrolled member of the Yakama Nation in
Washington State, purchased “80 acres of trust property ... from the
Yakama Nation Land Enterprise, the agency of the Yakama Nation
which is charged with overseeing the maintenance of real property
held in trust by the United States for the benefit of the Yakama
Nation and its members.” Wheeler then opened King Mountain
Tobacco Company, which manufactures cigarettes and roll-yourown tobacco in a plant located on this trust land. King Mountain
received a federal tobacco manufacturer’s permit in February 2007.
Today, King Mountain manufactures all of its tobacco products, and
grows some of its own tobacco, on trust lands within the boundaries
of the Yakama Nation. Some of those trust lands—including those
on which King Mountain is located—are allotted to Wheeler, while
others are allotted to other Yakama members. King Mountain
initially obtained all of the tobacco for its products from an entity in
North Carolina. But according to King Mountain, “[t]obacco has
historically grown on the Yakama Nation Reservation.” Over time,
King Mountain increased the proportion of tobacco grown on trust
land and incorporated into its manufactured products. By the end of
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2013, King Mountain’s products were composed “of at least 55
percent tobacco grown exclusively on allotted land held in trust by
the United States for the beneficial use of ... Wheeler.” King
Mountain also manufactures a small amount of “‘traditional use
tobacco’ that is intended for Indian ... ceremonial use” and consists
entirely of trust land-grown tobacco. The federal government
imposes excise taxes on manufactured tobacco products, including
cigars, cigarettes, and roll-your-own tobacco. Administered by the
Treasury Department’s Alcohol and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau
(“TTB”), these excise taxes are assessed on the privilege of
manufacturing tobacco products and determined at the time the
tobacco products are removed from a factory or bonded warehouse.
Although King Mountain initially paid federal excise taxes on its
tobacco products, it began to fall behind in 2009. The Treasury gave
King Mountain statutory notice, under I.R.C. § 5703(d), of the
delinquent taxes and afforded the company an opportunity to show
cause why the taxes should not be assessed. King Mountain did not
challenge the statutory notice. Accordingly, the Treasury delegate
timely made assessments against King Mountain for unpaid excise
taxes, failure-to-pay penalties, failure-to-deposit penalties, and
interest for periods in October, November, and December 2009. In
February 2010, the Treasury issued King Mountain a Notice and
Demand for Payment pursuant to I.R.C. § 6303. King Mountain paid
the assessed taxes in installments over a five-month period in 2010,
but it failed to pay the associated penalties and interest. Eventually,
King Mountain ceased paying federal excise taxes altogether. This
case has shuttled between the district court and our court on both
procedural and substantive grounds. In 2012, the United States
brought suit against King Mountain to collect the delinquent taxes.
The district court granted the Government’s motion to dismiss as to
King Mountain and Wheeler on the basis that the claims were barred
by the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a). The district court
then granted summary judgment in favor of the United States on the
merits, reasoning that neither the General Allotment Act nor the
Treaty with the Yakamas precluded the imposition of federal excise
taxes. On appeal, we held that the Yakama Nation’s suit was barred
by the Anti-Injunction Act. We thus vacated the judgment and
remanded with instructions to dismiss the suit for lack of subjectmatter jurisdiction. Back in the district court, the court granted
summary judgment to the Government on King Mountain’s liability
for payment of the excise tax. Observing that the merits issues were
“essentially identical” to those presented in the earlier Yakama case,
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the court expressly incorporated its conclusions of law from the
summary judgment order. The district court reserved ruling on the
amount of liabilities owed by King Mountain, however, in order to
enable King Mountain to obtain additional discovery. After further
discovery, the district court granted summary judgment in favor of
the government on the amount of King Mountain’s liabilities—
$57,914,811.27. However, when the district court entered final
judgment in favor of the government, it accidentally omitted this
amount from its order. The government quickly moved to alter or
amend the judgment pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure
59(e) to reflect that King Mountain owed “to the United States
federal tobacco excise tax liabilities totaling $57,914,811.27 as of
June 11, 2013, plus interest and other statutory additions accruing
after that date until paid in full.” King Mountain filed a timely notice
of appeal, which is now before us. We affirm our longstanding rule
that Indians—like all citizens—are subject to federal taxation unless
expressly exempted by a treaty or congressional statute. In this case,
neither the General Allotment Act nor the Treaty with the Yakamas
expressly exempts King Mountain from the federal excise tax on
manufactured tobacco products. King Mountain is therefore liable
for payment of the tax and associated penalties and interest.
Affirmed.
M.
159.

Trust Breach and Claims

Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town v. United States

No. 17-7003, 899 F.3d 1121, 2018 WL 3829245 (10th Cir. Aug. 13,
2018). Indian tribe brought action against United States, Secretary
and Associate Deputy Secretary of Interior Department, Treasury
Secretary, and another tribe seeking declaratory judgment that
property acquired pursuant to Oklahoma Indian Welfare Act
(OIWA) was purchased for its benefit, and order compelling
government to assign property to it and provide it with accounting
of related trust funds and assets. The District Court, No. 6:06-CV00558 granted government's motion for partial judgment on
pleadings, 2008 WL 11389448, granted other tribe's motion to
dismiss, 2016 WL 93848, and entered summary judgment in
government's favor, 2016 WL 7495806. Tribe appealed. The
appellate court held that: (1) other tribe was necessary party;
(2) other tribe did not waive its tribal immunity; and (3) Interior
Board of Indian Appeals' (IBIA) determination that other tribe was
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legal beneficiary of funds was supported by substantial evidence and
was not arbitrary or capricious. Affirmed.
N.
160.

Miscellaneous

Navajo Nation Human Rights Comm’n v.
San Juan County

No. 2:16-00154, 281 F.Supp.3d 1136, 2017 WL 3972481 (D. Utah
Sep. 7, 2017). Tribal human rights commission and registered voters
who were members of Navajo Nation and residents of county filed
suit against county, county clerk, and county commissioners, in their
official capacities, claiming that county’s voting procedures violated
Equal Protection Clause and Voting Rights Act (VRA), and seeking
injunctive and declaratory relief. Parties cross-moved for summary
judgment. The District Court held that: (1) declaratory claims
regarding prior voting procedures were moot; (2) amendment of
complaint was warranted to add VRA declaratory claims regarding
county’s new voting procedures; (3) equal protection claims
regarding new voting procedures were not sufficiently alleged;
(4) claims for injunctive relief were not moot; (5) summary
judgment was precluded for VRA claims challenging denial of early
in-person voting for Indian voters; (6) summary judgment was
precluded for VRA claims challenging adequacy of language
assistance to Indian voters and methods of publicizing voting
procedures; and (7) summary judgment was precluded on VRA
claims against county commissioner. Motions denied.
161.

Brakebill v. Jaeger

No. 1:16-cv-008, 2018 WL 1612190 (D.N.D. Apr. 3, 2018). In
August 2016, this Court carefully considered the Dataphase factors
and concluded the public interest in protecting the right to vote for
thousands of Native Americans who lacked a qualifying ID and
cannot obtain one, outweighed the purported interests and
arguments of the State. As a result, the North Dakota Secretary of
State was enjoined from enforcing N.D.C.C. § 16.1-05-07 without
any adequate “fail-safe” provisions that had been provided to all
voters in North Dakota prior to 2013. In the past, North Dakota
allowed all citizens who were unable to provide acceptable ID’s to
cast their vote under two types of “fail-safe” provisions which were
repealed in 2013. In response to the preliminary injunction issued
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August 1, 2016, the North Dakota Legislative Assembly amended
and enacted a new election law (House Bill 1369). Plaintiffs’
Motion for a Second Preliminary Injunction is GRANTED in
limited part. Specifically, the North Dakota Secretary of State is
enjoined from enforcing only certain subsections of N.D.C.C.
§ 16.1-01-04: (1) The Secretary of State is enjoined from enforcing
Section 16.1-01-04.1(2)(b) which mandates the need for a “current
residential street address.” The Court is unaware of any other state
that imposes such a requirement to vote. Neither the North Dakota
Constitution nor the National Registration Voting Act imposes such
a strict requirement. Instead, the Secretary of State shall allow a
qualified voter to receive a ballot if they provide a valid form of ID
as recognized in Section 16.1-01-04.1(3)(a) or another form of
identification that includes either a “current residential street
address” or a current mailing address (P.O. Box or other address) in
North Dakota. (2) The Secretary of State is enjoined from enforcing
N.D.C.C. § 16.1-01-04.1(3)(a)(2) which mandates only certain valid
forms of identification. Instead, the Secretary of State shall also
allow and accept as a valid form of identification an official form of
identification issued by a tribal government; the Bureau of Indian
Affairs (BIA), any other tribal agency or entity, or any other
document, letter, writing, enrollment card, or other form of tribal
identification issued by a tribal authority so long as those other
forms of identification, (documents, letters, writings) set forth the
tribal members name, date of birth, and current residential street
address or mailing address.
162.

Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians v. McKesson Corporation

No. 18-cv-286, 2018 WL 2390120 (W.D. Wisc. May 25, 2018).
Plaintiff the Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa
Indians filed this case in state court against defendants,
manufacturers and distributors of opioid medications, alleging
violations of Wisconsin statutory and common law as a result of a
conspiracy to cause national opioid addiction. Defendant McKesson
Corporation removed the case to this court under the federal officer
statute, 28 U.S.C. § 1442(a)(1). It appears that this court is just a pit
stop: McKesson hopes to have the case transferred to the Northern
District of Ohio for multidistrict litigation. See In re Nat’l
Prescription Opiate Litig., MDL No. 2804 (J.P.M.L. filed Sept. 25,
2017). The Judicial Panel on Multidistrict Litigation (JPML) issued
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a conditional transfer order, but the transfer is stayed pending
briefing on Lac Courte Oreilles’s motion to vacate the conditional
transfer order. See MDL No. 2804, Dkt. 1317 (Apr. 27, 2018).
Meanwhile, in this court, Lac Courte Oreilles has filed a motion to
remand the case to the Circuit Court for Sawyer County. McKesson
has moved to stay consideration of the remand motion pending the
MDL transfer. The court will grant McKesson’s motion to stay
litigation.

181

INDEX OF CASES
Ak-Chin Indian Community v. Central Arizona Water
Conservation District,
No. CV-17-00918, 2018 WL 397233 (D. Ariz. Jan. 12, 2018).
.................................................................................................106
Alabama-Quassarte Tribal Town v. United States,
No. 17-7003, 899 F.3d 1121, 2018 WL 3829245 (10th Cir.
Aug. 13, 2018) .........................................................................178
Allen v. United States of America,
No. C17-1279, 2017 WL 5665664 (N.D. Cal. Nov. 27, 2017). 57
Amador County, California v. United States Department of the
Interior,
No. 16-5082, 707 Fed. Appx. 720 (Mem) (D.D.C. Nov. 27,
2017). .......................................................................................114
American Indian Health & Services Corporation v. Kent,
No. C081338, 24 Cal. App. 5th 772, 234 Cal. Rptr. 3d 583 (Cal.
Ct. App. Jun. 19, 2018) ............................................................134
Amerind Risk Management Corporation v. Blackfeet Housing,
No. 16 CV 1093, 2017 WL 4712211 (D.N.M Oct. 17, 2017) .142
Bahe v. Office of Navajo,
No. CV-17-08016, 2017 WL 6618872 (D. Ariz. Dec. 28, 2017)
...................................................................................................58
Baley v. United States,
No. 1–591L; 134 Fed. Cl. 619 (Fed. Cir. Dec. 21, 2017) ........101
Barrett v. California Department of Tax and Fee Administration,
No. B276619, 2018 WL 2252657 (Cal. Ct. App. May 17, 2018)
.................................................................................................173
Battle Mountain Band of Te-Moak Tribe of Western Shoshone
Indians v. United States Bureau of Land Management,
No. 3:16–cv–0268, 2018 WL 1477628 (D. Nev. Mar. 23, 2018).
...................................................................................................92
Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray Reservation,
No. 16-4175, 868 F.3d 1199 (10th Cir. Aug. 25, 2017) ............73
Becker v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah,
No. 2:16–cv–00958, 311 F. Supp. 3d 1284, 2018 WL 2002476
(D. Utah Apr. 30, 2018) .............................................................77
Brakebill v. Jaeger,
No. 1:16-cv-008, 2018 WL 1612190 (D.N.D. Apr. 3, 2018....179
Buchwald Capital Advisors v. Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of
Chippewa Indians,
No. 16-cv-13643, 584 B.R. 706 (E.D. Mich. Jan. 23, 2018). ..146

182

Burt Lake Band of Ottawa and Chippewa Indians v. Zinke,
No. 17–0038, 304 F. Supp. 3d 70, 2018 WL 1542418 (D.D.C.
Mar. 29, 2018) ...........................................................................60
Butte County, California v. Chaudhuri,
No. 16-5240, 887 F.3d 501, 2018 WL 1769130 (D.C. Cir.
Apr. 13, 2018) ............................................................................62
Cachil Dehe Band of Wintun Indians of Colusa Indian
Community v. Zinke,
No. 17-15245, No. 17-15533, 889 F.3d 584 (9th Cir. May 2,
2018) ..........................................................................................62
Caddo Nation of Oklahoma v. Wichita and Affiliated Tribes,
No. 16-0559, 2018 WL 3354882 (W.D. Okla. Jul. 9, 2018) ...153
Caddo Nation of Oklahoma v. Wichita and Affiliated Tribes,
No. 16-6161, 877 F.3d 1171 (10th Cir. Dec. 18, 2017) .............91
Cain v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc.,
No. CV-12-181, 2018 WL 2272792, (D. Mont. May 17, 2018)
.................................................................................................152
California v. Picayune Rancheria of Chukchansi Indians of
California,
No. 16-15096, 725 Fed. Appx. 591 (9th Cir. Jun. 5, 2018) ....118
Carter v. Tahsuda,
No. 17-15839, 2018 WL 3720025 (9th Cir. Aug. 6, 2018) .......71
Cayuga Nation v. Campbell,
No. CA 17–01956, 2018 WL 3567391 (N.Y. App. Div. Jul. 25,
2018). .......................................................................................135
Charles v. Ute Indian Tribe of the Uintah and Ouray
Reservation,
No. 2:17-cv-00321, 2018 WL 611469 (D. Utah Feb. 21, 2018)
.................................................................................................146
Cherokee Nation v. Nash,
No. 13–01313, 267 F. Supp. 3d 86 (D.D.C. Aug. 30, 2017). ....53
Chinook Indian Nation v. Zinke,
No. C17-5668 RBL, 2018 WL 3046430 (W.D. Wash. Jun. 20,
2018) ..........................................................................................63
Chissoe v. Zinke, No. 16-5172, 2018 WL 919917 (10th Cir.
Feb. 16, 2018 .............................................................................60
Citizen Potawatomi Nation v. Oklahoma,
No. 16-6224, 881 F.3d 1226 (10th Cir. Feb. 6, 2018). ............115
Clayvin Herrera v. State of Wyoming,
No. 2016-242, Fourth Judicial District, Sheridan County, State
of Wyoming on appeal from the Fourth Judicial Circuit Court,

183

Sheridan County, Wyoming. Petition for Certiorari Filed, No.
17–532, (U.S. Jan. 8, 2018) .....................................................102
Cobb v. Morris,
No. 2:14-CV-22, 2018 WL 842406 (S.D. Tex. Jan. 11, 2018 .139
Coeur d’Alene Tribe v. Hawks,
No. 2:16-CV-366, 2017 WL 3699347 (D. Idaho Aug. 25, 2017)
.................................................................................................157
Coeur d'Alene Tribe v. Johnson,
No. 44478, 162 Idaho 754 (Idaho Nov. 3, 2017) .....................161
County of Amador v. United States Department of the Interior, et
al,
No. 15-17253, 872 F.3d 1012 (9th Cir. Oct. 6, 2017) ...............55
Coyote Valley Band of Pomo Indians of California v. United
States Department of Transportation,
No. 15-04987, 2018 WL 1569714 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 30, 2018) ..92
Crow Creek Sioux Tribe v. United States,
No. 2017-2340, 900 F.3d 1350, 2018 WL 3945585 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 17, 2018) .........................................................................112
Damon Young, Plaintiff, v. Deputy Warden Smith, et. al.,
No. 6:17-cv-00131, 2018 WL 3447179 (S.D. Georgia Jul. 17,
2018) ........................................................................................139
Darnell v. Merchant,
No. 17-03063, 2017 WL 5889754 (D. Kan. Nov. 29, 2017) ...124
Delebreau v. Danforth,
No. 17-C-1221, 2018 WL 2694527 (E.D. Wisconsin Jun. 5,
2018) ..........................................................................................84
Diego K. v. Department of Health & Social Services, Office of
Children's Services,
No. S-16374, 411 P.3d 622, 2018 WL 1023374 (Alaska Feb. 23,
2018) ..........................................................................................68
Dine Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment v. Bureau of
Indian Affairs,
No. 16-08077, 2017 WL 4277133 (D. Ariz. Sep. 11, 2017) .....85
Diné Citizens Against Ruining Our Environment v. Jewell,
No. 1:15-cv-00209, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2018 WL 1940992
(D.N.M. Apr. 23, 2018) .............................................................94
Douglas Indian Association v. Central Council of Tlingit and
Haida Indian Tribes of Alaska,
No. S-16235, 403 P.3d 1172 (Alaska Sep. 8, 2017) ................141
Drabik v. Thomas,
No. AC 38997, __ A.3d __, 2018 WL 3829155 (Conn. Ct. App.
Aug. 14, 2018) .........................................................................169
184

Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Gerlach,
No. 14–4171, 269 F. Supp. 3d 910 (D.S.D. Sep. 15, 2017). ...171
Flandreau Santee Sioux Tribe v. Sattgast,
No. 4:17-CV-04055-KES, 325 F. Supp. 3d 995, 2018 WL
3432047, D.S.D. Jul. 16, 2018) ...............................................175
Flathead Joint Board of Control v. State,
No. DA 16-0516, 389 Mont. 270 (Mont. Nov. 8, 2017)..........100
FMC Corporation v. Shoshone-Bannock Tribes,
No. 4:14-CV-489, 2017 WL 4322393 (D. Idaho Sep. 28, 2017)
.................................................................................................158
Forest County Potawatomi Community v. United States,
No. 15–105, 270 F. Supp. 3d 174 (D.D.C. Sep. 12, 2017) ........54
Forest County Potawatomi Community v. Zinke,
No. 14–2201, 278 F. Supp. 3d 181, 2017 WL 4402378 (D.D.C.
Sep. 30, 2017) ............................................................................54
Fort Sill Apache Tribe v. National Indian Gaming Commission,
No. 14-958, 317 F. Supp. 3d 504, 2018 WL 2389724 (D.D.C.
May 25, 2018) ..........................................................................117
Free v. Dellinger,
No. 18-cv-181, 2018 WL 3580769 (N.D. Okla. Jul 25, 2018) 165
FSS Development Co., LLC v. Apache Tribe of Oklahoma,
No. 17-661, 2018 WL 2248457 (W.D. Okla. May 16, 2018)....78
Gila River Indian Community v. United States Department of
Veterans Affairs,
No. 17-15629, 899 F.3d 1076, 2018 WL 3863856 (9th Cir.
Aug. 15, 2018) ...........................................................................79
Guidiville Rancheria of California v. United States,
No. 15-15221, No. 15-17069, 704 Fed. Appx. 655 (9th Cir.
Aug. 25, 2017). ..........................................................................74
Harvey v. Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah and Ouray Reservation,
No. 20160362, 416 P.3d 401, 2017 WL 5166885 (Utah Nov. 7,
2017) ........................................................................................144
Havasupai Tribe v. Provencio.
No. 15-15857, 876 F.3d 1242 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2017) .............89
Ho-Chunk, Inc. v. Sessions,
No. 17-5140, 894 F.3d 365 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 3, 2018) ................134
Hoopa Valley Tribe v. National Marine Fisheries Service,
No. 16-cv-04294, 2018 WL 2010980 (N.D. Cal. Apr. 30, 2018)
.................................................................................................108

185

Hopi Tribe v. Arizona Snowbowl Resort Limited Partnership,
No. 16-0521. 418 P. 3d 1032, 2018 WL 771809 (Ariz. Ct. App.
Feb. 8, 2018) ............................................................................138
In Interest of J.J.T.,
No. 08-17-00162, 544 S.W. 3d 874, 2017 WL 6506405 (Tex.
App. Dec. 20, 2017) ...................................................................66
In Interest of S.E.,
No. ED 105382, 527 S.W. 3d 894 (Mo. Ct. App. Sep. 12, 2017)
...................................................................................................65
In re A.F.,
No. D072226, 18 Cal.App.5th 833 (Cal. Ct. App. Nov. 29,
2017). .........................................................................................65
In re C.A., No.
D073229, 24 Cal. App. 5th 511, 2018 WL 2963795 (Cal. Ct.
App. May 23, 2018) ...................................................................71
In re D.F., a Person Coming Under the Juvenile Court Law, Los
Angeles County
Department of Children and Family Services v. Carla M.,
No. B285396, 2018 WL 3599379 (Cal. Ct. App. Jul. 27, 2018)
...................................................................................................72
In re Williams,
No. 155994, 915 N.W. 2d 328, 2018 WL 2294103 (Mich.
May 18, 2018) ............................................................................70
In re: Money Centers of America, Inc., et al., Debtors. Maria
Aprile Sawczuk, as Trustee of the Liquidating Trust of Money
Centers of America, Inc., and Check Holdings, LLC v.
Thunderbird Entertainment Center, Inc.,
No. 17-319, 2018 WL 1535464 (D. Del. Mar. 29, 2018). .......149
Interest of K.S.D.,
No. 20170272, No. 20170273, 904 N.W.2d 479 (N.D. Dec. 7,
2017) ..........................................................................................66
Jamestown S'Klallam Tribe v. McFarland,
No. 2:17–00293, 579 B.R. 853 (E.D. Cal. Sep. 19, 2017).......122
Jane Doe 1 v. The Corporation Of The President Of The Church
Of Jesus Christ Of Latter Day Saints, et al.,
No. 2:17-CV-0300, 2018 WL 3603087 (E.D. Wash. Jul. 6,
2018) ..........................................................................................71
John v. Garcia,
No. C 16-02368, 2018 WL 1569760 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 31, 2018)
.................................................................................................129
Jones v. Parmley,
No. 16-3603, 714 Fed. Appx. 42, 2017 WL 4994468 (2nd Cir.
Nov. 2, 2017) ...........................................................................123
186

JP Morgan Chase Bank, N.A. v. Yamassee Tribal Nation, et al.,
No. 1:17-cv-00759, 2018 WL 3629940 (E.D. Cal. Jul. 30, 2018)
.................................................................................................166
Kiva O. v. State Department of Health & Social Services,
No. S-16605, 408 P.3d 1181 (Alaska Jan. 5, 2018) ...................67
Kodiak Oil & Gas (USA) Inc. v. Burr,
No. 4:14–cv–085, No. 4:14–cv–087, 303 F. Supp. 3d 964, 2018
WL 1440602
(D.N.D. Mar. 22, 2018) ...........................................................163
LaBatte v. United States,
No. 2017-2396, 899 F.3d 1373, 2018 WL 3893124 (Fed. Cir.
Aug. 16, 2018) ...........................................................................81
Lac Courte Oreilles Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v.
McKesson Corporation,
No. 18-cv-286, 2018 WL 2390120 (W.D. Wisc. May 25, 2018)
.................................................................................................180
Lummi Tribe of the Lummi Reservation, Washington v. United
States,
No. 2016-2196, 870 F.3d 1313 (Fed. Cir. Sep. 12, 2017) .........74
Makah Indian Tribe, et al. v. Quileute Indian Tribe, et al.,
No. 15-35824, No. 15-35827, 873 F.3d 1157 (9th Cir. Oct. 23,
2017) ..........................................................................................99
Matter of Adoption of B.B.,
No. 20150434, 417 P. 3d 1, 2017 WL 3821741 (Utah Aug. 31,
2017) ..........................................................................................64
Matter of IW,
No. 115997, 419 P.3d 362, 2017 WL 70488132018 (Okla. Civ.
App. Dec. 29, 2017) ...................................................................67
Matter of L.D.,
No. 17-0419, 915 P.3d 328, 2018 WL 1478565 (Mont. Mar. 27,
2018) ..........................................................................................70
McKesson Corporation v. Hembree,
No. 17-CV-323, 2018 WL 340042 (N.D. Okla. Jan. 9, 2018).162
Mdewakanton Sioux Indians of Minnesota v. Zinke,
No. 16–2323, 264 F. Supp. 3d 116 (D.D.C. Sep. 1, 2017) .......53
Mendoza v. Isleta Resort,
No. A-1-CA-35520, 2018 WL 1725023 (N.M. Ct. App. Apr. 9,
2018). .........................................................................................84
Mitchell v. Tulalip Tribes of Washington,
No. C17-1279, 2017 WL 5010129 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 2, 2017)
.................................................................................................160

187

Modoc Lassen Indian Housing Authority, et al. v. United States
Department of Housing and Urban Development, et al.,
No. 14-1313, No. 14-1331, No. 14-1338, No. 14-1340, No. 141343, No. 14-1407, No. 14-1484, No. 15-1060, 881 F.3d 1181
(10th Cir. Dec. 22, 2017) ...........................................................76
Montella v. Chugachmiut,
No. 3:16–CV–00251, 283 F. Supp. 3d 774, 2017 WL 4238859
(D. Alaska Sep. 25, 2017) ........................................................141
Moody v. United States,
No. 16–10 7C, 135 Fed. Cl. 39 (Fed. Cl. Oct. 13, 2017). ..........56
Munoz v. Barona Band of Mission Indians,
No. 17-cv-2092, 2018 WL 1245257 (S.D. Cal. Mar. 8, 2018).
.................................................................................................148
Murphy v. Royal,
Nos. 07-7068 and 15-7041, 875 F.3d 896 (10th Cir. Nov. 9,
2017 .........................................................................................124
Nakai v. Zinke,
No. 16–cv–1500, 279 F. Supp. 3d 38, 2017 WL 3670023
(D.D.C. Aug. 23, 2017) .............................................................52
National Mining Association v. Zinke,
No. 14-17350, No. 14-17351, No. 14-17352, No. 14-17374, 877
F.3d 845 (9th Cir. Dec. 12, 2017) ..............................................90
National Wildlife Federation, et al. v. State of Oregon, et al,
No. 17-35462, No. 17-35463, No. 17-35465, No. 17-35466,
No. 17-35467, No. 17-35502, No. 18-35111, No. 18-35152, 886
F.3d 803, 2018 WL 1571429 (9th Cir. Apr. 2, 2018) ..............106
Navajo Nation et. al., v. Dalley,
No. 16-2205, 896 F.3d 1196, 2018 WL 3543643 (10th Cir.
Jul. 24, 2018) ...........................................................................119
Navajo Nation Human Rights Commission v. San Juan County,
No. 2:16–cv–00154, 281 F. Supp. 3d 1136, 2017 WL 3972481
(D. Utah Sep. 7, 2017 ..............................................................179
Navajo Nation v. Department of the Interior,
No. 14-16864, 876 F.3d 1144 (9th Cir. Dec. 4, 2017) .............101
Nguyen v. Gustafson,
No. 18-522, 2018 WL 1413463 (D. Minn. Mar. 21, 2018) .......68
Nipmuc Nation v. Zinke,
No. 14–40013, 305 F. Supp. 3d 257, 2018 WL 1570164 (D.
Mass. Mar. 30, 2018) .................................................................61
Nooksack Indian Tribe v. Zinke,
No. C17-0219, 2017 WL 5455519 (W.D. Wash. Nov. 14, 2017)
...................................................................................................56

188

Northern Natural Gas Company v. 80 Acres of Land in Thurston
County,
No. 16-2205, 2018 WL 3586527 (D. Neb. Jul. 26, 2018). ......136
Oglala Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission,
No. 17-1059, 896 F.3d 520 (D.C. Cir. Jul. 20, 2018) ................96
Olson v. North Dakota Department of Transportation,
No. 20170351, 909 N.W. 2d 676, 2018 WL 1722354 (N.D.
Apr. 10, 2018) ..........................................................................131
Oviatt v. Reynolds,
No. 17-4124, 733 Fed. Appx. 929. 2018 WL 2094505 (10th Cir.
May 7, 2018) ............................................................................133
Patchak v. Zinke,
No. 16-498, 138 S. Ct. 807 (U.S. Feb. 27, 2018) ......................51
Pauma v. National Labor Relations Board,
No. 16-70397, No. 16-70756, 888 F.3d 1066 (9th Cir. Apr. 26,
2018) ........................................................................................117
Pawnee Nation of Oklahoma v. Zinke,
No. 16–CV–697, 2017 WL 4079400 (N.D. Okla. Sep. 14, 2017)
...................................................................................................87
People ex rel. Becerra v. Rose,
No. C080546, 16 Cal. App. 5th 317 (Cal. Ct. App. Sep. 28,
2017) ........................................................................................171
Perkins v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,
Docket No. 28215–14, 62018 WL 1146343, 129 Tax Ct. Rep.
Dec. (RIA) 150.6 (T.C. Mar. 1, 2018) .....................................172
Puyallup Tribe of Indians v. Washington State Shorelines
Hearings Board, City of Tacoma,
No. 77748-3-1, 2018 WL 2203442 (Wash. Ct. App. May 14,
2018) ..........................................................................................95
Quinault Indian Nation v. Pearson for Estate of Comenout,
No. 15-35263, No. 15-35267, 868 F.3d 1093 (9th Cir. Aug. 29,
2017 .........................................................................................158
Rabang, et al., v. Kelly, Jr., et al.,
No. C17-0088, 2018 WL 3630295 (W.D. Wash. Jul. 31, 2018)
.................................................................................................167
Rape v. Poarch Band of Creek Indians,
No. 1111250, 250 So. 3d 547, 2017 WL 4325017 (Ala. Sep. 29,
2017) ........................................................................................142
Redding Rancheria v. Hargan,
No. 14–2035, 296 F. Supp. 3d 256, 2017 WL 5157235 (D.D.C.
Nov. 7, 2017) .............................................................................74

189

Rosales v. Dutschke,
No. 2:15–cv–01145, 279 F. Supp. 3d 1084, 2017 WL 3730500
(E.D. Cal. Aug. 30, 2017) ........................................................140
Saint Regis Mohawk Tribe v. Mylan Pharmaceuticals Inc.,
Nos. 2018-1638, 2018-1639, 2018-1640, 2018-1641, 20181642, 2018-1643, 896 F.3d 1322, 2018 WL 3484448 (Fed. Cir.
Jul. 20, 2018) ...........................................................................154
Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Biegalski,
No. 16-62775, 2017 WL 4570790, 2017 WL 4570790 (S.D. Fla.
Oct. 12, 2017) ..........................................................................172
Sharp Image Gaming, Inc. v. Shingle Springs Band of Miwok
Indians,
No. C070512, 15 Cal. App. 5th 391, 223 Cal. Rptr. 3d 362 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2017), reh'g denied (Oct. 16, 2017), review denied
(Dec. 20, 2017) ........................................................................115
Sisseton–Wahpeton Oyate of Lake Traverse Reservation v.
United States Corps of Engineers,
No. 16-4283, 888 F.3d 906 (8th Cir. Apr. 25, 2018) .................94
Skokomish Indian Tribe v. Forsman,
No. 17-35336,738 Fed. Appx.406, 2018 WL 3017052 (9th Cir.
Jun. 18, 2018)...........................................................................109
Stand Up for California! v. United States Department of Interior,
No. 1:17–cv–00058, 315 F. Supp. 3d 289, 2018 WL 2433576
(D.D.C. May 30, 2018) ..............................................................63
Stand Up for California! v. United States Department of Interior,
No. 16-5327, consolidated with 16-5328, 879 F.3d 1177 (D.C.
Cir. Jan. 12, 2018) ......................................................................59
Standing Rock Sioux Tribe v. U.S. Army Corps of Engineers,
No. 16–1534 (and Consolidated Case Nos. 16–1769 and 16–
267), 301 F. Supp. 3d 50,
2018 WL 1385660 (D.D.C. Mar. 19, 2018) ..............................91
State in interest of A.J.B.,
No. 20160954, 414 P.3d 552, 2017 WL 6728511 (Utah Ct. App.
Dec. 29, 2017) ............................................................................67
State in Interest of P.F.,
No. 20160247, 405 P.3d 755 (Utah Ct. App. Aug. 24, 2017) ...64
State Of California, et al., v. Iipay Nation Of Santa Ysabel, et al.,
Case No. 17-55150, 898 F.3d 960, 2018 WL 3650825 (9th Cir.
Aug. 2, 2018) ...........................................................................120
State v. Comenout,
No. 48990–2–II, 2017 WL 6603663 (Wash. Ct. App. Dec. 27,
2017). .......................................................................................125

190

State v. George,
No. 45196, __ P.3d __, 2018 WL 3598926 (Idaho Jul. 27, 2018)
.................................................................................................137
State v. Todd,
No. 20170240, 904 N.W. 2d 40 (Mem) (N.D. Dec. 7, 2017). .125
State v. Zack,
No. 34926-8-III, 413 P.3d 65 (Wash. Ct. App. Mar. 8, 2018).126
Stephen Mccoy v. Salish Kootenai College, Inc.,
No. 17-88, 2018 WL 3824147 (D. Mont. Aug. 10, 2018) .......168
Stockbridge–Munsee Community v. Wisconsin,
No. 17–cv–249, __ F. Supp. 3d __, 2017 WL 4857646 (W.D.
Wis. Oct. 25, 2017) ..................................................................114
Sturgeon v. Frost,
No. 13-36165, 872 F.3d 927 (9th Cir. Oct. 2, 2017). ................99
Swinomish Indian Tribal Community v. BNSF Railway
Company,
No. C15-0543, 2018 WL 1336256 (W.D. Wash. Mar. 15, 2018)
.................................................................................................126
Texas v. Ysleta del Sur Pueblo,
No. EP–17–CV–179, 2018 WL 1474679 (W.D. Tex. Mar. 26,
2018) ........................................................................................116
The Klamath Tribes v. U.S. Bureau of Reclamation, et al.,
No. 18-cv-03078, 2018 WL 3570865 (N.D. Cal. Jul. 25, 2018)
.................................................................................................111
Tortalita v. Geisen,
No. 1:17-CV-684, 2018 WL 3195145 (D.N.M. Apr. 24, 2018)
.................................................................................................132
Toya v. Toledo,
No. 17-0258, 2017 WL 3995554 (D.N.M. Sep. 19, 2017). .....123
United States v. 99, 337 Pieces of Counterfeit Native American
Jewelry,
No. 16-1304, 2018 WL 1568725 (D.N.M. Mar. 27, 2018) .....128
United States v. Board of Directors of Truckee-Carson Irrigation
District,
No. 16–15507, 708 Fed. Appx. 898 (9th Cir. Sep. 13, 2017) ....98
United States v. Jim,
No. 16-17109, 891 F.3d 1242 (11th Cir. Jun. 4, 2018)............173
United States v. King Mountain Tobacco Company, Inc.,
Nos. 14-36055, 16-35607, __ F.3d __, 2018 WL 3826230 (9th
Cir. Aug. 13, 2018) ..................................................................176

191

United States v. Lummi Nation,
No. 15-35661, 876 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. Dec. 1, 2017) .............100
United States v. Osage Wind, LLC,
Nos. 15-5121 and 16-5022, 871 F.3d 1078 (10th Cir. Sep. 18,
2017) ..........................................................................................56
United States v. United States Board of Water Commissioners,
No. 15-16316, No. 15-16317, No. 15-16319, No. 15-16321, No.
15-16323,
No. 15-16489, 893 F.3d 578 (9th Cir. Jun. 22, 2018)..............110
United States v. Walker River Irrigation District,
No. 15-16478, No. 15-16479, 890 F.3d 1161 (9th Cir. May 22,
2018) ........................................................................................109
United States v. Washington,
Case No. C70-9213, Sub-proceeding No. 17-01, 2017 WL
3726774 (W.D. Wash. Aug. 30, 2017) ......................................97
United States v. Washington,
No. 70-9213, Subproceeding 17-02, 2018 WL 1933718 (W.D.
Wash. Apr. 24, 2018) ...............................................................107
Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Lundgren,
No. 17–387, 138 S. Ct. 1649 (May. 21, 2018)...........................52
Upper Skagit Indian Tribe v. Suquamish Indian Tribe,
No. 15-35540, 871 F.3d 844 (9th Cir. Sep. 22, 2017) ...............98
Ute Indian Tribe of Uintah v. Lawrence,
No. 2:16–cv–00579, 312 F. Supp. 3d 1219, 2018 WL 2002477
(D. Utah Apr. 30, 2018) .............................................................77
Ute Indian Tribe v. Lawrence,
No. 16-4154, 875 F.3d 539 (10th Cir. Nov. 7, 2017) ................75
Washington v. U.S.,
No. 17-269, 138 S. Ct. 1832 (Mem), 86 USLW 361, 186 USLW
4400 (U.S. Jun. 11, 2018) ..........................................................52
White v. Schneiderman,
No. 59, 31 N.Y.3d 543__, 2018 WL 2724989 2018 N.Y. Slip
Op. 04028 (N.Y. Cir. Jun. 7, 2018) .........................................174
Wilhite v. Awe Kualawaache Care Center,
No. CV 18-80, 2018 WL 3586539 (D. Mont. Jul. 26, 2018)...137
Wilkes v. PCI Gaming Authority,
No. 1151312, __ So. 3d __, 2017 WL 4385738 (Ala. Sep. 25,
2017) ........................................................................................142
Williams & Cochrane, LLP v. Quechan Tribe of Fort Yuma
Indian Reservation,
No. 3:17-01436, 2018 WL 2734946 (S.C. Cal. Jun. 7, 2018) ...78

192

Williams & Cochrane, LLP v. Quechan Tribe of the Fort Yuma
Indian Reservation,
No. 3:17-01436, 2017 WL 7362744 (S.D. Cal. Nov. 7, 2017). .75
Williams v. Big Picture Loans, LLC,
No. 3:17-cv-461, 2018 WL 3615966 (E.D. Va. Jul. 27, 2018)
.................................................................................................155
Wilmington Savings Fund Society v. Fryberg,
No. C17-1196, 2017 WL 6344185 (W.D. Wash. Dec. 12, 2017)
.................................................................................................145
Wisconsin Department of Natural Resources v. Timber and
Wood Products Located in Sawyer County,
No. 2017AP181, 906 N.W. 2d 707 (Wis. Ct. App. Dec. 19,
2017) ........................................................................................145
Wyoming v. Zinke,
No. 16-8068, No. 16-8069, 871 F.3d 1133 (10th Cir. Sep. 21,
2017) ..........................................................................................89
Yurok Tribe v. Resighini Rancheria,
No. 16-cv-02471, 2018 WL 550233 (N.D. Cal. Jan. 25, 2018)
.................................................................................................106

193

